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Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the
Assault on Judicial Independence
Jerome B. Meites & Steven F. Pflaum*
In 1997, the Illinois House of Representatives conducted its
first impeachment investigation of an Illinois Supreme Court
justice in 145 years. In this Article, the authors discuss the
appropriate standards for impeachment under the Illinois
constitution and the need to ensure that the independence of the
judiciary is not harmed by politically motivated impeachment
proceedings. The authors also examine how the Special House
Investigating Committee ("House Committee") applied those
standards to its investigation of Illinois Supreme Court Justice
James D. Heiple. Finally, they propose reforms to the judicial
disciplinary provisions of the Illinois constitution as a result of
the Heiple experience.
On April 14, 1997, for the first time in 145 years, the Illinois House
of Representatives commenced an impeachment investigation of an
Illinois Supreme Court justice. Illinois House Resolution 89 ("H.R.
89") created a special ten-member committee to investigate charges
against Chief Justice James D. Heiple.' Unlike all other House
committees, there was no partisan majority. The House Committee
was co-chaired by House Majority Leader Barbara Flynn Currie (D. -
Chicago) and Representative Jack Kubik (R. - Riverside), and had five
members from each party.2 On May 15, 1997, the House Committee
voted eight-to-two to recommend to the full House that Justice Heiple
not be impeached.3
* Mr. Meites is a past chair of The Chicago Bar Association's ("CBA")
Constitutional Law Committee. Mr. Pflaum is the CBA's General Counsel. In the
spring of 1997, at the request of the Special Committee of the Illinois House of
Representatives investigating the potential impeachment of Illinois Supreme Court
Justice James D. Heiple, they co-authored a series of reports regarding legal issues
pertaining to the potential impeachment under the Illinois constitution.
1. See H.R. 89, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (I11. 1997). The Illinois House of
Representatives enacted H.R. 89 authorizing the impeachment investigation by a vote
of 113-0. See Rick Pearson & Christi Parsons, House Panel Selected for Heiple Probe:
Action Is First Step Toward Impeachment, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1997, § 1, at 1.
2. See Ill. H.R. 89; Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, Heiple Panel Looks for
Starting Point: House Commission Finds Few Precedents, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1997, §
1, at 1.
3. See infra Appendix (conclusion) (reprinting Heiple Impeachment Report: Text of
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Justice Heiple first came to the attention of most Illinois citizens in
June 1994 when he wrote the court's opinion in In re Doe4 (the "Baby
Richard Case"). In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Illinois Appellate
Court5 decisions approving the adoption of Baby Richard by his
adoptive parents. Because Baby Richard had lived with his adoptive
parents for more than three years, the Illinois Supreme Court's
reversal of the adoption caused a public uproar. Bob Greene, a
columnist for the Chicago Tribune, wrote dozens of highly critical
columns about the Baby Richard Case, many of which focused
directly on Justice Heiple.6
Both before and after the Baby Richard Case, Justice Heiple
purportedly was involved in a series of traffic offenses in which police
officers alleged that Justice Heiple did not immediately stop in
House Committee Report Recommending Heiple Not Be Impeached, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
May 16, 1997) (appearing with the permission of Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, 415 N.
State Street, Chicago, IL 60610). The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin article contains the
text of the Special Investigative Committee of the Ninetieth Gen. Assembly of the State
of Illinois Investigating Supreme Court Justice James D. Heiple, Report of the
Committee, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1997). The entire House Committee Report is
included as an appendix to this Article. See infra Appendix at 807-40.
While the impeachment proceedings were pending, Chief Justice Heiple resigned his
position as Chief Justice, but remained as a justice of the court. Justice Heiple resigned
as chief justice on May 2, 1997, two days after he was censured by the Illinois Courts
Commission in connection with his conduct during four traffic stops from 1992 to
1996. See Dirk Johnson, After Censure, Chief Justice of Illinois Quits, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1997, at 3A. The Courts Commission held that Justice Heiple's misconduct was
particularly damaging to the integrity of the court system. See In re Heiple, No. 97-CC-
1, Order at 8 (Cts. Comm'n of II!. Apr. 30, 1997). The Courts Commission held by a
five-to-zero vote that Justice Heiple had abused his authority by flashing his supreme
court badge to the officers and otherwise trying to use his office to avoid receiving
traffic citations. See id.
4. 159 I11. 2d 347, 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994).
5. See In re Doe, 254 III. App. 3d 405, 627 N.E.2d 648 (1st Dist. 1993), rev'd, 159
Il. 2d 347, 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994).
6. See e.g., Bob Greene, The Sloppiness of Justice Heiple, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1994,
§ 5, at 2 [hereinafter Green, Sloppiness of Heiple] (attacking the quality of the legal
reasoning in Justice Heiple's opinion, including the lack of any case citations and the
declaration that lilt was [the adoptive parents'] decision to prolong this litigation
through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless, appeal," when in fact, all appeals in the
case, up to that time, had been pursued by the biological father, not the adoptive
parents); see also Bob Greene, Supreme Injustice for a Little Boy, CHI. TRIB., June 19,
1994, § 5, at I [hereinafter Green, Supreme Injustice] (criticizing the Illinois Supreme
Court for applying property standards to "protect natural parents in their preemptive
rights to their own children," instead of the "best interests of the child" standard that
Justice Dom Rizzi applied when he upheld the validity of the adoption in the appellate
court). Justice Heiple referred to these newspaper columns in his opinion denying the
adoptive parents' petition for rehearing. See Doe, 159 Ill. 2d at 365-67, 638 N.E.2d at
189.
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response to their flashing lights and attempted to use his position' as a
supreme court justice to avoid receiving traffic citations. 7 These
charges resulted in the commencement by the Judicial Inquiry Board
("JIB") in 1996 of an investigation of Justice Heiple's conduct. The
JIB is the agency charged under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 with
investigating alleged improprieties of judges.8
The Heiple case presents several important issues regarding
impeachment and judicial independence in Illinois. The Illinois
constitution fails to provide any explicit guidance as to what is an
impeachable offense. Illinois lacks experience with impeachment
matters. 9 Thus, this Article will discuss what the appropriate
standards should be for impeachment of Illinois public officials.' The
Article then applies those standards to the work of the House
Committee as set forth in the House Committee Report and its two
dissents. Finally, the Article will recommend certain constitutional
reforms in the wake of the Heiple matter.
The Heiple controversy raises serious questions regarding the
vitality of judicial independence in Illinois. Although all of the
members of the House Committee stressed that they did not consider
the Baby Richard Case when evaluating Justice Heiple's conduct, that
case clearly served as the political catalyst for the impeachment
investigation." This Article will address the concern that the treatment
7. See infra Appendix pt. I.A.
8. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13. The JIB found the officers' charges credible.
Therefore, on January 23, 1997, the JIB issued a complaint against Justice Heiple,
arising out of the traffic stops. See David Bailey, State's Chief Justice Under Fire from
Within and Without: JIB Charges Heiple with Numerous Ethics Violations, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 23, 1997, at I [hereinafter Bailey, Under Fire]. The JIB alleged that Heiple's
efforts to use his position as a supreme court Justice to avoid traffic citations constituted
violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 61, which provides that a judge "should
personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved," and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62 which requires a
judge to "respect and comply with the law and [to] conduct himself or herself at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary." ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 61, 62. On February 13, 1997, Justice Heiple filed a pleading stating that he did
not contest the facts set forth in the JIB complaint. See David Bailey, Won't Contest
Ethics Accusations: Heiple, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 13, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Bailey,
Won't Contest Accusations].
9. The last effort by the Illinois House to remove a judge took place in 1842-43 when
the legislature targeted Illinois Supreme Court Justice Thomas Brown. See Pearson &
Parsons, supra note 1, at 1. For more on the Brown impeachment, see infra note 159.
10. See ILL. CONST., art IV, § 14. See infra Part II for a discussion of the
impeachment standards.
11. In its report, the House Committee majority said, "The Committee is sensitive to
the constitutional imperative that it should not consider the judicial decisions of a judge,
however it may disagree with them, in the determination it makes." lnfra Appendix
1998]
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of Justice Heiple with respect to the Baby Richard Case is not an
aberration. Rather, this situation reflects the burgeoning political
environment, found not only in Illinois, but throughout the United
States, in which politicians and private citizens alike call for the
impeachment of a judge or his or her removal from office merely
because he or she renders unpopular decisions.'
I. THE BABY RICHARD CASE
In order to understand the Heiple impeachment investigation and its
implications for the judicial independence of Illinois judges, it is
necessary to understand the Baby Richard case. The essential facts are
set forth in Justice Heiple's original opinion for the court, rendered on
June 16, 1994.13 In short, the case involved a custody dispute
(conclusion). Likewise, in his dissenting report, Representative Douglas P. Scott (D. -
Rockford) agreed that "[r]egardless of what anyone thinks of [the Baby Richard]
decision, or of any other opinion of the Court, it is clear that such rulings can play no
part in this or similar proceedings." Infra Appendix pt. IV (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
12. Perhaps the most notorious example of judges being punished for unpopular
decisions was the successful campaign by proponents of capital punishment in 1986
against the retention of three California Supreme Court justices, Chief Justice Rose Bird
and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. Those justices had participated
in a series of decisions overturning the imposition of capital punishment. See, e.g.,
People v. Anderson, 694 P.2d 1149 (Cal. 1985); People v. Lanphear, 680 P.2d 1081
(Cal. 1984); People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982); People v. Darrell, 633 P.2d
186 (Cal. 1981); People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468 (Cal. 1980). For a thorough discussion
of this campaign, see John H. Culver and John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of
Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81 (1986), Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention
Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980-81 (1988), and Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention
Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 203643 (1988).
13. See In re Doe, 159 Ill. 2d 347, 349-51, 638 N.E.2d 181, 181-82 (1994). On July
12, 1994, Justice Heiple issued the court's opinion denying the petition for rehearing
filed by the adoptive parents and the guardian ad litem of Baby Richard. See id. at 362,
638 N.E.2d at 187. Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the petition for
writ of habeas corpus filed by the biological father of Baby Richard. See In re Kirchner,
164 Ill. 2d 468, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995) (per curiam). It was the granting of the habeas
corpus petition which ultimately resulted in custody of Baby Richard being transferred
from his adoptive parents to his biological parents shortly after his fourth birthday. See
id. at 478-82, 502, 649 N.E.2d 329-31, 340. The opinion of the court in the habeas
corpus petition was a per curiam opinion. See id. at 470, 649 N.E.2d at 326. Justices
Miller and McMorrow filed dissenting opinions to both the denial of the petition for
rehearing and the habeas corpus petition. See Doe, 159 III. 2d at 370, 638 N.E.2d at 188
(Miller & McMorrow, JJ., dissenting to denial of petition for rehearing); Kirchner, 164
Ill. 2d at 502, 649 N.E.2d at 340 (Miller, J., dissenting to habeas corpus decision);
Kirchner, 164 I11. 2d at 509, 649 N.E.2d at 343 (McMorrow, J., dissenting to habeas
corpus decision).
The purpose of this Article is not to discuss the merits of the Baby Richard Case.
Rather, the discussion of Baby Richard is solely to put into context the events leading
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concerning a child whose natural parents were Daniella Janikova and
Otakar Kirchner. Janikova and Kirchner were not married when the
baby was conceived and born.' 4 During the last month of Janikova's
pregnancy, Kirchner went to his native Czechoslovakia to attend to his
gravely ill grandmother.' 5 During this time, Kirchner's aunt told
Janikova that Kirchner had resumed a romantic relationship with
another woman.' 6 As a result, Janikova moved out of the apartment
she had shared with Kirchner, refused to talk to him upon his return,
and gave birth at a different hospital from where they had originally
planned. 1
Janikova told Kirchner that the child had died shortly after birth. In
reality, Janikova consented to allowing the Does to adopt the child,
Baby Richard.' 8 She told the Does that she knew who the father was
but would not furnish his name.' 9 Fifty-seven days after the child was
up to the impeachment investigation of Justice Heiple.
For a discussion of the substantive issues raised by the Baby Richard Case, see e.g.,
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401
(1995). These authors state:
The sense that social norms and legal rules are divergent is reinforced in the
popular culture by cases such as "Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard," in which
courts have ordered the removal of young children from their adoptive families
and returned them to their biological parents. While public response in both
cases is based perhaps on a distorted view of the legal situation, the reaction
indicates a powerful disquiet with a legal regime that speaks in the language of
parental rights.
Id. at 2473.
An extensive discussion of the substantive adoption issues raised in the Baby Richard
Case and in the equally renowned "Baby Jessica" case, In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239(Iowa 1992), appears in Herma Hill Kay's Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: The UAA,
Not the UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 CAL. L. REV. 703 (1996). Professor Kay uses Baby
Jessica and Baby Richard to argue that the courts in both cases erred by applying the
child custody analysis for children of divorced parents set forth in the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act rather than the adoption analysis of the Uniform Adoption Act.
See Kay, supra, at 706-12.
There is also a significant discussion of the Baby Richard Case as it pertains to the
parental rights of unwed fathers in Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption
and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 60, 96-100 (1995). Finally, the approach of both the Illinois Appellate Court and
the Illinois Supreme Court in the Baby Richard Case to the use of the trial court record
and the facts derived from it is discussed briefly in Stewart G. Pollock, The Art of
Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 594 n.13 (1996). See also Paul V. McCord, In the
Child's Best Interest: The "Baby Richard" Case, 82 ILL. B.J. 578 (1994).
14. See Kirchner, 164 I11. 2d at 471, 649 N.E.2d at 326.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 472, 649 N.E.2d at 326.
19. See id.
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born, Kirchner discovered that his son was alive and had been placed
for adoption. Kirchner then began a court proceeding in the Circuit
Court of Cook County in Chicago, contesting the Does' adoption.
The trial court ruled that Kirchner was an unfit parent under the Illinois
Adoption Act2" because he failed to show a reasonable degree of
interest in the child within the first thirty days of the child's life.
21
Therefore, the trial court found that Kirchner's consent to the adoption
was unnecessary under section eight of the Adoption Act.22 The
Illinois Appellate Court, by a two-to-one vote, affirmed the trial
court's decision, retaining custody of Baby Richard with his adoptive
parents.'
On June 16, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed 24 the
decisions of the trial court and the appellate court.25 In an opinion
written by Justice Heiple, the supreme court held that the evidence
showed that Baby Richard's biological father, Otakar Kirchner, had
done everything possible during the first thirty days of Baby Richard's
life to determine whether his son was alive, where he was, and what
had happened to him. 26 Consequently, the court determined that,
without explicit evidence showing that Otakar Kirchner was unfit to be
a father, he had an absolute right to custody of his biological son.27
The initial decision was a unanimous one, although Justice Mary Ann
McMorrow submitted a lengthy concurrence in which Justices Ben
Miller and Charles Freeman joined.'
The opinion provoked a firestorm of public protest. Chicago
Tribune columnist Bob Greene wrote a barrage of columns regarding
the case.29 Illinois Governor Jim Edgar sought leave from the
20. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/0.01-50/24 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997)
(amended).
21. See In re Doe, 159 II1. 2d 347, 350, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (1994) (reviewing the
trial court's holding); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(/) (West 1996).
22. See Doe, 159 II1. 2d at 350, 638 N.E.2d at 182; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/8(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997). The relevant text of the statute provides: "[e]xcept
as hereinafter provided in this section, consents shall be required in all cases, unless the
person whose consent would otherwise be required shall be found by the court, by clear
and convincing evidence: (1) to be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act
.... 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8(a).
23. See In re Doe, 254 I11. App. 3d 405, 627 N.E.2d 648 (1st Dist. 1993).
24. See Doe, 159 III. 2d at 351, 638 N.E.2d at 183, rev'g 254 I11. App. 3d 405, 627
N.E.2d 648 (1st Dist. 1993).
25. See id. at 351, 638 N.E.2d at 183.
26. See id. at 350, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
27. See id. at 351, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
28. See id. at 352-61, 638 N.E.2d at 183-87.
29. See, e.g., Bob Greene, The Only Person to Think About, CHI. TRIB., July 17,
1994, § 5, at 1 [hereinafter Greene, The Only Person]; Bob Greene, Outraged Edgar to
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supreme court to intervene in connection with the petition for
reconsideration filed by the adoptive parents and Baby Richard's
guardian ad litem.3" The Illinois General Assembly also passed
emergency legislation requiring that a hearing be held to determine the
"best interests of the child" before any child could be returned from
adoptive parents to biological parents in circumstances such as those in
the Baby Richard Case.3'
On July 12, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court, with Justices
McMorrow and Miller dissenting, denied the Does' petition for
rehearing.3 2 Justice Heiple wrote the opinion for the court. In that
opinion, he noted that in Stanley v. Illinois,33 the United States
Supreme Court had held that unmarried fathers cannot be treated
differently than unmarried mothers or married parents when
determining their rights to the custody of their children.34 Justice
Heiple again held that the adoptive parents failed to meet their burden
of proving Otakar Kirchner's unfitness to act as a parent for Baby
Richard.3
In rendering his opinion, Justice Heiple inflamed the situation by
discussing the Bob Greene columns, Governor Edgar's political
motivations in seeking to intervene in the case, and the legislature's
passage of the "best interests of the child" statute.36 Legislators must
have had Justice Heiple's comments in mind when passing H.R. 89,
which authorized the commencement of the impeachment
investigation. Therefore, it is important to look at exactly what Justice
Heiple said:
The best interests of the child standard is not to be
denigrated. It is real. However, it is not triggered until it has
been validly determined that the child is available for adoption.
And, a child is not available for adoption until the rights of his
natural parents have been properly terminated. Any judge,
lawyer, or guardian ad litem who has even the most cursory
Enter 'Richard' Adoption Case, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1994, § 5, at 1; Bob Greene,
Richard's Story Is in the Transcripts, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1994, § 5, at 1; Bob Greene,
Silencing Richard's Voice in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1994, §, at 1; Greene,
Sloppiness of Heiple, supra note 6, at 1; Greene, Supreme Injustice, supra note 6, at 1;
Bob Greene, Will the Justices See New Evidence?, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 1994, § 5, at 1.
30. See Doe, 159 I1. 2d at 367, 638 N.E.2d at 190.
31. See Act of July 3, 1994, Pub. Act No. 88-550, § 20, 1993-1994 I11. Laws. 3d
Spec. Sess. (1994).
32. See Doe, 159 III. 2d at 362-72, 638 N.E.2d at 187-92.
33. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
34. See id. at 658.
35. See Doe, 159 III. 2d at 350, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
36. See id. at 365-67, 638 N.E.2d at 189-90.
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familiarity with adoption laws knows that. Justice Rizzi [the
author of the appellate court opinion awarding custody to the
adoptive parents], if he is to be taken at face value, does not
know that.
Columnist Bob Greene apparently does not care. Rather,
columnist Greene has used this unfortunate controversy to
stimulate readership and generate a series of syndicated
newspaper columns in the Chicago Tribune and other papers
that are both false and misleading. In so doing, he has wrong-
fully cried "fire" in a crowded theater,37 and has needlessly
alarmed other adoptive parents into ill-founded concerns that
their own adoption proceedings may be in jeopardy. In support
of his position, Greene has stirred up contempt against the
Supreme Court as an institution, concluding one of his columns
by referring to all of the Justices with the curse, "Damn them
all." 38
Greene's implicit objective is to secure justice for a child.
With that ethical and moral imperative, of course, no one could
disagree. Greene, however, elevates himself above the facts,
above the law, and above the Supreme Court of Illinois. He
arrogates to himself the right to decide the case.
In support of his objective, Greene brings to bear the tools
of the demagogue, namely, incomplete information, falsity, half-
truths, character assassination and spurious argumentation. He
has conducted a steady assault on my abilities as a judge,
headlining one of his columns "The Sloppiness of Justice
Heiple. ' '3' Another was entitled "Supreme Injustice for a Little
Boy." 4 He has shown my picture in his columns with bylines
reading, respectively, "Justice Heiple: Ruling takes boy from
37. This is a reference to United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
statement that, "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Schenck upheld the convictions of protesters against the World
War I military draft who had violated the Espionage Act of 1917 by distributing
pamphlets that claimed that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude and urged American men to ignore their draft notices. See
id. at 50-51. Ironically, in State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, 170 N.W. 201 (1918),
discussed infra note 117, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a judge could not be
removed from the bench for similar anti-war activity. See id. at 293.
In any event, Justice Heiple's use of the "fire in a crowed theater" metaphor with
respect to Bob Greene's columns is questionable. Greene argued and, by all indications,
he sincerely believed that the Illinois Supreme Court was doing a profound injustice to
Baby Richard. There can be nothing "false" about that or any other opinion; only
factual allegations (on which opinions may be based) can be "false."
38. Greene, Supreme Injustice, supra note 6, at 1.
39. Greene, Sloppiness of Heiple, supra note 6, at 1.
40. Greene, Supreme Injustice, supra note 6, at 1.
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home,"' and "James D. Heiple: No justice for a child." 42
Make no mistake about it. These are acts of journalistic
terrorism. These columns are designed to discredit me as a
judge and the Supreme Court as a dispenser of justice by
stirring up disrespect and hatred among the general population.
Lest we forget the place from which he comes, let us remind
ourselves that Greene is a journalist with a product to sell. He
writes columns for a living. His income is dependent on writing
and selling his columns to newspapers. He cannot secure either
sales or earnings by writing on subjects that lack impact or
drama. So, he must seek out subjects that are capable of
generating wide public interest. An adoption case involving two
sets of parents contesting for the custody of a three-year-old
boy is a ready-made subject for this type of journalist. So far,
so good.
The trouble with Greene's treatment of the subject, however,
is that his columns have been biased, false and misleading.
They have also been destructive to the cause of justice both in
this case and in the wider perspective. Part of Greene's fury
may be attributable to the fact that he staked out his views on
this case in a published column that appeared on August 22,
1993. 43 Subsequently, on June 16, 1994, the Supreme Court
had the audacity to base its decision on the law rather than on
his newspaper column. So much for his self-professed
moralizing.
That Greene has succeeded to a limited degree cannot be
denied. I have, indeed, received several pieces of hate mail with
such epithets as idiot, jerk, etc. The Governor, in a crass political
move, announced his attempt to intervene in the case. And the
General Assembly, without meaningful debate or consideration,
rushed into law a constitutionally infirm statute with the goal of
changing the Supreme Court's decision.
Both the Governor and the members of the General
Assembly who supported this bill might be well advised to
return to the classroom and take up Civics 101. The Governor,
for his part, has no understanding of this case and no interest
either public or private in its outcome. The legislature is not
given the authority to decide private disputes between litigants.
Neither does it sit as a super court to review unpopular decisions
of the Supreme Court. We have three branches of government
41. Greene Supreme Injustice, supra note 6, at 1.
42. Greene Supreme Injustice, supra note 6, at 1.
43. Bob Greene, Who Will Hear the Child's Cry?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1993, § 5, at
7491998]
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in this land. They are designated as the legislative, the executiye
and the judicial. Legislative adjudication of private disputes
went by the wayside generations ago. Moreover, this case
cannot be decided by public clamor generated by an
irresponsible journalist. Neither can it be decided by its
popularity or lack thereof. This case can only be decided by a
court of law. That is a judicial function pure and simple. For
the Supreme Court to surrender to this assault would be to
surrender its independence, its integrity and its reason for being.
In so doing, neither justice to the litigants nor the public interest
would be served. Under the circumstances, this case looms even
larger than the child or the two sets of contesting parents.
If there is a tragedy in this case, as has been suggested,
then that tragedy is the wrongful breakup of a natural family
and the keeping of a child by strangers without right. We must
remember that the purpose of an adoption is to provide a home
for a child, not a child for a home.44
Bob Greene responded to Justice Heiple's opinion with many
additional columns regarding the Baby Richard Case.45 In addition,
Governor Edgar and a number of legislators severely castigated the
supreme court.46
44. See In re Doe, 159 I11. 2d 347, 365-68, 638 N.E.2d 181, 189-90 (1994) (citations
added).
45. See, e.g., Greene, The Only Person, supra note 29, at 1; Bob Greene, The Words
That So Upset Them, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1995, § 5, at 1.
46. On the same day that Justice Heiple issued his opinion denying the adoptive
parents' motion for a rehearing (in which Justice McMorrow, joined by Justice Miller,
dissented from the denial of rehearing), Illinois Governor James Edgar issued an attack
on the supreme court, and particularly Justice Heiple. Governor Edgar's statement read:
This is a dark day for justice and human decency in Illinois. The highest
court in the state has committed a travesty.
This is not just another law suit, as Justice Heiple smugly suggests. It is not
about the rights of street thugs. It is not about whether one person is owed
money by another because of a fender bender. It is not about the governor of
Illinois. It is not about the Illinois General Assembly. It is not about a
columnist for the Chicago Tribune. It is about a young boy whom the court
has decreed should be brutally, tragically torn away from the only parents he
has ever known-parents who by all accounts loved and nurtured him from the
second he joined their family.
Justices Mary Ann McMorrow and Ben Miller expressed concern for the
child's well-being and agreed this case deserved-at the very least-a
rehearing. But the majority arrogantly refused to even reconsider its decision
and, frankly, I cannot imagine how the justices who prevailed in this case will
be able to sleep at night.
This young child should have found a champion-a protector-in the
highest court of this state. Instead, he found justices who betrayed their
obligations to him and to the people who placed them in their lofty positions.
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Although one may question the wisdom and temperance of Justice
Heiple's comments, they certainly do not create the basis for
impeachment. However, such comments created the political climate
in which additional events47 would precipitate a consensus in the
Illinois House of Representatives to investigate Justice Heiple for
impeachment.
Before addressing the House Committee investigation of Justice
Heiple, the next section reviews the Illinois constitutional provision
relating to impeachment and sets forth the appropriate standards for
impeachment of Illinois public officials.' Then, the following section
reviews the charges considered by the House Committee and the
standards it applied.49
II. THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT IN ILLINOIS
The Illinois constitution authorizes impeachment of judges,' but
neither the Illinois constitution nor any Illinois decisions specify the
grounds for impeachment. Consequently, it is necessary to review
source material from the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970
("Constitutional Convention") as well as case law from other
jurisdictions and scholarly analyses, to formulate an appropriate
standard.5'
What Two Justices Wrote and How Edgar Responded, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1994, § 1, at
17.
As late as his 1997 State of the State speech, delivered on January 22, 1997,
Governor Edgar described the plight of Baby Richard as "a tragedy." Christi Parsons &
Courtney Challos, Justice Calls "Baby Richard" Criticism Unfair, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23,
1997, § 1, at 10.
47. See infra Parts III.A.1-9.
48. See infra Part II.B-C.
49. See infra Part II.C-D.
50. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
51. On April 29, 1997, the Chicago Bar Association ("CBA") submitted a written
report to the Special House Committee in response to the House Committee's request for
guidance regarding the standards for impeachment. See Jerome B. Meites & Steven F.
Pflaum, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. ON THE PROPOSED IMPEACHMENT OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JAMES D. HEIPLE, CHICAGO BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE
ILLNOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE PROPOSED
IMPEACHMENT OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES D. HEIPLE (1997) [hereinafter CBA REPORT]. The
CBA Report was admitted into evidence. See infra Appendix pt. I. The House
Committee majority and both dissenters relied extensively on the CBA Report in
developing a standard for impeachable conduct. The House Committee majority said:
The report of the Bar Association discussed the standards for impeachment and
said:
"Not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct warrants
impeachment. Impeachment should be reserved for egregious
violations. Less serious ethical infractions should result in
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A. A Brief History of Impeachment
The doctrine of impeachment is a venerable component of Anglo-
American law.52 Moreover, the doctrine of impeachment was more
than 400 years old when the framers of the United States Constitution
met in Philadelphia in 1787. There are several explicit references to
impeachment in the United States Constitution.' Unlike the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, the United States Constitution specifies the
grounds for impeachment.'
In his article The Scope of the Impeachment Power," Paul S.
Fenton examines the history of judicial impeachments under the
Federal Constitution. Based on that case-by-case examination, Fenton
concludes that the appropriate scope of the impeachment power under
the Federal Constitution "is not a political tool for arbitrary removal of
officials." 56 Fenton also indicates that, "[w]ithin these limitations, it is
extremely difficult to define the proper standard for an impeachable
discipline by the Courts Commission."
It is the conclusion of the Committee that legislative impeachment should be
limited to extraordinary cases of judicial misconduct involving serious
violations of the law or serious breaches of trust.
Infra Appendix pt. I (quoting CBA REPORT, supra, at 15); see also infra Appendix pt. IV
(Rep. Scott, dissenting); infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting) (stating "I relied on
[the CBA Report] both as to the burden of proof as well as the standard to be used to
determine the grounds for impeachment.").
The authors of this Article also wrote the CBA Report. The discussion in this section
is taken substantially from the CBA Report.
52. A summary of its history reads as follows:
The practice [of impeachment], as we have it, comes from England. The
earliest record of an impeachment trial in England dates back to 1376. During
the reign of Edward III and some of his successors, bills of Attainder, and
proceedings in the Court of the Star Chamber took the place of impeachment
trials. In 1620, impeachment was revived and during the next 68 years, there
was an impeachment on the average of every 20 months. There has been no
resort to impeachment in England since the trial of Henry, Lord Viscount
Melville, Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy, for misappropriation of funds in
1806 in the reign of George III.
Leon R. Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution, 26
GEO. L.J. 849, 849-50 (1938).
53. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that the House of Representatives
has "the sole [plower of [i]mpeachment"); id. art. I, § 3 (describing the Senate's power
to conduct impeachment trials); id. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President's pardon
authority does not apply to impeachments).
54. The Federal Constitution provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id. art. II,
§ 4.
55. Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 719,
746 (1970).
56. Id.
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offense in affirmative terms... [and] the only generalization that can
safely be made is that an impeachable offense must be serious in
nature." 57
B. Impeachment Under the Illinois Constitution
The legislative article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 contains an
explicit impeachment provision.' Unlike the Illinois Constitution of
1870 that it replaced, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 does not
expressly state the grounds for impeachment. The Illinois Constitution
of 1870 provided that impeachment was available for any
"misdemeanor" in office. During the 1970 Constitutional Convention,
delegates expressed concern about the use of the word
"misdemeanor."59 Ultimately, the delegates to the Illinois Constitution
57. Id.
58. Illinois constitution article IV, section 14, provides:
The House of Representatives has the sole power to conduct legislative
investigations to determine the existence of cause for impeachment and, by
the vote of a majority of the members elected, to impeach Executive and
Judicial officers. Impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for
that purpose, Senators shall be upon oath, or affirmation, to do justice
according to law. If the Governor is tried, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of the Senators elected. Judgment shall not extend beyond removal
from office and disqualification to hold any public office of this State. An
impeached officer, whether convicted or acquitted, shall be liable to
prosecution, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
59. On May 28, 1970, Delegate James Parker discussed that issue:
MR. J. PARKER: .... The Constitution presently reads that "[tihe governor
and all civil officers of this state shall be liable to impeachment for any
misdemeanor in office." And the committee has changed this to read: "may be
impeached for official misconduct." This is the only substantive change.
Now, the purpose of this change was that the committee felt that the
terminology "misdemeanor" in the usual and ordinary sense of the word is of a
minor offense, and that they felt that there could be some confusion that a
governor or the other state or civil officers could be impeached for some minor
traffic offense, which is technically a misdemeanor. Therefore, we felt that the
real intent of this provision was that it should be that he would be liable for
impeachment if he does something serious in his official capacity as a state
officer.
And actually, as a practical matter, no matter what language we use here, the
power to impeach is strictly within the General Assembly and that this
language we use is merely a directive to the General Assembly as to what our
intent on it is, and that it is just to be added as a guide in exercise of their
discretion. We just felt that this language of "official misconduct" would
direct that it is only for acts of an official nature and not his personal affairs,
unless it is serious enough that it would reflect on his official job.
3 Record of Proceedings: Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1310-11 (1970)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Constitutional Proceedings].
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of 1970 even deleted the phrase "official misconduct," which had been
proposed by the Convention's Legislative Committee, from the final
document. Thus, article IV, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 does not contain any explicit grounds for impeachment, but it
simply entrusts the Illinois House with the right to impeach officials in
the executive or judicial branch and charges the Illinois Senate with the
duty to conduct trials of any impeached official.'
There is no other guidance in the Illinois Constitution of 1970, or in
the record of the 1970 Constitutional Convention, regarding what is an
impeachable offense. Nor are there any reported Illinois decisions that
address this issue.6 However, it is clear that impeachable conduct is
not limited to misconduct that would authorize removal from office by
the Illinois Courts Commission. In People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois
Courts Commission,62 the Illinois Supreme Court held "that only
conduct violative of the Supreme Court Rules of judicial conduct may
be the subject of a complaint before the Commission." 63 Thus, a judge
It is also ironic that a considerable portion of the Heiple hearing pertained to traffic
stops. Of course, the amount of attention devoted to them was not because Justice
Heiple was the subject of four stops in four years but rather because of his reaction upon
being stopped on those occasions. See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
60. ILL. CONST. art IV, § 14.
6 1. There is apparently only one published decision, Palmer v. United States Civil
Service Commission, 191 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d
450 (7th Cir. 1962), that discusses the grounds for impeachment under the Illinois
Constitution of 1870. Although not directly involving any impeachment proceedings,
the decision includes the following interpretation of the impeachment provisions
contained in the 1870 constitution:
This provision of the Constitution [article IV, section 24] does not provide
the basis for returning a bill of impeachment, but it does provide that the
senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and
evidence. The meaning generally ascribed to such a provision is that
impeachment proceedings generally lie as a rule for treason, bribery or any
high crime or misdemeanor in office . . . . The grounds must be causes
attaching to the qualifications of the officer, or his performance of his duties,
showing that he is not a fit and proper person to hold the office.
In State v. Hastings . . . it is said: "Where the act of official delinquency
consists in the violation of some provision of the constitution or statute
which, if denounced as a crime or misdemeanor, or where it is a mere neglect of
duty, willfully done .... or where the negligence is so gross, and the disregard
of duty so flagrant, as to warrant the inference that it was willful or corrupt, it
is a misdemeanor in office .... ." [B]ut mere negligence or mere excess of
power without corrupt intention is not a 'crime or misdemeanor' for which the
officer should be impeached.
Palmer, 191 F. Supp. at 510 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Hastings, 55 N.W. 774
(Neb. 1893)).
62. 69 111. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53 (1977).
63. Id. at 64. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that permitting the Courts
Commission to discipline judges for conduct that does not violate the Code of Judicial
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is only subject to discipline by the Courts Commission if the judge has
violated one of the ethical 9 rovisions contained in Illinois Supreme
Court Rules 61 through 68.
In contrast, the scope of the Illinois House's power to investigate
alleged wrongdoing by judges and to impeach them for that
wrongdoing is not so limited. As Delegate Parker noted, the House
has the "sole" power of impeachment.65 Accordingly, it is solely up to
the House to decide what type of conduct constitutes an impeachable
offense.
Delegate John Linebough Knuppel, an attorney in the central Illinois
towns of Petersburg and Havana, also underscored this point in his
comments at the Constitutional Convention. 66 Delegate Knuppel
discussed the problems that had arisen in 1969, the year before the
Constitutional Convention took place, when a self-styled "legal
reformer" in Chicago, Sherman Skolnick, and his assistant, Harriet
Sherman, raised allegations of serious impropriety against Illinois
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy J. Solfisburg, Jr. and Associate
Justice Ray I. Klingbiel.67 Skolnick claimed that the justices had
purchased stock in the Civic Center Bank in Chicago while the
criminal appeal of one of the bank's officers was pending before the
Illinois Supreme Court.68 Solfisburg and Klingbiel, who had not
publicly disclosed their stock purchase, ruled in favor of the bank
officer.69 After Skolnick made his allegations, the Illinois Supreme
Court appointed a special commission to investigate the charges. 70
Conduct would undermine the court's exclusive authority under article VI, section 13(a)
of the Illinois constitution to "adopt rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges."
Id. In addition, serious due process vagueness and overbreadth concerns would exist if
the Courts Commission were not tethered to the Code of Judicial Conduct in deciding,
pursuant to its authority under article VI, section 15(c)(1) of the constitution, whether a
judge was guilty of "willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties,
or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the
judicial office into disrepute." Id. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that "any other
construction would effectively nullify section 13(a) of article VI, eliminate the decision-
making function which the [Constitutional Convention] delegates unanimously
intended this court to have, and jeopardize the integrity and independence of the
judiciary which the delegates sought to protect." Id.
64. See id.
65. See Constitutional Proceedings, supra note 59, at 1310.
66. See id. at 2709.
67. See Paul Galloway, Reissued Sherman Skolnick Is Back Raising, Well, Some
Unusual Topics, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1988, § 5, at 2.
68. See E.R. Shipp, 3 Chicago Judges Face Bribe Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1983, at Al.
69. See Galloway, supra note 67, at 2.
70. See id.
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The commission reported that Solfisburg and Klingbiel had engaged in
"positive acts of impropriety," and shortly thereafter, they resigned.7'
While the allegations against Solfisburg and Klingbiel were
pending, but before the special commission had issued its report, the
Illinois House of Representatives established a seven-member special
committee, under the chairmanship of Representative George
Lindberg,72 to conduct an investigation regarding the allegations.
Almost immediately after the House created the committee, five
citizens filed a taxpayer's suit, Cusack v. Howlett,73 seeking to enjoin
the expenditure of public funds by the legislative committee on the
ground that the Illinois House of Representatives had no role in
investigating judicial misconduct under the 1870 constitution. 74 The
citizens argued that under the Judicial Article of the 1870 constitution,
as it had been amended in 1962, only a commission appointed by the
supreme court, and not the Illinois House, could investigate judicial
misconduct or remove judges from office.75
The Circuit Court of Cook County concurred with the citizens'
argument and consequently entered an injunction preventing the special
committee from proceeding with its investigation.76 The Illinois
Supreme Court, in an opinion by the highly respected Justice Walter
Schaefer, affirmed that decision, holding that the judicial department
now held the exclusive power to prescribe and enforce the standards
71. Id.
72. In 1976, George Lindberg gave up his seat in the legislature to run as the
Republican candidate for state comptroller, a race which he lost. In 1978, Lindberg was
elected to the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District, a district which includes
the "collar counties" of Chicago. In 1989, Lindberg was appointed by President George
Bush to a seat on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
He continues to serve in that capacity today.
73. 44 I11. 2d 233, 254 N.E.2d 506 (Ii. 1969). A taxpayer's suit is a statutory action
that may be brought either by the Illinois Attorney General or by a private citizen. See
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-301 (West 1996). It is "an act to restrain and enjoin the
disbursement of public funds by any officer or officers of the State government." Id.
The underlying premise of any taxpayer's suit is that the planned expenditure of public
funds is unlawful. The usual grounds for attacking a proposed expenditure are: (1) it
violates the state or federal constitution; (2) the General Assembly did not appropriate
the money for the purpose for which the executive branch intends to spend it; or (3) the
funds are being used for a private, rather than a public purpose. See Granberg v.
Didrickson, 279 II. App. 3d 886, 889, 665 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1st Dist. 1996).
74. See Cusack, 44 11. 2d at 244, 254 N.E.2d at 511.
75. Id. at 233, 240-42, 254 N.E.2d at 509-10. The plaintiffs argued that "the
authority to impeach members of the judiciary was eliminated when the constitution of
1870 was adopted" or, "alternatively that impeachment was supplanted in 1964 when
the present section eighteen of the Judicial Article became effective." Id., 254 N.E.2d at
509.
76. See id. at 234, 254 N.E.2d at 507.
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for judicial conduct.77 Justice Schaefer also ruled that the General
Assembly's power was limited to "fixing... a mandatory retirement
age for judges and ... request[ing] that the Courts Commission be
convened.,78  The Illinois Supreme Court did not decide whether
judges could be impeached under the 1870 constitution because the
House committee conceded at the oral argument that its enabling
resolution "does not conform to the established pattern of investigating
resolutions looking toward impeachment and that 'realistically'
impeachment is not a factor in this case. '
Delegate Knuppel told the 1970 Constitutional Convention that the
first sentence of the impeachment provision in the 1970 constitution
served to overrule Cusack and to ensure that the House could conduct
impeachment investigations of judges as well as of executive branch
officials. 8' That provision provides that the House has "the sole
power to conduct legislative investigations to determine the existence
of cause for impeachment. "8'
At the commencement of the House's investigation of Justice Heiple
in April 1997, Heiple's attorney, former Governor James R.
77. See id. at 244, 254 N.E.2d at 511-12.
78. Id., 254 N.E.2d at 512.
79. Id. at 240, 254 N.E.2d at 509. In addition, prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's
Cusack decision, both Chief Justice Solfisburg and Justice Klingbiel had resigned from
the supreme court, thus rendering any impeachment effort against them moot.
80. Delegate Knuppel stated:
Section 13 deals with impeachment. I think up until last year, there was a
little question about the right of the legislature to impeach judicial and
executive officers. In the case of Cusack v. Howlett, the court cast some
doubts on the strength of this article or the ability of the legislature to
impeach judicial officers under the new judicial article of the constitution
adopted in 1964. [The amended Judicial Article of the 1870 Constitution was
ratified by the voters in the November 1962 election. It took effect on
January 1, 1964.] That is what has prompted including the impeachment in
just a little different language . . .than it was in the 1870 Constitution, and
you can read it: "The House of Representatives, by a majority of all the
members elected, has the sole power to impeach all executive and judicial
officers. (and including the following sentence) The House of Representatives
shall have power to investigate to determine if cause for impeachment exists.
Impeachment shall be tried by the senate when sitting for that purpose," et
cetera.
Now there was a question as to the right of the Lindberg Commission to
investigate the alleged improprieties of certain judges here in the state of
Illinois under the resolution which they had adopted. What this attempts to do
is to improve on the language of the old Constitution and assure, inviolate,
the right of the House of Representatives to impeach members of the judicial
and executive branch of government.
See Constitutional Proceedings, supra note 59, at 2709.
81. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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Thompson, raised the issue of whether the committee had the authority
to proceed with an impeachment investigation prior to the Courts
Commission's rendering of its decision on the traffic stop charges
against Justice Heiple.82 Indeed, Thompson even indicated that he
might argue that the legislature could never consider impeachment on
any of the charges considered by the Courts Commission.83
However, based on the plain language of the first sentence of article
IV, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and on the
discussion of this issue at the Constitutional Convention,' the Illinois
House certainly possessed the authority to conduct an impeachment
investigation at any time, regardless of the pendency of an ostensibly
similar matter before the Courts Commission or the disposition of
similar charges by the Courts Commission. Because the House has
the "sole" right of any governmental body in Illinois to impeach, there
is, by definition, no conflict between the House conducting an
impeachment investigation and the Courts Commission adjudicating
charges pending before it, even if such adjudication could result in
removal of the judge from the bench. Furthermore, because the
Illinois Supreme Court in Harrod limited the Courts Commission's
authority regarding judicial discipline solely to violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules,85 the overlap between what the House can investigate and what
the Courts Commission can adjudicate is not complete. Any partial
overlap in a particular case simply does not mean that the House must
wait until the Courts Commission has completed its work.
82. See Rick Pearson, Thompson Turns on Old Charm at Capitol, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24,
1997, § 1, at 1.
83. See id. Thompson said, "There are some arguments that when the constitution
sets up the Courts Commission and says its decision should be final, that precludes the
legislature from acting on the same matters. That question has never been answered."
Id.
84. See Constitutional Proceedings, supra note 59, at 2709.
85. See People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 445, 470, 372
N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1977).
If judicial officers are to rely on the rules for guidance, then disciplinary
actions should be limited to conduct that violates the rules' expressed
requirements and prohibitions .... Accordingly, we hold that only conduct
violative of the Supreme Court Rules of judicial conduct may be the subject of
a complaint before the Commission.
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C. Analyzing the Most Recent Judicial Impeachment Proceeding
Before the Heiple Investigation
Because there have been no impeachment proceedings in Illinois
since the 1840s, the standards for impeachment developed in other
jurisdictions provide guidance for the appropriate use of impeachment
today. Prior to the Illinois House's investigation of Justice Heiple, the
most recent impeachment investigation of a state court judge occurred
in Pennsylvania. In November 1993, the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives passed House Resolution 205 authorizing the
Subcommittee on Courts of the House Judiciary Committee ("House
Subcommittee") to conduct an investigation into allegations against
Justice Rolf Larsen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8 6 The
impeachment provision of the Pennsylvania constitution authorizes
impeachment for "any misbehavior in office." T
The Pennsylvania House Subcommittee reviewed seven specific
grounds for the possible impeachment of Justice Larsen. 8 These
seven allegations may be divided into three general types of alleged
misconduct: (1) commission of felonies; (2) abuse of power as a
judge; and (3) unethical conduct bringing the judiciary into disrepute.
The felony allegations related to charges that Justice Larsen gave
perjured testimony to a grand jury and misused the legal process by
falsely accusing two other Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices of
criminal and judicial misconduct in an attempt to obtain a reversal of
his reprimand from the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.89
With respect to abuse of power or unethical conduct, Judge Larsen
allegedly arranged for special treatment of certain petitions for leave to
appeal so that the petitions would be specially handled by him and his
staff.90 Judge Eunice Ross of the Allegheny County Court of
86. See SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, JUDICIARY COMM., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONDUCT OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
ROLF LARSEN AUTHORIZED BY HOUSE RESOLUTION 205 OF 1993, H.R. 177, 1st Sess. I (Pa.
1994) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE REPORT].
87. PA. CONST. art. VI, § 6. This section reads, in its entirety:
The Governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for
any misbehavior in office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend further
than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of trust or
profit under this Commonwealth. The person accused, whether convicted or
acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and
punishment according to law.
Id.
88. See PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 86, at 3-5.
89. See id. at 4, 34-35, 38-51.
90. See id. at 3, 22-34.
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Common Pleas in Pittsburgh accused Justice Larsen of bringing about
an improper ex parte contact by an attorney who was a friend of his
with Judge Ross concerning a case that was pending before her.9' In
addition, Judge Larsen's secretary, Barbara Roberts, apparently
testified before the House Subcommittee that Justice Larsen had
instigated, or allowed to be instigated, improper ex parte contact with
another attorney with whom Justice Larsen was also very friendly, and
who had two cases pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 92
That attorney, Richard Gilardi, asked Justice Larsen to vote a certain
way on two pending petitions for allowance of appeal in which Mr.
Gilardi was serving as counsel to one of the parties. 93 The committee
found documentary evidence that Justice Larsen had done as Mr.
Gilardi requested.'
In October 1993, Justice Larsen was charged in the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas with criminal conspiracy and
violations of the Pennsylvania Controlled Substances Act because he
"regularly obtained certain psychotropic (anti-anxiety and anti-
depressant) drugs for his own use by having one of his physicians,
Dr. Earl Humphreys, issue prescriptions for the drugs in the names of
the members of Justice Larsen's staff. '95 Based on the testimony of
Dr. Humphreys and members of Justice Larsen's staff, the House
Subcommittee found that Justice Larsen had used his position to
influence his physician and his staff "to participate in his arrangement
to obtain prescription drugs by fraudulent means. ' ' 6
The Special Pennsylvania House Subcommittee recommended that
Justice Larsen be impeached on all of these grounds. 97 It also
recommended that he be impeached because "[i]t is the cumulative
effect of Justice Larsen's misbehavior that has the most profound and
deleterious impact on the integrity of the judiciary as an institution."
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania House Subcommittee impeached Justice
Larsen on all seven grounds recommended by the Special
Subcommittee.' The Pennsylvania Senate, however, only convicted
Justice Larsen on the allegations involving his ex parte
91. See id. at 4, 35-37.
92. See id. at 3, 29-30.
93. See id. at 29-32.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 51.
96. Id. at 52.
97. See id. at 6.
98. Id. at 5.
99. See GEORGE Fox RISHEL, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
RESEARCH RESPONSE: IMPEACHMENT IN ILLINOIS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 7(1995).
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communications with his attorney friend who had matters pending
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. im
At the outset of the Pennsylvania House Report, the House
Subcommittee explicitly addressed the standard for impeachment under
the Pennsylvania constitution.'0 l This standard appears on its face to
be broader than the following standard ultimately adopted by the
Illinois House Committee: "It is the conclusion of the committee that
legislative impeachment should be limited to extraordinary cases of
judicial misconduct involving serious violations of the law or serious
breaches of trust."'10 2
D. Conclusions Regarding the Grounds for Impeachment and
Removal of Judges Under Illinois Law
Based on the sources discussed above, the standard for
impeachment of Illinois public officials can be distilled to four
grounds:
1. Systemic nonfeasance. This refers to a judge who is afflicted
with such substantial physical or mental disabilities that it is not
physically or mentally possible for the judge to continue
functioning in office;
103
100. See id. at 8.
101. The Pennsylvania House Subcommittee described the standard as:
The Subcommittee on Courts has researched the grounds for impeachment set
forth in article VI, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to determine
whether any conduct of Justice Larsen warrants the adoption of Articles of
Impeachment. The Constitution gives the "sole" impeachment power to the
House of Representatives. Therefore, it is the unique responsibility of the
House to interpret the standard for impeachment in article VI, section 6, and to
determine whether a judicial officer's conduct falls within that standard. In the
Subcommittee's view, "misbehavior in office" in the case of a judge or justice
is conduct which brings the courts into disrepute, undermines public
confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the court system, or brings into
serious question a judicial officer's fitness to remain in office.
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 86, at 2 (emphasis added).
102. Infra Appendix pt. I.
103. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 (1970)
(recognizing that impeachment is one, but not the sole, recourse for addressing
problems of judges who are unable to perform their duties); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Unitary Executive Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 313, 317 (1993) (recognizing the
power to impeach senile judges); Melissa H. Maxman, Note, In Defense of the
Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L. REV. 420, 427 (1987)
(noting that the legislature may impeach incapacitated judges). But see Harvey T.
Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 768 (1989) (noting that the Constitution is silent on the
removal of judges with a serious disability).
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2. Willful malfeasance. This generally refers to serious
criminal conduct, such as accepting a bribe, committing perjury,
or evading taxes;1" 4
3. Egregious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. This
refers to ethical violations that also would warrant a judge's
removal from the bench by the Illinois Courts Commission;1
0 5
and
4. Gross abuse of power. This refers to intentional or bad faith
misuse of judicial power that tends to bring the justice system
into disrepute. 0 6
A judge who has become too physically or mentally ill to continue to
function (systemic nonfeasance) obviously should not be on the
bench. Similarly, willful malfeasance, such as the commission of a
serious crime like accepting a bribe, is clearly a ground for removal
from office. Because the necessity for removal is so self-evident in the
wake of systemic nonfeasance and willful malfeasance and because
there were no such allegations against Justice Heiple, this Article will
focus on cases pertaining to the last two grounds: egregious violations
of judicial ethics rules and gross abuse of power. This discussion will
conclude with an analysis of the burden of proof needed to establish an
impeachable offense.
1. Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct
Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, found in Illinois Supreme Court
Rules 61 through 68, is based on the ABA's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. 10 7 Not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
104. "[I]mpeachment proceedings generally lie for treason, bribery, or any high
crime or misdemeanor in office." Palmer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 191 F.
Supp. 495, 510 (S.D. Ill. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1962);
see also Constitutional Proceedings, supra note 59, at 1310-11 (noting that legislature
may impeach state officers for "serious" wrongdoing).
105. See supra notes 62-64.
106. See infra Appendix pt. I.
107. The ABA issued a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (rev. 1990). With respect to the House Committee's
investigation of Justice Heiple, it appears that only Illinois Supreme Court Rules 61,
62(A), and 63(B) were relevant. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 61, 62(A), 63(B). Specifically, rule
61 provides:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The
provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that
objective.
ILL. SuP. Cr. R. 61. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62(A) reinforces the requirement that a
judge promote the integrity of the judiciary, and states, "[a] judge should respect and
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warrants impeachment. Normally, the Courts Commission should be
permitted to fashion the appropriate punishment for misconduct that
consists solely of ethical violations." The Courts Commission has
the power to remove a judge from office-the practical equivalent of
impeachment.'09 Less serious ethical infractions can result in repri-
comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 62(A).
Finally, Rule 63(B) addresses the performance of a judge's duties both in his or her ad-
ministrative capacity. This rule applies to appointments made by a judge, and provides
in pertinent part:
A judge should diligently discharge the judge's administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administra-
tion, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of
other judges and court officials .... A judge should not make unnecessary
appointments. A judge should exercise the power of appointment on the basis
of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. A judge should not approve com-
pensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
Sup. CT. R. 63(B)(1), (4).
108. Article VI of the Illinois constitution authorizes the Courts Commission to
discipline judges. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e). Violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct constitute the sole grounds for such discipline. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois
Courts Comm'n, 69 I1l. 2d 445, 469-470, 372 N.E.2d 53, 64 (1977).
109. The Illinois Courts Commission has removed five Illinois judges because of
violations of the Judicial Canon of Ethics. See RiSHEL, supra note 99, at 7. The judges
and the causes of their removal are:
Year of
Name Removal Grounds
Richard A. 1970 Violated provision of Illinois constitution
Napolitano prohibiting judges from engaging in any outside
business while on the bench.
Randall S. 1974 Involved in a vote fraud scandal.
Quindry
James L. 1975 Violated outside business provision.
Oakley, Jr.
William D. 1976 Unilaterally and summarily charged, accepted
Vanderwater guilty plea, and sentenced defendant who allegedly
stole a key to an apartment building in which the
judge had an ownership and management interest.
John R. Keith 1994 Bad judicial temperament.
See id.
Justice Heiple served as Chair of the Illinois Courts Commission at the time of Judge
Keith's removal from the bench. The cumulative effect of a number of incidents
prompted Judge Keith's removal. During his testimony before the House Committee,
Justice Heiple was asked about statements he had made during the Keith hearing and
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mand, censure, or suspension without pay.' 0 Minor ethical
infractions also can result in reassignment by the Illinois Supreme
Court or by the trial court judge with supervisory or assignment power
over the judge in question. " '
Given the rough engine of impeachment's all-or-nothing remedy
and the existence of other avenues for redressing ethical violations,
this ground for impeachment should be reserved for egregious ethical
violations. It should be a rare case, such as one in which there is
reason to believe that the judicial disciplinary process has
malfunctioned or been thwarted," 2 in which ethical violations,
standing alone, warrant impeachment. In most cases, ethical
violations would justify impeachment only if other misconduct is
present.
whether they applied to Justice Heiple, himself, with equal force. That exchange was as
follows:
Q. The statement attributed to you and, I quote, is "One or two of the
matters brought to our attention might have been overlooked or disregarded as
a bad day for a judge or an aberration or a temporary lapse .... Considered in
isolation, specific incidents of a judge's misconduct might have warranted
only reprimand or censure. Considered as a whole however, the judge's
misconduct indicates a person who should not occupy the position of a judge.
Q. I point that out only to suggest or ask whether that stands for the
proposition that in considering an issue of impeachment, this committee is
empowered and indeed would be wise to consider not only individual incidents
but courses of conduct. Do you agree to that?
A. I presume so, sir.
Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
110. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e).
111. See ILL. SUP. Cr. R. 56 (authorizing chief circuit court judge to temporarily
assign to restricted or non-judicial duties a judge against whom ethics charges are
pending); SuP. CT. R 21(b) (granting chief judge's power to assign judges).
112. In the Heiple matter, there was some concern that Justice Heiple interfered with
the judicial disciplinary process by selecting Justice Moses Harrison II to chair the
Courts Commission, knowing that ethics charges arising out of the traffic stops were
likely to come before the Commission. Justice Charles E. Freeman contended that the
court's tradition was to select the justice who was next in line to be Chief Justice, which
would have been Justice Freeman, to chair the Courts Commission. Justice Freeman also
claimed that Justice Heiple passed over him and selected Justice Harrison to chair the
Courts Commission because Justices Heiple and Harrison were good friends. Justice
Heiple disputed these allegations and denied any wrongdoing in connection with the
selection of Justice Harrison. See Ken Armstrong & Bob Secter, Has Heiple Stacked the
Deck? Chief Justice Veered Away from Tradition, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1997, § 1, at 1;
Illinois Chief Justice Draws Criticism from Colleague, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
13, 1997, News, at 2B, available in 1997 WL 3323696. The House Committee
addressed the appointment of Justice Harrison to chair the Courts Commission in its
report and determined that Justice Heiple had not committed an impeachable offense in
connection with that selection. See infra Part III.A.4.
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2. The Gross Abuse of Power Standard
There are at least three different elements to the ground of
impeachment based on a judge's gross abuse of power. The first
element involves whether the wrongful behavior constituted a misuse
of judicial power or other misconduct." 3 The second element relates
to the judge's state of mind and whether impeachment is warranted for
anything other than intentional misconduct." 4  The third element
relates to the importance of the subject matter of the misconduct." 5
Each of these elements will be addressed in turn.
First, the gross abuse of power standard involves misuse of judicial
power. Judicial power includes the decision of cases, the issuance of
orders, the making of appointments, or other action taken as a judge.
By definition, abuse of power does not involve non-judicial
misconduct.' 6 This is not to say that a judge never can be impeached
for non-judicial misconduct, but impeachable non-judicial misconduct
generally involves serious criminal offenses." 7
Second, the abuse of power standard involves intentional or bad
faith misconduct. Intentional misconduct requires knowingly and
willfully doing something that is improper or unauthorized by law." 8
113. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
116. See CBA REPORT, supra note 51, at 16.
117. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, 170 N.W. 201 (Minn. 1918).
Burnquist is a classic example of an effort to remove a judge based on non-judicial
actions. In that case, the Governor of Minnesota sought to have a probate judge
removed from the bench because of speeches he gave which strongly opposed the United
States' entry into World War 1. See id. at 202. Among other things, the judge had
stated that Germany justifiably sank the Lusitania. Id. The judge also accused President
Woodrow Wilson of lying to the American people during the 1916 presidential
campaign when he said that he would never enter the war and then entering the war
almost immediately after his re-election to a second term. See id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the judge's statements did not constitute the performance of
judicial duties and were not grounds for removal from office:
The misconduct or malfeasance under our law must have direct relation to and
be connected with the "performance of official duties," and amount either to
maladministration, or to willful and intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office at all.
• . . But we are clear that scolding the President of the United States,
particularly at long range, condemning in a strong voice the war policy of the
federal authorities, expressing sympathy with Germany, justifying the
sinking of the Lusitania, by remarks made by a public officer of the juris-
diction and limited authority possessed by the judge of probate under the
Constitution and laws of this state do not constitute malfeasance in the
discharge of official duties, and therefore furnish no legal ground for removal.
Id. at 203.
118. See Murtagh v. Maglio, 195 N.Y.S.2d 900, 905-06 (App. Div. 1960) (stating
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Bad faith in this context means objective bad faith-misconduct that
the judge could not have reasonably thought to be proper or authorized
by law." 9
Third, abuse of power involves serious "misconduct that tends to
bring the judicial system into disrepute., 120 This element recognizes
that impeachment is an extreme remedy. In terms of a judge's career,
it constitutes capital punishment. Only very serious misconduct
should constitute an impeachable offense.
3. Burden of Proof
In determining whether grounds exist for impeachment, proof of
any such misconduct should be by clear and convincing evidence. 21
The Illinois Supreme Court defines the clear and convincing evidence
standard as "the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in
the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in
question.' ' 22 Neither Justice Heiple nor any member of the House
Committee questioned the application of the clear and convincing
standard.'23
that "neither error of judgment, nor error in the decision of particular cases, nor mistakes
in the construction of statutes, nor mistakes in the determination of the extent or
limitation of his powers, without further proof of unworthy or illegal motives, will
sustain" removing a city magistrate).
119. Cf. Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221
(Cal. 1975) (emphasizing "the importance of an objective rather than a subjective
appraisal of judicial conduct").
120. CBA REPORT, supra note 51, at 16-17; cf. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e)
(authorizing the Courts Commission to discipline judges whose conduct "is prejudicial
to the administration of justice or ... brings the judicial office into disrepute").
121. See In re Inquiry Relating to Rome, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (Kan. 1975) (holding
that clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate burden of proof relating to
depriving a judge of his office or subjecting him to some form of discipline); In re
Diener, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (Md. 1973) (stating that the severity of the circumstances
regarding judicial misconduct warrants a clear and convincing standard).
122. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1995) (noting
that "courts consider clear and convincing evidence to be more than a preponderance
while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a
criminal offense); see also Cronin v. McCarthy, 264 Ill. App. 3d 514, 525, 637 N.E.2d
668, 675 (1994) ("The spectrum of increasing degrees of proof, from preponderance of
the evidence, to clear and convincing evidence, to evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
would be clearer if the degrees of proof were defined, respectively, as probably true,
highly probably true, and almost certainly true.").
123. Another interesting evidentiary issue that arose in the Heiple case, but never
surfaced in the public proceedings, was whether Justice Heiple held a "property interest"
in his judgeship that allowed him to have the full panoply of due process rights provided
for under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and under article I,
section 2, of the Illinois constitution. Initially, the House Committee indicated that
Justice Heiple's counsel, former Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, could ask
"clarifying questions" of witnesses, but could not formally cross examine them. Justice
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Heiple contended that he possessed a "property interest" in his judgeship and, therefore,
had a due process right to have his counsel "cross examine" witnesses. Ultimately,
Justice Heiple's counsel was allowed to cross-examine witnesses, so the issue
disappeared.
The CBA was asked by counsel to the Special House Committee to opine on this issue.
The CBA submitted a supplement to the CBA Report on this issue and on the issue ofjudicial privilege, see supra note 51, written by the authors of this Article. The
following is a summary of that supplement as it relates to the question of whether an
Illinois judge has a "property interest" in his judgeship for due process purposes.
Existing precedent indicates that at least elected judges (as contrasted to appointedjudges who serve for life under the federal system) do not have a "property interest" in
their judgeships. In Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, former
Justice Larsen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court contested the procedures used in his
impeachment proceeding by the Pennsylvania House and in his trial by the
Pennsylvania Senate on the ground that he did not receive the full panoply of due
process protections. Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pa., 955 F. Supp. 1549
(M.D. Pa. 1997). The district court held that: "according to the teachings of [Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)] ... [Larsen] may not pursue [his] procedural
due process claims ... unless an independent source such as state law affords [him] a
legitimate claim of entitlement to his post as a supreme court justice." Id. at 1567-68(citation omitted and ellipsis in original) (quoting Independent Enter., Inc. v. Pittsburgh
Water and Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1177 (3d Cir. 1997)). The Larsen court relied on
two prior Pennsylvania cases, Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 713 (Pa. 1977) and
In re 1991 Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n, 609 A.2d 132, 140-41 (Pa.
1992). See id. at 1568. In the Reapportionment Comm'n case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that "elected officials' interest in their offices does not merit
constitutional protection." Reapportionment Comm'n, 609 A.2d at 141. In Sweeney, a
state legislator unsuccessfully argued that he had a property interest in his office that
entitled him to procedural due process in proceedings seeking his expulsion from the
legislature. See Sweeney, 375 A.2d at 712-13. The court held that: "an elected office is
a public trust, not the private domain of the officeholder .... An elected official can
never have tenure in the same sense as an ordinary public employee." Id. at 713.
Two Illinois cases, although not involving impeachment, both indicate that state
court judges do not hold a property interest in their judgeships. In Field v. Boyle, 503
F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974), a Cook County magistrate, who had been elected by the full
circuit court judges under the 1870 constitution for a one-year term on January 1, 1971,
complained that he had been denied a due process hearing when he was not converted to
an associate judge by the full circuit court judges when the Illinois Constitution of 1970
took effect on July 1, 1971. Magistrate Field claimed that he had a property interest in
his judgeship for the full year and that his removal without a formal hearing violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Field, 503 F.2d at 775. The
Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, stating "[w]e disagree that Field had a property
interest or expectancy of employment which could not-consonant with the Federal
Constitution-be divested without Field first being afforded some kind of due process
hearing." Id. at 776.
Similarly, in Nicholson v. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 233 I11. App. 3d 1040, 1050, 599
N.E.2d 1132 (1992), the Illinois Appellate Court held that an Illinois judge does not
have a property interest in a judgeship. See id. at 1139. In that particular case, Judge
Nicholson (who coincidentally had been a delegate to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional
Convention) served as a judge on the Circuit Court of Cook County. See id. at 1133.
She sought appointment by the Illinois Supreme Court to the Illinois Appellate Court to
fill a vacancy pending the next election. See id. at 1134. The Illinois Supreme Court re-
quired Judge Nicholson to submit her credentials to the CBA. The CBA found her "[niot
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E. Relationship Between Grounds for Impeachment and the Doctrine
of Judicial Independence
In his supplemental opinion denying rehearing in the Baby Richard
Case, Justice Heiple emphatically reminded everyone that the judiciary
is independent of the other branches of government. 24 The Illinois
House Committee also acknowledged the importance of maintaining
the independence of the judiciary. 25
Judicial independence is the bedrock of the judicial system and the
constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of
government. 126 The essence of judicial independence is a judge's
[qjualified" for the position. Id. Judge Nicholson claimed that the CBA failed to give
her due process in its consideration of her qualifications. See id. at 1135. Although the
appellate court held the CBA was not a state actor, so that the due process clause did not
apply to it, the appellate court went on to hold that even if the CBA were a state actor,
Illinois citizens do not have property interests in judgeships and, therefore, are not
entitled to due process pertaining to their efforts to become judges or, presumably, to
remain judges. See id. at 1139-40.
124. See In re Doe, 159 III. 2d 347, 367, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (1994). Heiple
declared:
We have three branches of government in this land. They are designated as the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. Legislative adjudication of private
disputes went by the wayside generations ago. Moreover, this case cannot be
decided by public clamor generated by an irresponsible journalist. Neither can
it be decided by its popularity or lack thereof. This case can only be decided
by a court of law. That is a judicial function pure and simple. For the Supreme
Court to surrender to this assault would be to surrender its independence, its
integrity and its reason for being. In so doing, neither justice to the litigants
nor the public interest would be served. Under the circumstances, this case
looms even larger than the child or the two sets of contesting parents.
Id.
125. See infra Appendix pt. I. The House Committee majority stated at the outset of
its report:
History teaches us that freedom is threatened when one branch of government
is able to control or ignore the independence of another branch. Each branch
of government, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, must function
cooperatively with but independently of the other two. This doctrine of
separation of powers requires that each branch of government respect and
protect the independent function of the other two branches within their own
sphere. Flowing from that concept is the necessary independence of the
judiciary. The independence of the judiciary is indispensable to the rule of law
and therefore to the protection of individual liberty. A fundamental aspect of
judicial independence is that the legislature cannot intervene in judicial affairs
on political grounds or because of disagreement with or dissatisfaction with
the opinions of a judge. Any such authority would destroy judicial inde-
pendence and make judicial tenure dependent on legislative pleasure. It would
deprive the citizens of this state of a major safeguard for their constitutional
rights.
Infra Appendix pt. I.
126. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also infra note 141
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ability-indeed, sometimes his or her responsibility-to render
unpopular decisions. Judges cannot fulfill this responsibility
effectively if they fear impeachment for doing so.
In considering the grounds for impeachment, it was essential for the
House Committee to ensure that Justice Heiple not be impeached
because of the opinions he had rendered. This was especially so
because, as a practical matter, without the unpopular Baby Richard
opinion, the ostensibly unrelated impeachment charges probably never
would have been brought. Both the majority and the dissenters on the
House Committee quite properly said that they had given no weight to
the Baby Richard Case in reaching their conclusions. 127
Most Americans learn about the constitutional role of the judiciary
prior to high school. They learn that judges are not to make decisions
based on majority vote or on their own personal predilections, but
rather on what the law says. This is an easy standard to articulate but
often a very difficult one to put into practice.
At the same time, Americans often have had a very difficult time
accepting unpopular decisions by judges who may be unelected and,
even if elected, are unavailable to be lobbied and persuaded as are
other public officials, such as aldermen, state legislators, and
congressmen, but who have the authority to block the public will. For
example, in California, in 1995, public outrage erupted after a federal
judge found portions of California's Proposition 187
unconstitutional. 28 This law, the result of a referendum passed by an
overwhelming vote of California citizens, amended the California
constitution to severely limit the rights and benefits of legal and illegal
aliens in California. 29 Another act by the judiciary that spurred
animosity among white Americans in the South in the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s occurred when federal judges declared various aspects of
(providing a defense of judicial independence).
127. See supra note 11 in which both the House Committee majority and dissenting
Representative Scott are quoted on the issue.
128. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D.
Cal. 1995); William Claibourne, Judge Strikes Some California Immigrant Bans, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 9847927; Paul Feldman, Prop. 187
Ruling Frustrating for Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22 1995, at Al; James 0.
Goldsborough, Prop. 187 Is Dead: Its Burial Is Overdue, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 4,
1995, at B7, available in 1995 WL 10340964.
129. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3418 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1998). The Proposition 187 provisions held unconstitutional
by the district court are modified at: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5(a), (b), and (c);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a), (b), and (c); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 and §
66010.8(a), (b), and (c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b(a), (b), and (c); and CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 53069.65.
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segregation unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution. Indeed,
white outrage became so high after the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in cases like Brown v. Board of Education130 and Cooper v.
Aaron 13 1 that "Impeach Earl Warren" billboards sprang up all over the
South.
More recent events reveal threats to the independence of Illinois
courts. In December of 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a five-to-
one vote, held the "Tort Reform Act of 1995' ' 132 unconstitutional under
the Illinois constitution.133 Among other things, the act placed "caps"
on the amounts of damages plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases
could recover for "pain and suffering."' ' 4 After the Illinois Supreme
Court held the bill unconstitutional, the Chicago Tribune reported that
the decision might trigger a wave of political contributions to judicial
candidates who are sympathetic to "tort reform."'' 35
130. 358 U.S. 463 (1954) (declaring "separate, but equal" elementary schools
unconstitutional).
131. 371 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering immediate desegregation of Central High School in
Little Rock, Arkansas).
132. Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-7.
133. See Best v. Taylor, 179 Il. 2d 367, 378, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (Il. 1997).
134. See id.
135. See Ken Armstrong & Sheryl Kennedy, Tort Reform Struck Down by Justices,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, § 1, at I. The report notes that:
For years, supporters and opponents of tort reform have flooded the
legislature with campaign dollars. Trial lawyers, the measure's biggest
opponents, consistently have given Democrats big donations. Manufacturing
and medical associations, the measure's biggest supporters, have ponied up
for the Republicans.
Given the fact that Illinois elects its judges, the donations flowing into the
campaigns of judicial candidates could see a marked increase.
"Organizations like ours have always paid a great deal of attention to who
is elected to the legislature and the governor's office. I think now we'll have
to pay closer attention to who is elected to the courts," said Greg Baise,
president of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association.
Id.
Article VI, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that members of
the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Court will serve ten-year terms,
whereas trial court judges who sit on one of the state's twenty-two circuit courts will
serve six-year terms. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, §10. All of these judges are initially
elected by the voters in partisan elections (except those judges initially appointed by
the Illinois Supreme Court to fill vacancies until the next election). See id. art. VI,
§12(c). When the initial term of these elected judges expires, they run for "retention."
See id. art. VI, § 12(d). In a retention election, the judge has no opponent. See id.
Instead, a proposition, which essentially reads, "Shall Judge Smith be retained in
office?" is put before the voters in the district in which the judge serves. See id. art. VI,
§ 12(d). Voters then vote either "yes" or "no." To be retained, a judge must receive
"yes" votes from 60% of those voting on his or her retention. See id. In downstate
Illinois, there are often only a handful of retention candidates in any given election. By
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The Illinois Manufacturers' Association ("IMA") responded to the
supreme court's tort reform decision by issuing a press release that
ignores the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of
judicial review. The IMA stated:
Today's action by the Illinois Supreme Court represents an
outrageous affront to a co-equal branch of the Illinois
government. By throwing out the entire tort reform act, five of
the justices of the court have sent a message that the will of the
people, acting through their elected representatives in the
General Assembly is irrelevant .... The complete dismantling
of the Illinois business community's efforts to improve the
business climate and future prosperity of Illinois is
disheartening to say the least. Apparently, it is time for the
business community to take a much closer look at the
individuals who seek to be the leaders of our judicial system in
Illinois. 136
The theory of the supreme court's tort reform decision is, of course,
that the General Assembly violated the limits placed on it by "the will
of the people" in acting beyond the scope of the legislative powers
delineated in the Illinois constitution. The role of judges in such cases
is similar to that of baseball umpires calling balls and strikes without
regard to which team benefits. Judges are supposed to "call"
legislation "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" based on what the
constitution says and how the judges interpret it, not based on whether
the decision will help or hurt any particular interest group.
The reported reactions to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
the tort reform case are by no means atypical. Americans believe in
majority rule. Majority rule appropriately governs the legislative and
executive branches of government. Yet, since Chief Justice Marshall's
decision in Marbury v. Madison 37 in which he held that "[iut is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,' 38 the third branch, the judiciary, has "undone" the
work of the other branches when, in an ostensibly neutral way, it
applies "the law" to declare a statute unconstitutional. Organized
contrast, in Cook County, there are always a substantial number. For example, in 1998,
if all of the judges in Cook County whose terms expire run for retention, there will be 81
retention candidates on the November, 1998 general election ballot.
136. Press release by Gregory W. Baise, President of Illinois Manufacturers'
Association ("IMA") (Dec. 18, 1997) (referring to overturning of tort reform) (on file
with the author). Mr. Baise previously served as an official in the administration of
former Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, and was the unsuccessful Republican
candidate for State Treasurer in 1990.
137. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
138. Id. at 177.
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opposition to judges in retention elections, as threatened by the
IMA, 139 is as serious a threat to judicial independence as a politically
motivated impeachment arising out of a controversial decision by a
judge.
A recent commentary on impeachment of federal judges addressed
the inextricable connection between judicial independence and the
appropriate limits on the ability of the legislature to impeach judges."14
That discussion harkened back to the original intent of the framers of
the Constitution in providing both an impeachment provision and
assurances of judicial independence. 4 ' The framers went to great
lengths to institute a system that would preserve judicial independence.
The reasons for this were discussed by Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist Paper No. 78, a treatise that Hamilton devoted entirely to the
rationale for insuring judicial independence under the Constitution. 42
139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (regarding IMA statements).
140. See Maxman, supra note 103.
141. In defense of judicial independence, one article notes:
The debates at the Constitutional Convention make clear that the Framers'
primary goal for the judiciary was to preserve its independence. The
importance of this objective traces back to the colonists' resentment of the
iron-fisted monarchical control of the judges in England. This is evidenced by
one of the principal grievances recited in The Declaration of Independence:
King George had "made judges dependent upon his will alone for the tenure of
their offices and the amount and payment of their salaries." The colonists'
dissatisfaction with the English system led them to adopt only those
provisions that promulgated the ideal of judicial autonomy.
Id. at 439 (footnotes omitted) (citing W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (1913); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN'rION OF 1787, at 65 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911)).
The Framers accurately recognized the need to protect the judiciary's independence.
"Today's judges frequently find that they have to cope with 'dramatic litigation in which
[they find themselves] confronted with the need to decide an explosive issue' and the
attendant 'risk[s] of unpopularity."' Id. at 440-41 (quoting [Justice] John Paul Stevens,
Reflections on the Removal of Sitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REV. 215 (1984)). Both
the Federal and Illinois Constitutions' complex impeachment design, and their
requirement of a two-thirds majority of the Senate for conviction, ultimately protects
citizens by ensuring that their judges do not make political decisions in order to
preserve their own tenure in office. This principle is as important today as it was at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution.
142., As Hamilton explained:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this,
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
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Judges today are rightly concerned that their independence is being
attacked because of the opinions they render. The kind of adverse
public reaction prompted by Justice Heiple's decision in the Baby
Richard Case is all too common. 43 So, too, is the reaction of the IMA
to the supreme court's decision in the Tort Reform case.' 44
One way in which the attacks on judicial independence have
manifested themselves is the efforts by some members of Congress to
amend Article III of the Federal Constitution to end life tenure for
federal judges and substitute fixed terms. Indeed, Senator Bob Smith
(R. - N.H.) has introduced a constitutional amendment to limit the
terms of all federal judges to ten years. t45 Interestingly, this proposal
is not new. Indeed, President Thomas Jefferson was one of the first
proponents of fixed terms for federal judges. Jefferson supported life
tenure during the ratification debates for the adoption of the
Constitution in 1789 and 1790 and continued to support them prior to
his taking office as President at noon on March 4, 1801. However,
just before noon that day, Jefferson's predecessor President John
Adams, whom Jefferson had defeated for re-election in a very bitter
race, made a number of "midnight appointments" to the federal bench
and other federal offices, including the appointment of John Marshall
as Chief Justice.14  Jefferson was furious, both with Marshall's
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors,
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have
a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (Alexander Hamilton); see also Geras v. LaFayette Display
Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Judicial independence is crucial to
the preservation of our system of government.").
143. See M.A. Stapleton, Loss of Judicial Independence Termed Real Risk, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 1, 1997, at 1. The story discusses a report issued by the American
Bar Association's Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence. The
report stated, "Recently, individual judges have been subjected to misleading criticism,
demagogic attacks and threats of impeachment from representatives of both political
branches in both political parties." Id. The article also noted that earlier in the year
Congressman Thomas DeLay, the House Majority Whip, stated that "Congress should
impeach federal judges whose rulings are particularly egregious." Id.
144. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 11. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill.
1997).
145. Walter R. Mears, Clinton Gets a Recess, But No Resolution in the Fight Over
Federal Judges, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 6, 1997.
146. In fact, Marshall's seminal decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1
Cranch) (1803), in which he declared that "it is emphatically the province and duty of
the Judicial department to say what the law is," involved the midnight appointments
which Marshall had certified in his capacity as Adams' Secretary of State. Id. at 177.
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appointment and, later, with decisions that the Supreme Court made
under Marshall's leadership during Jefferson's eight years in office.
Consequently, while President, Jefferson recommended that Congress
adopt an amendment to the Constitution, limiting the tenure of
judges. 117
The current political climate reflects the inherent unpopularity of
judicial independence, especially in instances where the exercise of that
independence means that popular legislation is rendered
unenforceable." ¢ Moreover, there is often little that judges can do to
counter that unpopularity. Judicial ethics rules generally prohibit
judges from explaining or defending their decisions outside of the
proceedings in which they are rendered. 149 Given judges' limited
ability to defend themselves, the constitutional necessity of maintaining
judicial independence, and judges' vulnerability to attacks from well-
organized groups that disapprove of a decision, it is especially
important that the legislative branches of government, whether it be
Congress or the Illinois General Assembly, show great restraint in
exercising the impeachment power.
In April 1996, Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered a major
speech on this subject occasioned by the decision of Judge Harold
Baer, Jr., a federal district judge in New York, barring certain evi-
dence from being admitted in a criminal drug trial.' 5° Judge Baer's
decision ignited a political firestorm in the then-on-going presidential
campaign between President Bill Clinton and Senator Bob Dole.
Senator Dole suggested that impeachment might be in order and
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During
the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997) (providing historical
details).
147. Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side, in RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 2.9, at 117 (2d ed. 1992).
148. See supra notes 31, 128-29, 132-33.
149. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63A(6) ("A judge should abstain from public comment about
a pending or impending proceeding."); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 96-5
(1996) ("A Judges Response to News Media Inquiries Regarding a Pending Case"),
available in 1996 WL 136795. This opinion held, in sum, that a violation of Supreme
Court Rule 63A(6) occurs if a judge speaks to a reporter about a ruling in a pending case,
unless the judge's comments are limited to: explanations of administrative procedures
of the court; the contents of the official transcript of the proceeding; or the contents of
the court order or written opinion. See id.; see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 67 (limiting a
judge's political activities, including the prohibition against a judicial candidate
"mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, to controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come before the court").
150. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 921 F.
Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at Washington
College of Law (Apr. 9, 1996).
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President Clinton stated that the judge, whom he had appointed,
should consider resigning if he did not reverse his decision.' 5' Chief
15 1. Newspapers around the country criticized both President Clinton and Senator
Dole for their statements. In an editorial, the Chicago Tribune stated, "Both remarks
amounted to nothing less than a frontal assault on the independence of the judiciary,
which [Chief Justice] Rehnquist rightly described as 'One of the crown jewels of our
system of government' . . . . That Dole and Clinton were willing to make political
football of a principle so fundamental to our system is deeply worrying." Editorial, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 11, 1996, §1, at 28. Similar editorials criticizing Clinton and Dole and
commending Chief Justice Rehnquist for his speech appeared in other papers. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Judicial Independence Listen to Rehnquist, ARIz. REPUBLIC-PHOENIX GAZETrE,
May 3, 1996, at B4, available in 1996 WL 7704386; Editorial, Judicial Independence: A
Matter for the Courts, HERALD-SUN, Apr. 22, 1996, at A8, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Hldsun File.
In a column, David Broder, a long-time syndicated political writer for the Washington
Post, quoted approvingly from the comments of Jon 0. Newman, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and three of his predecessors:
"The recent attacks on a trial judge of our Circuit have gone too far," they
said in a March 30 statement. "They threaten to weaken the constitutional
structure of this nation, which has well served our citizens for more than 200
years."
"Last Friday, the White House Press Secretary announced that the President
would await the judge's decision on a pending motion to reconsider a prior
ruling before deciding whether to call for the judge's resignation. The plain
implication is that the judge should resign if the decision is contrary to the
President's preference. That attack is extraordinary intimidation."
"Last Saturday," the statement continued, "The Senate Majority Leader
escalate the attack by stating that if the judge did not resign, he should be
impeached. The Constitution limits impeachment to those who have
committed 'high crimes and misdemeanors.' A ruling in a contested case
cannot remotely be considered a ground for impeachment .... "
"The Framers of our Constitution . . . did not provide for resignation or
impeachment whenever a judge makes a decision with which elected officials
disagree."
David Broder, Editorial, When Justice and Politics Collide, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA
CONST., Apr. 19, 1996, at A19. To a similar effect were the following articles: Nat
Hentoff, Judges in the Dock, WASH. POST., Apr. 13, 1996, at A2; Michael Kramer,
Cheap Shots at Judges: Where Clinton and Dole Took Presidential Politics Too Far, TIME
MAG., Apr. 22, 1996, at 57; and Anthony Lewis, The Stupid Politics of Judge-Bashing,
TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 13, 1996, at 15, available in 1996 WL 9959309; and Marianne
Means, Playing Judicial Politics Is Not Good for the Nation, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Apr.
17, 1996, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chtms File.
Intriguingly, Carol McHugh Sanders, a staff writer for the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
wrote an analysis in April 1996 comparing Judge Baer's plight to that of Justice Heiple,
nearly a year before the impeachment investigation of Justice Heiple began. See Carol
McHugh Sanders, Judges Find Themselves Caught in Spotlight's Cold Glare, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Apr. 27, 1996, at 24. The American Bar Association Journal, in an article
which appeared in its May 1996 issue, noted that House Speaker Newt Gingrinch (R. -
Ga.) and 150 other members of Congress had issued a statement urging Judge Baer to
resign. See Henry J. Reske, A Duffle Bag of Controversy for Judge: Jurist Reverses his
Criticized Decision to Bar Drug Evidence Stashed in Luggage, 82 A.B.A. J. 32 (May
1996).
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Justice Rehnquist nevertheless implicitly defended Judge Baer against
attacks by the other branches of government. Rehnquist began his
discussion by recounting the impeachment trial of Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, which was prompted by and based
explicitly on the decisions Chase had rendered as a trial court judge.
The Senate narrowly acquitted Justice Chase, a result which Rehnquist
strongly applauded. 152 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the
independence of the... judiciary is essential to its proper functioning
and must be retained."' I
The granting of judicial independence to judges and either life tenure
or tenure for a substantial number of years carries with it certain
obligations on the part of judges. Among those obligations are that
judges conduct themselves in a "decorous" and "judicial" manner.15
There were also some newspaper columns and editorials that supported President
Clinton and Senator Dole in their comments regarding Judge Baer. An Indianapolis Star
editorial explicitly disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's statement that judges can only be
impeached for a commission of serious crimes or grossly unethical conduct. The
editorial commented, "[Als long as judicial activists like Judge Baer come up with
offbeat rulings, there will be howls of protest from the other branches of government.
The principle of an independent judiciary is not a license for abuse of the Constitution."
Editorial, A Vote for Original Intent, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 17, 1996, at A16,
available in 1996 WL 3133586.
In a column in the Boston Globe, Jeff Jacoby explicitly called for the use of
impeachment in cases where judges make offensive decisions. He said, "The
impeachment tool has grown rusty with disuse. It ought to be resorted to more
frequently. When judges make blunders that shock the conscience, calls for their
removal aren't cheap shots. They are healthy and honest, just what the Framers
intended." Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Judges Aren't Untouchable-Incompetent Ones Should
Be Impeached, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 1996, at 17; see also Bruce Fein, It's OK to
Judge Judges, RECORDER, May 22, 1996, at 4.
152. In commenting on that decision and its importance today, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said:
This decision by the Senate was enormously important in securing the kind of
judicial independence contemplated by Article III. Coming only two years
after the seminal decision of the Court in Marbury v. Madison, it, coupled with
the authority of the federal courts to declare legislative acts unconstitutional
[established in Marbury], [provided] the assurance of federal judges that their
judicial acts-their rulings from the bench-would not be a basis for removal
from office by impeachment and conviction. And that has been the guiding
principle of the House of Representatives and the Senate from that day to this;
federal judges have been impeached and convicted-happily, only a very
few-but it has been for criminal conduct such as tax evasion, perjury and the
like.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at Washington College of Law (Apr. 9,
1996).
153. Id.
154. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 62(A) ("A judge . . . should conduct himself or herself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.").
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They must speak about cases only through their rulings 5' and they
must endeavor to base their decisions on neutral, non-political
principles.' 6 Judges never must use their immense power for any
private end. 57
Justice Heiple may well have breached these obligations by his
conduct in the Baby Richard Case. He certainly violated "rules"
requiring decorum and proscribing political opinions by including his
virulent criticisms of Bob Greene, Governor Edgar, and the General
Assembly in his opinion on the motion for reconsideration.'m This
action diminished the court's stature and demonstrated poor judgment.
Heiple's opinion also injected the court into a direct political dialogue
with the executive and legislative branches of state government, a
dialogue the court was institutionally not well-equipped to carry on.
However, despite Justice Heiple's clear lapses in judgment, it is not at
all clear that these actions warranted an impeachment hearing or
investigation.
III. THE HOUSE COMMITTEE'S DISPOSITION OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST JUSTICE HEIPLE
The Special House Investigating Committee's impeachment
investigation of Justice Heiple was handled on an expedited basis. On
April 14, 1997, the House adopted H.R. 89, which authorized the
creation of the Special House Investigative Committee. In H.R. 89,
the House required the House Committee to report its findings by no
later than May 12, 1997, only twenty-eight days later. On April 17,
1997, then Chief Justice Heiple retained former Illinois Governor
James R. Thompson to act as his attorney in the impeachment
proceedings."5 The Special House Investigating Committee hired its
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
156. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 63(A)(1) ("A judge should be faithful to the law and... should
be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear or criticism.").
157. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 62(B) (mandating that judges not allow family or other
relationships to influence the judge's conduct).
158. In re Doe, 159 Il. 2d 347, 365-68, 638 N.E.2d 181, 189-90 (Il1. 1994). See
supra text accompanying notes 13-49 for relevant excerpts of this decision.
159. See Daniel J. Leahmann, Thompson to Defend Heiple at Hearings, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1997, at 4.
Justice Heiple was not the first Illinois Supreme Court Justice threatened with removal
by the Illinois House to retain a prominent former public official to act as his counsel.
In 1842, Justice Thomas Brown retained former State Representative Abraham Lincoln
(Whig-Springfield) to represent him in removal proceedings being held in the House.
See Kevin McDermott, Lincoln Defended Judge in 1843 Case that Parallels 1997, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 4, 1997, § 1, at 7C, available in 1997 WL 3339845. Justice
Brown was one of the original members of the Illinois Supreme Court when the state was
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counsel on April 24, 1997, when it retained former United States
District Court Judge Frank McGarr."6
On April 29, 1997, the Special House Investigating Committee held
its first hearing. 61  At that hearing, the House Committee heard from:
Donald Hubert, the President of the Chicago Bar Association
("CBA"), who both testified and tendered the CBA report; Ralph A.
Gabric, the President-elect of the Illinois State Bar Association; and
Martin J. Oberman, the President of the Chicago Council of Lawyers.
Each of the bar association presidents testified as to what they thought
were the important legal issues confronting the House Committee. All
three bar leaders emphasized the need to preserve judicial
formed in 1818. See id. In 1839, the Whig-Party dominated supreme court had allowed a
Whig Secretary of State to remain in office over the objection of a newly-elected
Democratic governor. The same supreme court essentially disenfranchised Irish and
German immigrants from voting in elections, to the perceived political detriment of the
Democratic Party. See Doug Pokorski, Heiple's Call to Big Jim Not Without Precedent:
Lincoln Once Served at Impeachment Hearing, STATE J.-REG., May 4, 1997, § 1, at 1. In
response, when the Democrats took control of the legislature, they enacted a "court-
packing" scheme which increased the membership on the Illinois Supreme Court from
four to nine, with all five of the new members being Democratic. See id. Despite now
holding a majority on the court, the Democrats sought to punish Justice Brown and so
they alleged that he lacked the physical or mental capacity to continue serving as a
judge. See id. Bill Bierd, currently the Assistant Editor of the Lincoln Legal Papers
Research Project in Springfield, Illinois, reports that Justice Brown had not written an
opinion in nearly a decade at the time the House considered removing him from the
bench. See id.
Lincoln spoke at the second House hearing on Justice Brown's potential removal
which was held on New Year's Day of 1843. See id. Lincoln was apparently so eloquent
on Brown's behalf that the Democratic majority passed a gag rule barring him from
speaking again for the remainder of the hearing. Thereafter, the House would only allow
Justice Brown and members of the House to speak. See id. By contrast, the Special
House Committee allowed former Governor Thompson to speak on Justice Heiple's
behalf throughout the 1997 impeachment investigation.
The House in 1843 never took any definitive action with respect to Justice Brown. It
is not clear from the record if the House actually conducted an impeachment
investigation or considered removing Justice Brown through the mechanism of
"legislative address," a procedure under the Illinois Constitution of 1818 which allowed
a judge to be removed for "reasonable cause" that was insufficient for impeachment. See
RISHEL, supra note 99, at 3. Two-thirds of both the Illinois House and Senate had to vote
for removal and the governor had to approve. See id. In any event, Lincoln succeeded in
preserving his client's tenure on the Illinois Supreme Court.
160. Andrew Fegelman & Christi Parsons, House's Heiple Panel Picks Retired Judge,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 1997, § 2, at 1. Judge McGarr has served as a member of the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting in Chicago from 1970 to 1988.
Possibly the most recognized case over which he presided was Charles 0. Finley & Co.
v. Kuhn, No. 76C-2358 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'g 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). In this
case, McGarr upheld baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn's right to disallow trades made
by Oakland A's owner Charlie Finley on the ground that the trades were not in the "best
interest of baseball." Id.
161. See infra Appendix pt. I.
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independence. The House Committee then recessed until May 5,
1997, at which time it began four days of evidentiary hearings.' 62
The Special House Investigating Committee consisted of ten
members.'" The House Committee heard testimony from twenty-four
witnesses."6 The witnesses included: (1) several of the police officers
who had been involved in the traffic altercations with Justice Heiple;
(2) Bonita Welch, a law clerk working for the Illinois Appellate Court
in Justice Heiple's home third judicial district whose salary Justice
Heiple allegedly improperly reduced; (3) Illinois Supreme Court
Justices Charles Freeman, Moses Harrison II, and Benjamin Miller;
and (4) Justice Heiple himself.' 65
The House Committee heard evidence on nine subjects. These
included:
(1) Justice Heiple's traffic violations and his alleged efforts
to use his office to avoid receiving citations;
(2) Justice Heiple's discussion of one of the traffic incidents
that occurred in Pekin, Illinois, with fellow members of the
court, including Justice Harrison, prior to the Courts
Commission hearing;
(3) Issues pertaining to Justice Heiple's election as Chief
Justice by his fellow justices in September 1996;
(4) Justice Heiple's selection of Justice Harrison to chair the
Courts Commission in January 1997;
(5) The appointment in January 1997, by Justice Heiple of
Illinois Appellate Court Justice William Holdridge of the third
judicial district to serve as the Administrator of the Office of
Illinois Courts, while simultaneously continuing to serve as a
judge;
162. See infra Appendix pt. II.
163. The House Committee consisted of five Democrats and five Republicans.
Representative Barbara Currie (D. - Chicago) and Representative Jack Kubik (R. -
Riverside) served as co-chairpersons of the House Committee. See infra Appendix
(conclusion). The other four Democratic members were Representative Judy Erwin (D. -
Chicago), Arline Fantin (D. - Calumet City), Lovana Jones (D. - Chicago), and Douglas
Scott (D. - Rockford). The other Republican members were Representatives Verna
Clayton (R. - Buffalo Grove), Brent Hassert (R. - Lemont), Carolyn Krause (R. - Mt.
Prospect), and Dan Rutherford (R. - Pontiac). See infra Appendix (conclusion). The
House of Representatives in the 90th Illinois General Assembly is composed of 60
Democrats and 58 Republicans. Although virtually all standing committees contain a
partisan majority, both House Speaker Michael Madigan (D. - Chicago) and House
Minority Leader Lee Daniels (R. - Elmhurst) felt that the Heiple investigation committee
should have an equal number of Democrats and Republicans. See Pearson & Parsons,
supra note 1, at 1.
164. See infra Appendix.
165. See infra Appendix pt. II.
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(6) The reduction in salary of Bonita Welch;
(7) Justice Heiple's alleged failure to include on his
Statement of Economic Interest certain loan transactions into
which he had entered;
(8) Issues pertaining to Justice Heiple's rental of space for
his Peoria office as a justice of the court in a building owned by
a bank in which his wife was a director and shareholder; and
(9) Issues pertaining to Justice Heiple's request to be
excused from serving on jury duty.
In its majority report, the House Committee examined each of these
nine issues. It commented on what it felt were the essential facts and,
with the exception of the Bonita Welch matter, set forth its conclusion
that impeachment was not warranted. The two dissenters,
Representatives Douglas Scott (D. - Rockford) and Carolyn Krause
(R. - Mt. Prospect), filed separate reports addressing certain of these
issues in detail and explaining why they felt impeachment was
warranted.
In this section, the House Majority's appraisal of the facts
surrounding each of the nine categories of charges will be examined
first and then the dissenting views of Representatives Scott and Krause
will be considered.
A. The House Committee's Majority Report
1. Traffic Violations
The House Committee addressed the conduct of Justice Heiple with
respect to the four traffic stops that served as the subject of the Courts
Commission hearing. Three of the stops were for speeding; in each of
those instances, no citation was issued. On two of those occasions,
Justice Heiple, when asked for his driver's license and proof of
insurance, displayed his court credentials in a manner calculated to
insure that the officer knew of his position as a supreme court justice.
The fourth traffic stop occurred in Pekin, Illinois, when a police
officer tried to pull Justice Heiple over for speeding. The incident
escalated into a confrontation, resulting in Justice Heiple's arrest and
the issuance of charges for speeding, failure to yield to an emergency
vehicle, resisting a police officer, and two counts of disobeying a
police officer.66 Justice Heiple ultimately pled guilty to speeding and
disobedience to a peace officer, which resulted in a fine of $346. The
166. See Bailey, Under Fire, supra note 8, at 1.
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other charges were dismissed. 67
At some point in the summer of 1996, the JIB commenced an
investigation of Justice Heiple regarding his conduct during these four
traffic stops. On January 23, 1997, the JIB issued a complaint against
Justice Heiple. 168  Subsequently, Justice Heiple filed a written
response in which he stated that he would not refute the facts alleged
by the JIB. 16
9
167. See infra Appendix pt. II.A.
168. See Bailey, Under Fire, supra note 8, at 1.
169. See Bailey, Won't Contest Accusations, supra note 8, at I. On February 28,
1997, the Courts Commission set a public hearing on the complaint for April 1, 1997,
to be held in Collinsville, Illinois. See David Bailey, Convenience of Site Cited for
Chief Judge Ethics Hearing, CHI. DAILY L. BULL, Mar. 3, 1997, at I [hereinafter Bailey,
Convenience Cited]. On March 14, 1997, Justice Heiple moved that no witnesses or
other evidence be presented at the public hearing. See David Bailey, Act Quickly, Heiple
Asks Commission, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 14, 1997, at 1. The JIB opposed Justice
Heiple's motion and sought to call several of the officers as witnesses. See David
Bailey, Ethics Panel Wants Heiple Evidence Heard, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 19, 1997,
at 1. Heiple's attorney subsequently sought leave to submit transcripts of JIB
interviews with the police officers and to permit Heiple to address the Commission. See
Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, When his Hearing Ends, Heiple Does the Talking:
Judge Tells His Side After Panel Session, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 1997, § 1, at 1. In a
controversial ruling, the Courts Commission decided that no evidence could be permitted
because Chief Justice Heiple was not disputing the allegations of the complaint. See
Panel Putting Witnesses on Hold Until Hearing on Heiple Charges, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25,
1997, § 2, at 3; Heiple Gets a Hearing: No Testimony Heard, But Press Session Held,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 1, 1997, at 1.
The JIB also unsuccessfully sought to have Illinois Supreme Court Justice Moses
Harrison II recused as the chair of the Courts Commission for Justice Heiple's case. See
David Bailey, Courts Panel Rejects Bid to Boot Harrison, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 24,
1997, at 1 [hereinafter Bailey, Panel Rejects Bid]. The JIB argued that "Harrison should
be recused because Heiple selected him for chairman while already under investigation
for ethics violations. The JIB had also contended that if Harrison could not be replaced
for cause, the board could still ask for his substitution as a matter of right," pursuant to
section 2-1001 of the ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-1001(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997), which allows a party to disqualify one judge in a
civil trial court proceeding for any reason, prior to the judge rendering a substantive
ruling in the case. Id. With Justice Harrison abstaining, the Courts Commission held
that the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to proceedings before the Courts
Commission because members of the Courts Commission are more akin to appellate
judges than trial judges, even though they normally do hear witnesses and make findings
of fact. See id. There is, however, also no right of appeal of a Courts Commission
decision. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e). Because there is no right of substitution of
judge for appellate or supreme court proceedings, the Courts Commission reasoned that
the JIB had no right of substitution in its proceeding against Chief Justice Heiple. See
Bailey, Panel Rejects Bid, supra, at 1.
The Illinois constitution mandates that the Courts Commission consist of one member
of the Illinois Supreme Court, two appellate court Justices, and two circuit court judges.
See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e). But see infra Part IV.B (discussing a proposed
amendment to the Illinois constitution to be submitted to Illinois voters for ratification
in November 1998 which would change the composition of the Courts Commission, by
1998]
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On April 30, 1997, after the commencement of the impeachment
investigation, the Illinois Courts Commission sustained the JIB's
position and issued its opinion and order in which it censured Justice
Heiple for his conduct regarding the traffic violations. 70 The Courts
Commission found that Justice Heiple violated canons of judicial
ethics set forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rules 61 and 62A.17 ' The
Courts Commission held that "Justice Heiple's conduct was prejudicial
to the administration of justice and brought the judicial office into
disrepute.' 17
2
The House Committee majority concluded that Justice Heiple "used
his position on the Court to influence the officers detaining him to treat
him with leniency."' 73 The House Committee also found that Heiple
disregarded his obligation as a citizen to respond to police instructions
and flashing patrol lights. The House Committee concluded that
"[Heiple's] conduct during the confrontation ... was arrogant and
overbearing . . . [but] did not rise to the level of an impeachable
offense." 74
2. Justice Heiple's Discussion of the Pekin Incident with Fellow
Members of the Supreme Court
At the first meeting of the Illinois Supreme Court, following the
Pekin incident in January, 1996, Justice Heiple conveyed his version
of those events to his fellow justices. 75 About a year later, when the
JIB filed a complaint against Justice Heiple, Justice Freeman raised the
issue of whether the Illinois Courts Commission was the appropriate
adding public lay members and alternate judicial members).
The press criticized the Courts Commission for both the location and the date of the
hearing. See Bailey, Convenience Cited, supra, at 1. All prior Courts Commission
hearings had taken place in either Springfield or Chicago. See id. The Courts
Commission held the Heiple hearing in Justice Harrison's hometown, Collinsville, a
small city in the southern tip of Illinois, far from the Chicago and Springfield media
markets. See id. The Commission held the hearing on municipal election day in
Illinois. See id. Among the cities holding a hotly contested mayoral election that day
was Peoria, the largest city in Chief Justice Heiple's third judicial district. Some
commentators charged that the Courts Commission chose April 1, 1997 as the hearing
date knowing that it would obtain little media coverage because of the media attention
paid to the elections. See Bob Greene, Will the Public Believe the Fix Is in?, CHt. TRIB.,
Mar. 30, 1997, § 1, at 2.
170. See In re Heiple, No. 97-CC-1, order at 8 (Cts. Comm'n of I11. Apr. 30, 1997).
171. See id.
172. See id; see infra Appendix pt. II.A.
173. Infra Appendix pt. II.A.
174. Infra Appendix pt. II.A.
175. The "Pekin incident" refers to Justice Heiple's arrest by the Pekin police. See
supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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body to consider the charges against Justice Heiple because Justice
Moses Harrison chaired the Courts Commission and had been a
witness to Justice Heiple's description of the facts of the Pekin
incident. 76  Justice Freeman sought a meeting of the justices to
discuss whether a special commission or some other vehicle should be
established to adjudicate the charges against Justice Heiple.' 7 7
However, only two other justices, Justices Mary Ann McMorrow and
Benjamin Miller, joined in Justice Freeman's call for such a meeting.
Four justices needed to be present for such a meeting to be held.' 78 In
considering Justice Heiple's refusal to vote for the holding of such a
meeting, the House Committee declared that Heiple's action did not
constitute an impeachable offense. 79
3. Election of the Chief Justice
Article VI, section 3, of the Illinois constitution provides that the
seven members of the Illinois Supreme Court are to elect, from their
number, a chief justice who serves a three-year term.18 It has been a
practice of the supreme court to alternate the election of the chief justice
between a member of the court from Cook County, from which there
are three members, and a member from one of the four downstate
districts, based on seniority.'18  Upon the expiration of Chief Justice
Michael Bilandic's three-year term in December 31, 1996, pursuant to
the geographic and seniority practice, Justice Heiple was next in line to
serve as chief justice. 82
176. See infra Appendix pt. ll.B.
177. See infra Appendix pt. II.B.
178. See infra Appendix pt. II.B.
179. See infra Appendix pt. II.B. Specifically, the House Committee noted that "[i]t
would appear to have been a better course had Justice Heiple voted for a meeting to
discuss alternatives to the Courts Commission's resolution of this matter, but this
internal administrative decision does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct."
Infra Appendix pt. lI.B.
180. ILL. CONST. art VI, § 3.
181. See Adriana Colindres, Freeman New Chief Justice, STATE J.-REG., May 13,
1997, at I ("Traditionally, Supreme Court members choose as their Chief Justice the
person who has the most seniority on the court but who has not yet been chief justice.
The Chief Justice's title has also traditionally alternated between justices from Cook
County and downstate."); Heiple Named Chief Justice, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 26,
1996, at 1.
182. Justice Bilandic is from Cook County. Justice Heiple, from the third judicial
district, was the second-most senior justice from the four downstate districts. The most
senior, Justice Ben Miller from the fourth judicial district, had served as chief justice
from January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1993. As the senior-most justice on the
court, Justice Miller also served as acting chief justice during the two-week period in
May 1997 after Justice Heiple had resigned as chief justice and before the court convened
to elect Justice Freeman to serve the balance of Justice Heiple's term as chief justice
1998] 783
784 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
Traditionally, the court votes on the election of a new chief justice in
November of the year of expiration of the current chief justice's
term.'1 3 However, in September 1996, Justice Freeman suggested
that the court hold its election of a new chief justice, presumably
Justice Heiple, during its September term rather than waiting until
November because "an earlier election might serve to avoid an
anticipated letter-writing campaign against the election of Justice
Heiple."'
According to the House Committee, Justice Freeman asked Justice
Heiple, on a number of occasions in September, 1996, whether there
was an ongoing JIB investigation of his conduct regarding the traffic
stops and, if so, what had come of it.185 Justice Freeman wanted that
through December 31, 1999.
183. See infra Appendix pt. II.C.
184. Infra Appendix pt. II.C. Justice Freeman testified to this effect when he
appeared before the House Committee. Both his testimony and the Illinois Supreme
Court's unusual action in electing Justice Heiple in September 1996 instead of
November 1996 indicate that the court itself demonstrated a surprising fear of public
opinion. See infra Appendix pt. II.C.
185. See infra Appendix pt. II.C. Testimony regarding this and other conversations
between Justice Heiple and his colleagues on the supreme court was elicited at the House
Committee hearing despite initial indications that Justice Heiple might attempt to
invoke "judicial privilege" to bar such evidence. Judicial privilege enables judges to
keep confidential conversations with their secretaries, clerks, and fellow judges. See
generally Statement of the Judges, 14 F.R.D. 335, 335-36 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (noting that
judicial privilege barred enforcement of a subpoena seeking to compel a judge to testify
about a pending case). Justice Heiple's lawyers apparently raised this issue in private
discussions without any privilege being asserted.
There are only a handful of Illinois cases that discuss the term "judicial privilege," and
none of them pertain to a judge exercising such a privilege. See People v. May, 251 111.
54, 95 N.E. 999 (1911) (finding that "judicial privilege" required the Clerk to determine
the adequacy of surety bond for stay pending appeal); People v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 27
N.E. 1091 (II1. 1891); Cummings v. Beaton Assocs., Inc., 249 Ill. App. 3d 287, 311,
618 N.E.2d 292, 306 (1st Dist. 1992) (finding that judicial privilege did not support
repudiation of a contract entered into in bankruptcy court proceeding).
It is fairly well established in both case law and commentary that judges do have a need
for confidentiality in dealing with their staff members and, at least on an appellate level,
with their fellow judges. The following succinctly states the rationale for such
confidentiality:
The relationship between a judge and her staff is one that, until recently, the
communities of the bench, the bar, and society at large have regarded as nearly
sacred. The injury that would inure to that relationship if judges knew that
their law clerks and other chamber staff could be summoned by judges serving
on other courts would outweigh any conceivable benefit.
Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 117-18 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
A number of cases arose during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon in
which federal courts, in addressing issues of executive privilege exercised by the
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information before deciding whether to go forward in voting for
Justice Heiple to be the new chief justice.'8 According to the House
Committee, Justice Heiple had been informed by the JIB of the
opening of a file, had acknowledged that fact in writing, and had been
given a date to be interviewed by the JIB, all before the Illinois
President commented in dicta on the existence of judicial privilege. See, e.g., New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. 752 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(commenting in the "Pentagon Papers Case" that the Court possesses the inherent power
to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations by "whatever judicial measures
may be required").
The lone out-of-state decision on the applicability of judicial privilege in an
impeachment investigation indicates that a judge usually cannot assert the privilege in
those circumstances. See In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an
Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488
(11 th Cir. 1986). That case concerned an investigation by the Judicial Council of the
Eleventh Circuit into the possible impeachment proceedings of then United States
District Court Judge Alcee Hastings. Judge Hastings had been acquitted of bribery
charges as a basis for impeachment. The Judicial Council played an analogous role to
that of the House Committee in the Heiple matter.
When Judge Hastings and his staff invoked judicial privilege in an effort to quash
subpoenas directed to Judge Hastings' law clerk and secretary, the Court of Appeals held
that the investigating committee has the burden of proving "the importance of the
inquiry for which the privileged information is sought; the relevance of that information
to its inquiry; and the difficulty of obtaining the desired information through alternative
means." Id. at 1521. However, the court held that judicial privilege is a qualified
privilege that would ordinarily fall in the context of a judicial impeachment
investigation: "Allowing witnesses to withhold evidence relevant to the Committee's
investigation would call into question the Committee's ability to arrive at an accurate
recommendation and thus could gravely impair the Committee's performance of its
statutorily-assigned functions." Id. at 1522-23. Judge Hastings' staff was required to
testify. In 1989, the House of Representatives did impeach Judge Hastings based on the
bribery allegations. Later that year, the Senate convicted him and thus removed him
from his judicial office. In 1992, former Judge Hastings became Congressman Hastings
(D. - Fla.) when he was elected by an overwhelming margin from his Miami district. He
continues to serve in that capacity today.
Rather than the broad judicial privilege exception for impeachment proceedings
articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, a standard for Illinois judges should be employed
similar to that used to determine the applicability in litigation of the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege. Just as the crime-fraud exception prevents
the use of the attorney-client privilege "when a client seeks or obtains the services of an
attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity," In re Decker, 153 I11. 2d 298,
313, 606 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (1992). The judicial privilege should not be used with
respect to a judge's communications in furtherance of an abuse of power or an egregious
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, the assertion of judicial
privilege by the subject of an impeachment investigation should be overcome only if a
showing is made adequate to support a good-faith belief by a reasonable person that the
desired testimony may reveal evidence that the judge knew or should have known that
the intended conduct addressed in those communications was illegal or unethical. Cf. id.
at 322-25, 606 N.E.2d at 1106-07 (adopting a similar procedure for determining
applicability of crime-fraud exception).
186. See infra Appendix pt. II.C.
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Supreme Court held the election for a new chief justice."s The House
Committee found that Justice Heiple did not disclose any of those facts
to his fellow justices. Nonetheless, the House Committee held that
this did not constitute an impeachable offense."im
4. Election of Justice Harrison to Chair the Courts Commission
During Justice Bilandic's three-year term as chief justice from
January 1994 through December 1996, Justice Heiple served as Chair
of the Illinois Courts Commission. It is a normal practice of the
Illinois Supreme Court to have the justice who is next in line to be
chief justice serve as Chair of the Courts Commission.'89 Upon
Justice Heiple's election as chief justice, Justice Freeman became next
in line for the chief justice position by virtue of his seniority and the
fact that he was from Cook County. However, in early January,
1997, at a meeting of the court, Chief Justice Heiple announced his
resignation from his position as Chair of the Courts Commission and
recommended that Justice Moses Harrison succeed him. 90 The
justices thereupon elected Justice Harrison to chair the Courts
Commission.191
At the time that then Chief Justice Heiple recommended Justice
Harrison for election as Courts Commission Chair, he still failed to
inform his fellow justices of the JIB's ongoing investigation. 92
Moreover, Chief Justice Heiple had not disclosed that charges could be
filed against him and that a trial could be held by the Courts
Commission under the chairmanship of whomever the justices
selected.' 93 In considering these facts, the House Committee criticized
Justice Heiple and suggested that he should have recused himself from
the vote; however, the House Committee concluded that Justice
Heiple's acts and omissions regarding the election of Justice Harrison
did not constitute an impeachable offense."9
187. See infra Appendix pt. II.C.
188. See infra Appendix pt. II.C. "It is the conclusion of the Committee that a
concern for comity, cooperation and trust among the Justices should have led Justice
Heiple to inform the Court of these facts, but his failure to do so does not rise to the
level of an impeachable offense." Infra Appendix pt. II.C.
189. See infra Appendix pt. II.D.
190. The House Committee heard conflicting evidence regarding whether or not
Justices Heiple and Harrison were close friends. See infra Appendix pt. I.D.
191. See infra Appendix pt. II.D.
192. See infra Appendix pt. II.D.
193. See infra Appendix pt. II.D.
194. The House Committee commented:
Thus, at the time of the election of the Chairman, the Chief Justice should
have informed the Court of the open Judicial Inquiry Board file involving him
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5. Appointment of Justice Holdridge as Court Administrator
In January, 1997, before the Illinois Supreme Court convened for
its January term, Chief Justice Heiple informed his fellow justices that
he was going to appoint his former law clerk and now Illinois
Appellate Court Judge William Holdridge of the third judicial district 95
as the Director of the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts. 1" Three
members of the court, Justices Miller, Freeman, and McMorrow,
informed Justice Heiple that they objected to the appointment of Judge
Holdridge on the ground that it violated the provision of the Illinois
constitution that requires judges to "devote full time to judicial duties"
and prohibits them from holding "office under the United States or this
State or unit of local government or school district or in a political
party.'', 97 The three justices asked Justice Heiple to refrain from
issuing his order appointing Justice Holdridge until they could file
simultaneous dissents. 198  Despite these requests, Justice Heiple
proceeded to issue his order after the close of business on a Friday
afternoon without waiting for the dissents to be prepared. In its
review of this action, the House Committee chided Heiple's lack of
collegiality.'99 The House Committee did not explicitly state that
and should have recused himself from voting on the Harrison appointment.
While the Committee is highly critical of this conduct, it finds that it does not
rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
Infra Appendix pt. II.D.
195. The third judicial district is the district which Justice Heiple "represents" on the
supreme court and in which he had served on the appellate court.
196. See infra Appendix pt. II.E.
197. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13(b); see also infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting)
(providing portions of the dissents of Justices Miller, Freeman and McMorrow).
198. See infra Appendix pt. II.E.
199. See infra Appendix pt. II.E (The Committee notes, again, Justice Heiple's lack
of attention to collegiality on the Court.")
The Chicago Council of Lawyers ("Council") took the preliminary steps necessary to
commence a quo warranto proceeding against Justice Holdridge under section 18-101 of
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-101 (West 1996).
A quo warranto action can be brought against any person who "unlawfully holds or
executes any office created by the authority of this state." Id. at 5/18-101(1). The
Council would have sought to have Justice Holdridge removed as Administrator of the
Office of Illinois Courts on the ground that he could not constitutionally serve in that
capacity because of the full-time employment provision for judges contained in the
Illinois constitution, article VI, section 13. Before filing its action, the Council was
required to demand that the State's Attorney of the appropriate counties (in this case,
Cook and Sangamon Counties, where the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts is
located, and LaSalle County, where Justice Holdridge resides) and the Illinois Attorney
General file the action and that they had refused to do so. See id. The Council had
received notification from the Attorney General and all but one of the state's attorneys
that they were going to file a quo warranto action when, on April 17, 1997, Justice
Holdridge resigned as the Director of the Administrative Office.
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Justice Heiple's conduct did not constitute an impeachable offense.
Instead, the House Committee indicated that it would not question the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution on this issue. 200
6. Reduction of the Salary of Bonita Welch
Bonita Welch served from 1982 to 1994 as the law clerk to Illinois
Appellate Court Justice Tobias Barry, a member of the Illinois
Appellate Court from the third judicial district. In 1990, Justice Barry,
a Democrat, ran against Justice Heiple, a Republican, for the vacancy
on the supreme court from the third district. Justice Heiple defeated
Justice Barry by less than one percent of the popular vote and less than
2,300 total votes. 20 1
After Justice Barry announced his retirement from the appellate
court in early 1994, Ms. Welch sought and received a position as a
legal research clerk to the entire appellate court in that district. 2°2 The
appellate court justices placed her salary at the mid-range for her grade,
$39,464. One of the justices then made a request to Justice Heiple, in
his administrative capacity, to authorize an increase in Ms. Welch's
annual salary to approximately $40,200, the amount she had been
receiving when she was clerking for Justice Barry.2 °3 The House
Committee found that, in response, Justice Heiple ordered that Ms.
Welch's salary be reduced to the entry level salary of $32,571.204 The
House Committee found that Justice Heiple exceeded his authority
under Rule 5(D)(1) of the Illinois Supreme Court Job Classification
and Compensation Rules.20 5 The House Committee did not express
any conclusion as to whether this conduct constituted an impeachable
offense but instead noted the inconsistencies in the testimony. 2°6
200. See infra Appendix pt. II.E.
201. See William Grady, Democrats Keep High Court Edge, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1990,
§ 3, at 15.
202. See infra Appendix pt. II.F.
203. See infra Appendix pt. II.F.
204. See infra Appendix pt. II.F. In explaining why he reduced Ms. Welch's salary,
Justice Heiple testified that "a research clerk claiming twelve years of experience has but
one year of experience repeated twelve times." Infra Appendix pt. II.F.
205. See infra Appendix pt. II.F.
206. The House Committee stated:
Testimony differs on this matter. Two witnesses testified that Justice
Heiple ordered the reduction in salary. Justice Heiple said he was merely
giving his opinion. Bonita Welch testified that Justice Heiple was motivated
by hostility to her former judge employer, Justice Barry. Justice Heiple
testified that he had no personal animus against Bonita Welch, and that he
acted only on the general principle that her experience did not justify more
than entry level compensation.
Infra Appendix pt. II.F.
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7. Failure to Disclose Loans
Justice Heiple failed to include on his annual Statements of
Economic Interest, two short-term loan transactions he entered into
during the years 1991 and 1995.207 Justice Heiple repaid these two
loans less than a month after receiving them.2  The House Committee
found Justice Heiple's failure to report the loans inadvertent and
insignificant.2"
8. Office Rental
Justice Heiple leased his regional court office in Peoria from a bank
in which his wife was a director and a shareholder. It is unlawful for
an elected official to enter into a lease, or other contract, which will be
paid for with state funds if the other party to the lease is a corporation
in which the elected official's spouse owns at lease seven and one-half
percent of the outstanding stock.2 0 However, the House Committee
found that Justice Heiple's wife's ownership interest in the bank did
not exceed the statutory minimum. 1
9. Jury Summons
Media reports alleged that Justice Heiple may have improperly
avoided jury duty.21 2 However, the House Committee found that he
had properly asked to be excused because of an illness in his family.2"3
10. House Committee's Conclusions
In examining the allegations against Justice Heiple, the House
Committee found that Justice Heiple's conduct did not warrant
impeachment. Instead, the House Committee found that Justice Heiple
acted in a manner unbecoming an Illinois Supreme Court justice and
that he had demeaned the Illinois Supreme Court. In summarizing its
conclusions, the House Committee declared:
207. Virtually all Illinois state elected officials from all three branches of
government are required to file statements of economic interests on an annual basis. See
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 420/4A-101 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997). These statements
require office-holders to disclose publicly certain economic interests they hold,
especially in securities and real estate, in hopes of ferreting out conflicts of interest.
208. See infra Appendix pt. II.G.
209. See infra Appendix pt. II.G.
210. See infra Appendix pt. II.H; 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/11.1 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997).
211. See infra Appendix pt. II.H; 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/11.1.
212. See Bill Bush, Heiple Cited Hardship to Get out of Jury Duty, COPLEY NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 4, 1997, State and Regional section.
213. See infra Appendix pt. II.I.
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The Illinois House of Representatives and this Committee
may consider the totality of Justice Heiple's conduct, even if his
acts when viewed separately do not support the conclusion that
impeachment is appropriate. There is no question that Justice
Heiple's lapses in memory while testifying, poor judgment and
repeated instances of arrogant behavior have diminished the
public's respect for the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the
standard for impeaching a judge because his or her conduct
brings the court into disrepute must be based on egregious
conduct. It is clear that Justice Heiple's conduct does not meet
the criminal standard such as treason, bribery, sale of office. A
Justice may be impeached for non-criminal conduct. But that
conduct must be of a magnitude of gravity comparable to the
criminal standard. In the opinion of the Committee, Justice
Heiple's transgressions do not meet that standard. The
Committee's conclusions must be supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Bearing this standard in mind the Committee
finds the testimony it has heard has failed to show that Justice
Heiple engaged in impeachable conduct. Breaches of comity,
common sense and collegiality, while unfortunate, are not
sufficiently grave to justify impeachment.
In no way should the Committee's failure to find grounds
for impeachment lead to the conclusion that the Committee
condones Justice Heiple's behavior. On the contrary, the
Committee is severely critical of Justice Heiple's arrogance, his
failure to deal with his colleagues with candor and trust, and
his imperious internal administration of the Courts.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that the conduct of
Justice Heiple evidenced by this hearing, while mean spirited
and demeaning to the Court, and unbecoming a Justice of the
Illinois Supreme Court, does not justify the recommendation to
the Illinois Senate of Articles of Impeachment. 1
B. The Dissents
The two lawyer members of the House Committee, Representative
Douglas Scott (D. - Rockford) and Representative Carolyn H. Krause
(R. - Mt. Prospect), each filed dissents, arguing that Justice Heiple's
conduct did warrant impeachment. Representative Scott contended
that Justice Heiple should be impeached because he had committed
serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and had abused his
power as a judge. Representative Krause argued that impeachment
214. Infra Appendix (conclusion).
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was warranted because of the cumulative effect of Justice Heiple's
conduct. Both dissents are examined in this section.
1. Representative Scott's Dissent
Representative Douglas Scott contended that Justice Heiple's
conduct with respect to the traffic incidents, his interference with
Bonita Welch's salary, his withholding of information from his fellow
justices, and his failure to recuse himself from the election of Justice
Harrison to chair the Courts Commission, all constituted abuses of
power and breaches of the public trust.21 5 Specifically, Representative
Scott found "clear and convincing evidence demonstrat[ing] that
Justice Heiple has both committed serious violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and has abused his power as a judge. "216
In connection with the traffic incidents, Representative Scott found
that Justice Heiple's testimony was not credible. Commenting on both
the Pekin incident and a prior incident that occurred in Mason City,
Representative Scott said that Heiple's explanation of the incidents
"neither comport with law or common sense., 217 Quoting the Courts
Commission's opinion, Representative Scott's discussion of the traffic
incidents concluded that "[b]ecause of [Heiple's] office and his
position of leadership in the judiciary, he had a special obligation to
comport himself properly and to set an example for others. Under
these circumstances, [Heiple's] misconduct was particularly damaging
to the integrity of the court system. '21
With respect to Bonita Welch's salary, Representative Scott set forth
a detailed summary of the testimony that the House Committee heard
from other witnesses. Because virtually all of the other witnesses
contradicted Justice Heiple's testimony, Representative Scott did not
find Justice Heiple's testimony credible.21 9 Representative Scott
contended that, "[w]hile the motivation may not be clear, it is clear that
215. See infra Appendix pts. II.A-C (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
216. Infra Appendix pt. I (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
217. Infra Appendix pt. II.A (Rep. Scott, dissenting). Specifically, Representative
Scott commented:
Justice Heiple's explanation for failing to pull over was that, in both the
incident in Pekin and the Mason City incident, where he did not pull over for
over five miles, Justice Heiple stated that he did not believe the lights were
meant for him. This explanation neither comports with law or common sense,
as drivers are taught to, and, in fact, legally required to, pull over for
emergency vehicles approaching from the rear, whether they think they are
meant to be pulled over or not. This is also part of the Vehicle Code.
Infra Appendix pt. II.A (Rep. Scott, dissenting) (citations omitted).
218. Infra Appendix pt. II.A (Rep. Scott, dissenting) (citation omitted).
219. See infra Appendix pt. II.B (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
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Ms. Welch was treated differently and unfairly . . . and that this
different treatment was the direct result of actions by Justice
Heiple. ' 22
0
Representative Scott concluded that Justice Heiple also abused his
power in failing to tell his fellow justices about the pendency of the
JIB investigation in September 1996 when he was elected chief justice,
and then again in January 1997 when Justice Heiple sought approval
of his nomination of Justice Harrison to chair the Courts
Commission. 22' Representative Scott argued that Justice Heiple's
conduct constituted violations of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, as codified in Illinois Supreme Court Rules 61, 62,
and 63.222
Representative Scott concluded his examination of the various
incidents by arguing:
Individually, perhaps none of these incidents would warrant
removal from the bench. But it is clear to me that the
Legislature (and for that matter, the Courts Commission) should
220. Infra Appendix pt. II.B (Rep. Scott, dissenting). Representative Scott
summarized the evidence as follows:
Justice Heiple's testimony with respect to this matter is simply not
credible in light of the other evidence. He testified that his first involvement
with the case was the phone call from Judge Slater. However, Mr. Davison
testified that, on February 21st, and before Judge Slater's call to Justice
Heiple, Justice Heiple had told him to reduce Ms. Welch's salary to the
minimum level. This is corroborated by Mr. Davison's February 21st Order
reducing Ms. Welch's salary to the minimum level.
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Justice Heiple
intervened in this matter, where no other Supreme Court justices have
intervened in similar situations, in direct contravention of Supreme Court
Rules, the practice of the Third District, and ,the desires of the judges of the
Third District. While the motivation may not be clear, it is clear that Ms.
Welch was treated differently and unfairly compared to other employees, and
that this different treatment was the direct result of actions by Justice Heiple.
lnfra Appendix pt. II.B (citations omitted).
221. See infra Appendix pt. ILC (Rep. Scott, dissenting) (citations omitted).
Representative Scott stated,
Justice Heiple's participation in all of these decisions cannot be sloughed off,
as it directly pertains to the integrity of the Court, and the Courts
Commission.
Not only his fellow justices, but the public has the right to expect that
important judicial decisions are made with full knowledge of all pertinent
information, and that individual justices are not withholding information for
their own personal gain. That happened in this matter and it cannot be coun-
tenanced.
Infra Appendix pt. II.C (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
222. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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and does have the ability to remove a judge for a pattern of
behavior that evidences the abuse of power and breach of the
public trust that is evident in this case.
We have a Supreme Court Justice who not only refused to
recuse himself from a decision impacting the selection of a
person who would shortly thereafter rule on his case, but who
helped to block an attempt even to discuss the issue, and who
most importantly, withheld information and misrepresented his
circumstances to his fellow justices to further his personal ends.
Justice Heiple's Post-Hearing Memorandum also makes the
argument that an impeachment in this case would "dilute the
force of the Constitution's impeachment clause." Again, I
disagree. Simply because impeachment in Illinois has been
used once, or because it was used for conduct different or
arguably worse than these matters does not mean that it is
improper to proceed in this case. If we do not proceed, we run
the risk of weakening the bench, by destroying the integrity of
the judiciary as set forth through the Canons. That is a far
worse consequence.223
2. Representative Carolyn Krause's Dissent
Representative Krause dissented on the ground that the cumulative
effect of Justice Heiple's conduct warranted impeachment because it
constituted "egregious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct."'224
Representative Krause felt that the House Committee majority
employed too narrow a standard of "egregious conduct" in its
evaluation of Justice Heiple's conduct.22 In addition, Representative
Krause relied on at least two sources outside of the Illinois Code of
Judicial Conduct to formulate the standard she used to assess Heiple's
conduct: (1) a North Dakota Supreme Court decision involving
proposed discipline of a trial court judge, in which the Court explained
that "[j]udges hold a unique position of administering justice" and are
held to a higher standard than laymen;226 and (2) the Pennsylvania
223. Infra Appendix pt. IV (Rep. Scott, dissenting).
224. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
225. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
226. See Matter of Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 327 (N.D. 1978). The court found
that:
It necessarily follows that judges must be and are held to higher standards than
laymen. Judges hold a unique position of administering justice. They
symbolize the law and justice and, consequently, their action and behavior
will reflect favorably or unfavorably on the integrity of the judiciary and the
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House Report concerning the impeachment of then Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen in 1994.227
Representative Krause argued that Justice Heiple should be
impeached for violating Illinois Supreme Court Rule 61, Rule 1 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct of Illinois, because he failed to "personally
observe[] high standards of conduct so that the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary may be preserved. '228  In particular,
Representative Krause found that Justice Heiple's failure to inform his
fellow justices about the pendency of the JIB investigation prior to his
election as chief justice and his conduct with respect to the traffic
violations constituted violations of Rule 61.29
Representative Krause also concluded that Justice Heiple violated
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62, which requires a judge to "[a]void
[ilmpropriety and the [a]ppearance of [i]mpropriety in [a]ll of the
[jiudge's [a]ctivities" by his participation in the election of Justice
Harrison to chair the Courts Commission. 230 Representative Krause
stated that this act constituted an impeachable offense because the
elected judge (whom Justice Heiple had nominated and voted for)
would chair the trial of the JIB's claims against Justice Heiple should
the JIB file a complaint against him."
Finally, Representative Krause stated that Justice Heiple violated
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63, which requires a judge to "diligently
discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the
high respect required in the administration of justice . ... Any action or
behavior of a judge which will destroy the public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary will tend to cause disrespect for the law itself.
Id.; see infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
227. See infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting). Representative Krause cited the
following language from the Pennsylvania House Report:
I. Because the House has the sole power of impeachment, it has broad
discretion to consider a variety of serious misconduct as grounds for impeach-
ment. If the misconduct may bring the courts into disrepute, undermine public
confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the court system or bring into
serious question a justice's fitness to remain in office, it may be considered.
2. Impeachable misconduct is not limited to criminal offenses, but it must
be serious and substantial in nature, and reasonably related to the judicial
office of the subject.
3. The House of Representatives may consider a person's misconduct in
the aggregate in considering whether he or she is liable to impeachment.
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 86.
228. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
229. See infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
230. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting) (quoting ILL. SUP. CT. R. 62).
231. See infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
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performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and
court officials," when he lowered Bonita Welch's salary.232 Like
Representative Scott, Representative Krause found Justice Heiple's
testimony on this issue not to be credible. Justice Heiple's
appointment of Justice Holdridge without allowing dissents to be filed
simultaneously with the order announcing the appointment also
troubled Representative Krause. Representative Krause concluded her
dissent by stating that "I believe that the cumulative effect of Justice
Heiple's actions can lead to no other conclusion but his conduct
constitutes egregious violations of the Judicial Code of Ethics and...
impeachment should proceed.
' '23
IV. DID THE HOUSE COMMITTEE GET IT RIGHT?
By all indications, all ten members of the House Committee took
their responsibilities seriously and conducted the investigation in a
nonpartisan and professional manner. The House Committee
members made critical judgments regarding witness credibility as well
as what type of behavior by a public official constitutes "egregious"
behavior. 234 In setting out what should be the appropriate standards
for impeachment, the House Committee relied upon the CBA Report
that had been presented to the House Committee on the first day of the
hearings. In reaching its conclusion that Justice Heiple should not
be impeached, the House Committee majority declared that "[t]o
impeach on any basis less than the most serious misconduct is to
232. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting) (quoting ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63).
233. Infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
234. In the United States, politicians have always been the judges of other public
officials in the impeachment process. Explaining why the Federal Constitution placed
impeachment power in the legislative, rather than the judicial branch of government,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
[w]hat, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution [of impeachment]
itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct
of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the
inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves?
THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
235. The House Committee said:
The report of the [Chicago] Bar Association discussed the standards for
impeachment and said: "Not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
warrants impeachment. Impeachment should be reserved for egregious
violations. Less serious ethical infractions should result in discipline by the
Courts Commission."
It is the conclusion of the Committee that legislative impeachment should
be limited to extraordinary cases of judicial misconduct involving serious vio-
lations of the law or serious breaches of trust.
Infra Appendix pt. I (quoting CBA REPORT, supra note 51).
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establish a precedent susceptible to future abuse of the legislative
authority and unwarranted attempts to breach the doctrine of
Separation of Powers. '
The House Committee was correct in its general formulation of a
standard. However, the House Committee majority did not adequately
support the conclusions in its report because it failed to respond
directly to the arguments raised by both Representatives Scott and
Krause in their dissents. It certainly would have been helpful had the
House Committee majority explained why it concluded that none of the
allegations against Justice Heiple constituted impeachable conduct.
For example, with respect to Justice Heiple's conduct regarding the
traffic violations, the House Committee concluded that Justice Heiple
"used his position on the Court to influence the officers detaining him
to treat him with leniency. ' '237 Both Representatives Scott and Krause
set forth their reasons, in detail, for determining that such conduct
constituted an impeachable offense.2 38 The majority should have
explained why it found such conduct "serious" but not rising to the
level of "egregious" conduct that would require impeachment.
Instead, the House Committee merely provided a tautological statement
that the Justice Heiple's conduct was not impeachable because
"[h]owever inappropriate," it did "not rise to the level of an
impeachable offense.""
Similarly, both Representatives Scott and Krause explained, in
detail, the bases for their conclusion that Justice Heiple committed an
impeachable offense with respect to the reduction of Bonita Welch's
salary.2' ° By contrast, the House Committee majority merely set forth
a short summary of the facts regarding the incident with Ms. Welch,
without providing even a conclusory statement that the conduct did not
warrant impeachment.24  Because both of the dissents put such strong
emphasis on the Bonita Welch matter and, in particular, their
236. Infra Appendix (conclusion).
237. Infra Appendix pt. II.A.
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. Infra Appendix pt. II.A.
240. Representative Scott relied upon the testimony of Justice Ken Slater of the
Illinois Appellate Court in the third district and Bob Davison, the Director of the
Administrative Office of Illinois Courts, as well as various correspondence to argue that
Justice Heiple's testimony of Bonita Welch salary was not credible and that his actions
"constitute[d] an abuse of his judicial power." Infra Appendix pt. II.B (Rep. Scott,
dissenting).
Representative Krause relied on essentially the same evidence to argue that Justice
Heiple's conduct with respect to Bonita Welch constituted an "egregious" violation of
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63. See infra Appendix (Rep. Krause, dissenting).
241. See infra Appendix pt. II.F.
796 [Vol. 29
Impeachment and Judicial Independence
contentions that all of the other witnesses contradicted Justice Heiple's
testimony, the House Committee majority should have addressed
Justice Heiple's credibility and the bottom line issue of why the
majority concluded that the conduct did not warrant impeachment.
Ultimately, President Gerald R. Ford's definition of impeachment,
"whatever a majority of the House of Representatives consider it to be
at a given moment in history, 242 may be the most accurate practical
description. In the case .of Justice Heiple, it appears that eight of the
ten members of the House Committee simply did not "feel" that
impeachment was warranted, based on their "experiences" as
politicians and legislators.
The House Committee majority made the correct political judgment
in deciding not to pursue impeachment, but they did so based on a
questionable rationale. According to what both the majority and the
dissenters said in their opinions and based on the conclusion of the
Illinois Courts Commission in its censure of Justice Heiple, it appears
that Justice Heiple did, indeed, commit offenses that, at least in the
aggregate, could be deemed impeachable. Certainly, the repeated use
of his position to try to persuade the police officers not to issue tickets
to him constituted an abuse of power. Justice Heiple's conduct with
respect to the reduction in salary of the law clerk, Bonita Welch, also
equated to an abuse of power and "egregious conduct;" even the
House Committee majority did not try to dispute this.
Justice Heiple's actions in orchestrating the appointment of Justice
Harrison to chair the Courts Commission and Justice Holdridge to
become the Courts Administrator are also troubling. It appears that
Justice Heiple misled his fellow justices about the status of the pending
JIB investigation. If this conduct merely demonstrates Justice
Heiple's lack of candor and collegiality, then the majority correctly
decided that this act did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
However, if Justice Heiple arranged the appointment of Justice
Harrison to influence the Courts Commission, this would constitute a
gross abuse of power and an egregious violation of ethical duty under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63 that requires judges to "exercise the
power of appointment on the basis of merit." Justice Heiple also
242. JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 405
(1980). President Ford rendered his definition in 1970 when, as the Minority Leader of
the U.S. House of Representatives, he led an abortive effort to seek the impeachment of
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas. See id. Four years later when Ford was
serving as President Richard Nixon's Vice-President and while Nixon was the subject of
a House impeachment investigation, Ford posited a much narrower definition: only the
commission of a serious criminal offense could warrant impeachment. See Philip
Shabecoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1974, at 1.
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demonstrated very poor judgment on April 1, 1997 when immediately
after his Courts Commission hearing ended, at which none of the
police officers were allowed to testify based on Justice Heiple's
promise to the Commission to rely only on his pleading and not
contest the facts, Justice Heiple conducted a ninety-minute press
conference during which he repeatedly attacked the credibility of the
police officers.243 All of these actions established a hostile political
climate. Indeed, only two days after Justice Heiple's press
conference, Representatives Gwenn Klingler (R. - Springfield) and
Eileen Lyons (R. - Western Springs) filed their impeachment
resolution.2 4
Despite all of Justice Heiple's actions, the potential damage to the
independence of the Illinois court system had Justice Heiple been
impeached and convicted would have been a greater blow to Illinois
government than any damage resulting from not removing Justice
Heiple from the bench. There would not have been an impeachment
investigation of Justice Heiple but for the Baby Richard Case. Had
Justice Heiple been impeached and convicted, albeit ostensibly for his
conduct regarding the traffic stops or the Bonita Welch incident, or
even for his aggregate conduct as a judge and judicial administrator,
the lesson that would have been drawn by Illinois judges, legislators,
and citizens is that impeachment is a legitimate punishment for a judge
who renders an unpopular decision in a highly publicized case. Such a
result would discourage Illinois judges from rendering controversial
decisions in highly publicized cases, such as Baby Richard or the tort
reform case.
V. A CALL FOR REFORM
As a result of the Heiple saga and the related issues already
discussed, at least two significant reforms should be made regarding
the Illinois judiciary:
243. See ILL. SuP. Cr. R. 63(B)(4). The authors agree with the majority that none of
the remaining allegations against Justice Heiple satisfies the standard for impeachment.
For example, the appointment of Justice Holdridge as Director of the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts before the dissenting Justices could file dissents displays an
unfortunate lack of collegiality, but does not constitute a gross abuse of power or other
impeachable offense. The same is true for Justice Heiple's lack of candor with' his
fellow justices regarding the status of the JIB investigation before his selection as chief
justice.-
244. Christi Parsons & Ken Armstrong, Move to Impeach Under Way, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 4, 1997, § 1, at 1.
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1. The Illinois constitution should be amended to contain a
formal definition of an impeachable offense.
2. The Illinois constitution should be amended to prohibit any
member of a particular court from sitting as a member of the
Courts Commission when another member of that same court is
being tried. Laypersons also should be added to the Courts
Commission.
A. Amend the Impeachment Provision of the Illinois Constitution
The absence of any description of appropriate grounds for
impeachment in the Illinois Constitution of 1970 is problematic.245
245. It appears that the constitutions of 47 states have impeachment provisions.
Hawaii, North Carolina, and Oregon appear to be the only states without them.
Of the states which have impeachment provisions, Illinois appears to be one of only
six states whose constitutions provide for impeachment that does not define an
impeachable offense. Texas, Montana, New York, Connecticut, and Georgia are the
other five states. The Texas constitution simply provides for the impeachment of
"Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and District Court" without defining the
grounds. TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 2. The Montana constitution provides only that certain
categories of public officials, including "judicial officers" are subject to impeachment,
but it does not appear to define an impeachable offense. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 13. The
New York constitution provides that judges may be removed by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses of the Legislature "for a cause" but does not define "cause." N.Y. CONST. art. VI,
§ 23. The Connecticut constitution provides only that the executive and judicial offices
"shall be liable to impeachment." CONN. CONST. art. IX, §3. The Georgia constitution
says that the Georgia House of Representatives may bring "impeachment charges"
without defining any basis for such charges. GA. CONST. art. III, §6.
The provisions of the remaining states can be divided into several general categories.
Ten states have impeachment provisions which are essentially modeled on the
impeachment provision in the federal constitution of "high crimes and misdemeanors."
See ARIZ. CONST. art. 8, § 2; ARK. CONST. art. 15, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. VI, § 2; KAN.
CONST. art. II, § 28.; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 50; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 19; VA. CONST.
art. IV, § 17, WASH. CONST. art. V, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. III, § 18; Wis. STAT. § 17.06
(West 1996); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9. Some of these states also provide for
additional grounds. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (malfeasance in office); ARK. CONST.
art XV ("gross misconduct in office"); DEL. CONST. art. VI ("malfeasance in office,
corruption, or neglect of duty"); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 17 ("malfeasance in office,
corruption, or neglect of duty"); WIS. STAT. § 17.06 ("corrupt conduct in office").
A second group of states have impeachment provisions which tend to define
impeachable conduct as "any misdemeanor in office." CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. IV, §
19; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17; IDAHO PENAL CODE § 19-4001; IND. CONST. art. VI, § 7; KY.
CONST. § 68; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 5; NE. CONST. art. IV, § 5; N.J. CONST. art VII, § 3;
NEV. CONST. art. 7, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 24. The Illinois Constitution of 1870
defined an impeachable defense as a "misdemeanor" in office, but that provision was
removed from the Illinois Constitution of 1970 for the reasons set forth by delegate
James Parker to the Illinois Convention of 1970. See supra note 59.
Five states, Alaska, Iowa, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, have a
definition of an impeachable offense as "malfeasance" or "misfeasance" or
"maladministration" or a similar word. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("malfeasance
or misfeasance"); IOWA CONST. art. 3, sec. 20 ("misdemeanor or malfeasance in office");
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The House Committee majority in the Heiple case was hindered by the
failure of the Illinois constitution to define an impeachable offense.
The inclusion of standards might have helped guide the House
Committee in Justice Heiple's case. For example, there seemed to be
relatively little dispute among the members as to what happened with
respect to Justice Heiple's involvement in bringing about a significant
reduction of Bonita Welch's salary. House Committee members
obviously differed as to what Justice Heiple's conduct meant from the
perspective of impeachment.
In light of the House Committee majority's view that impeachment
should apply only to "egregious" conduct, the Illinois General
Assembly should adopt an amendment to article IV, section 14, for
ratification by the voters that would read, in pertinent part, with the
new portion being italicized and added immediately after the current
first sentence:
MASS. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, pt. 2c.1 ("misconduct and maladminstration"); PA. CONST.
art. VI, §6 ("any misbehavior in office); and VT. CONST. ch. II, §58
("maladministration").
Eight states explicitly provide for impeachment for the commission of crimes or
felonies. These are Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Each of these states has slight variance of
this felony theme. See LA. CONST. art. X, § 24 ("felony or for malfeasance or gross
misconduct"); MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 7 ("crimes or misdemeanors"); MINN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2 ("corrupt conduct in office or for crimes and misdemeanors"); N.H. CONST. pt.
2, art. 38 ("bribery, corruption, mal-practice, or maladministration"); N.M. CONST. art.
IV, § 36 ("crimes, misdemeanors, and malfeasance in office"); R.I. CONST. art. XI, § 3
("incapacitated or guilty of the commission of a felony or crime of moral turpitude,
misfeasance, or malfeasance); S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 1 ("serious crimes or serious
misconduct"); TENN. CONST. art. V, § 4 ("commit any crime in their official capacity
which may require disqualification").
Six states have a very lengthy lists of impeachable offenses, all of which include the
improper use of alcoholic beverages and most of which include moral turpitude, as well
as some of the grounds listed in the less-inclusive constitutions of the states previously
mentioned. These six states are Alabama, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and West Virginia. See ALA. CONST. art VII, sec. 173 ("willful neglect of duty,
corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or
narcotics to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its
duties, as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving
moral turpitude while in office"); MO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("crimes, misconduct, habitual
drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense
involving moral turpitude or oppression in office"); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 10 ("habitual
drunkenness, crimes, corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in office"); OKLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § l("willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, habitual drunkenness,
incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude committed while in office");
S.D. CONST. art. 16, § 3 ("drunkeness, crimes, corrupt conduct or malfeasance or
misdemeanor in office"); W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 ("maladminstration, corruption,
incompetency, gross immorality, neglect of duty or any high crime or misdemeanor").
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The House of Representatives has the sole power to conduct
legislative investigations to determine the existence of cause for
impeachment and, by the vote of a majority of the members
elected, to impeach executive and judicial officers.24 Cause for
impeachment with -respect to, judicial officers shall consist of
egregious violations of judicial ethics, gross abuses of power,
systemic nonfeasance, or willful malfeasance in office. Cause
for impeachment with respect to executive officers shall include,
but not be limited to, gross abuses of power, systemic
nonfeasance, willful malfeasance, or other serious misbehavior
in office.
This proposed definition distills the concepts contained in many of
the constitutional provisions in the other states in both the judicial
discipline removal cases and impeachment proceedings. It is both
complete and concise. It acknowledges that judges can commit
"egregious violations of judicial ethics" whereas executive officers, by
definition, cannot. Defining the grounds for impeachment would
benefit members of all three branches of Illinois government by
providing guidance and direction on these crucial matters. In addition,
it would undercut any claim by a future subject of an impeachment
investigation that the lack of any definition in the Illinois constitution
of an impeachable offense constitutes a violation of the subject's
federal due process rights.247
B. The Composition of the Illinois Courts Commission
When it created the Illinois Courts Commission as part of the 1962
Amendment to the Judicial Article of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, the
Illinois General Assembly most likely did not contemplate that a
member of the Illinois Supreme Court would be brought up on charges
before the Courts Commission. Specifically, article VI, section 15(e)
246. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
247. See, e.g., In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1988). In Young, a judge
challenged the constitutionality of the judicial disciplinary commission's proceedings
against him on the ground that the allegation that he had engaged in "conduct
unbecoming a judge," was void for vagueness. See id. at 387-88. It appears from the
cases cited in Young that almost any definition of cause is constitutionally satisfactory
in a judicial removal proceeding. See, e.g., Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 614 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (holding that a standard of "misconduct in office is constitutional");
Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp 79, 81 (N.D. III. 1970) (holding that a statute
providing for dismissal "for cause" is constitutional); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785,
809 (Minn. 1978) ("The constitutionality of necessarily broad standards of professional
conduct has long been recognized."). However, it is not absolutely clear that a state
constitution's impeachment provision which contains no definition of cause would
survive a federal due process challenge. Thus, inclusion of some definition of grounds
for impeachment in the Illinois constitution would be helpful.
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of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provided for the continued
existence and functioning of the Illinois Courts Commission, 2' but
despite the 1969 scandal involving Illinois Supreme Court Justice Roy
J. Solfisburg, Jr. and Ray I. Klingbiel, 24 9 the constitution did not
prescribe procedures to be followed in disciplinary cases against an
Illinois Supreme Court Justice.
The ancient Romans used to ask the question, "Quis custodes et
custodiet?" which means "Who guards the guards? 2 50 The Illinois
Supreme Court is in an untenable position whenever the Courts
Commission investigates one of its members because the Illinois
constitution, in its current form, provides that a member of the
supreme court must be the chair of the Courts Commission. This
creates an inherent appearance of a conflict of interest.
Justice Heiple exacerbated this problem by using his power as chief
justice to appoint Justice Harrison as his successor, at a time when
Justice Heiple was under investigation by the JIB. Justice Harrison,
was perceived, correctly or otherwise, as Justice Heiple's closest
friend on the court.25'
The JIB moved for the disqualification of Justice Harrison from
sitting on the Commission for the Heiple hearing.252 The Courts
Commission denied that motion, indicating that the constitution
mandates that a member of the supreme court sit on and, indeed,
preside over the Courts Commission's hearings. 253 In other words,
the Courts Commission relied on the "rule of necessity" that allows a
248. Article VI, section 15(e) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides in
pertinent part:
A Courts Commission is created consisting of one Supreme Court Judge
selected by that Court, who shall be its chairman, two Appellate Court Judges
selected by that Court, and two Circuit Judges selected by the Supreme Court.
The Commission shall be convened permanently to hear complaints filed by
the Judicial Inquiry Board . . . . The Commission shall have authority after
notice and public hearing, (1) to remove from office, suspend without pay,
censure or reprimand a Judge or Associate Judge for willful misconduct in
office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office
into disrepute, or (2) to suspend, with or without pay, or retire a Judge or
Associate Judge who is physically or mentally unable to perform his duties.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e).
249. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
250. JUVENAL, SATIRES VI, act I, 1. 347 (Niall Rudd Trans, Claredon Press 1991).
251. See Bailey, Panel Rejects Bid, supra note 169, at 1; Bailey, Convenience Cited,
supra note 8, at 1.
252. See Bailey, Panel Rejects Bid, supra note 169, at 1; John Flynn Rooney, Courts
Commission Wrong on Recusal: JIB, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 27, 1997, at 1.
253. See Bailey, Panel Rejects Bid, supra note 169, at 1.
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judge or group of judges, who have a conflict of interest, to
nevertheless hear a case when no one else is legally eligible to hear the
case.254 The only way to address the inherent conflict of interest is to
amend the constitution.
Article VI, section 15(e) should be amended to provide that, when a
member of the Illinois Supreme Court is brought before the Courts
Commission, no member of the supreme court may serve on the
Courts Commission for that proceeding. It should further read that in
such proceedings the fifth member of the Commission should be
chosen by the Illinois Appellate Court from amongst the presiding
justices of all of the districts of the appellate court, other than the
district in which the supreme court justice being charged resides.
To further improve the impartiality, and the appearance of
impartiality, of Courts Commission proceedings, article VI, section
15(e) should be amended to provide that no judge from an appellate
district or circuit court can sit on a Courts Commission hearing
involving another judge from the same appellate district or circuit
court. If the JIB brings a member of the First District Appellate Court
of Illinois before the Courts Commission, then neither of the appellate
court members of the Courts Commission who hear that matter should
be from the first district. Similarly, if the JIB brings a judge from the
nineteenth judicial circuit before the Courts Commission, neither of the
two circuit court judges sitting on the Courts Commission who hear
that matter should be from the nineteenth circuit.
Public confidence in the Courts Commission also would be
enhanced if there were public lay members on the Courts Commission.
The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC")
that hears charges against and disciplines Illinois attorneys does have
public members.2" Having public members would tend to ensure the
general public in high profile disciplinary actions, similar to that of
Justice Heiple, that embarrassing matters were not being swept under
the proverbial rug.
As this Article is going to press, the Illinois General Assembly has,
just adopted, a proposed constitutional amendment for placement on
the ballot for ratification by all Illinois voters at the November-3, 1998,
254. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (holding that the rule of
necessity authorized Supreme Court to decide cases involving compensation of federal
judges); Collura v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 135 Ill. App. 3d 827, 482 N.E.2d 143, 149
(2d Dist. 1985) (authorizing the rule of necessity), aff'd, 113 Ill. 2d 361, 498 N.E.2d
1148 (1986).
255. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 751(b) provides, in pertinent part, that, "the Commission
shall consist of four members of the Illinois Bar and three nonlawyers appointed by the
Supreme Court."
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general election.- Three amendments were originally proposed in the
1998 session of the Illinois General Assembly. Representative
William Brady (R. - Bloomington) 25" proposed House of
Representatives Joint Resolution 14 ("H.R.J. Res. 14"), the first of
these amendments. Next, Representatives Louis I. Lang (D. - Skokie)
and Senator Dan Cronin (R. - Elmhurst) filed separate, but verbatim,
amendments in both the House and Senate respectively. Lang filed the
amendment as House of Representatives Joint Resolution 20 ("H.R.J.
Res. 20"), and Cronin filed it as Senate Joint Resolution 52 ("S.J.
Res. 52"). Elena Z. Kezelis, Governor Edgar's Chief Legal Counsel,
served as the primary drafter of the Lang-Cronin Amendment.2 5 On
March 25, 1998, the Illinois House Judiciary-Civil Law Committee
voted eleven-to-zero to adopt H.R.J. Res. 20.25o On the same day, the
Illinois Senate Executive Committee approved S.J. Res. 52
unanimously.26 On April 2, 1998, the entire Senate adopted S.J.
Res. 52 by a vote of fifty-eight-to-one.26' On April 21, 1998, the
Illinois adopted H.R.J. Res. 20 by a vote of one-hundred-ten-to-
one.
262
The Lang-Cronin Amendment would increase the membership of
the Courts Commission from five to seven. The Governor would
appoint two new, public members who could be either attorneys or
non-attorneys but who could not be judges.263  The five judicial
256. See David Heckelman, House OKs Measure to Revamp Courts Panel, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Apr. 22, 1998, at I [hereinafter Heckelman, House OKs Measure]; David
Heckelman, Amendment to Change Courts Commission to Appear on Ballot, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Apr. 29, 1998, at I [hereinafter Heckelman, Amendment to Appear on Ballot].
257. Brady represents the legislative district in the heart of Justice Heiple's supreme
court judicial district.
258. See David Heckelman, Bill to Change Court's Commission Advances, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 25, 1998, at 24.
259. See id. at 1. At that hearing, Ms. Kezelis testified in support of the Lang-
Cronin Amendment, as did Representative Lang himself. In addition, Jerome Meites,
the co-author of this Article, testified in support of both the Lang-Cronin and Brady
Amendments on behalf of the CBA. He testified that the CBA supported the principal
provisions of both amendments, the inclusion of public members, the Courts
Commission's publication of rules, and the use of alternates to avoid conflicts of
interest. However, he also suggested an accommodation of the provisions of each in a
the final draft of the amendment.
260. See Margaret Schroeder, Proposals Would Amend Judiciary Article, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Mar. 25, 1998, at I.
26 1. See Measure Would Add 2 Laypersons to Courts Panel, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr.
3, 1998, at 1.
262. See Heckelman, House OKs Measure, supra note 256, at 1; Heckelman,
Amendment to Appear on Ballot, supra note 256, at I.
263. See H.R.J. Res. 20, 90th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (III. 1998); S.J. Res. 52, 90th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (III. 1998).
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members would consist of: (1) one Illinois Supreme Court justice
chosen by the supreme court; (2) two Illinois Appellate Court justices,
elected by the appellate court justices; and (3) two Illinois Circuit Court
judges appointed by the supreme court. Both the composition of the
judicial membersand their method of selection under the Lang-Cronin
Amendment would be the same as they are under the current
constitutional provision. 264  As with the current constitutional
provision, the person under investigation would not have the right to
appeal.265 The public members would receive compensation on a per
diem basis as well as reimbursement for their expenses. To avoid
"Heiple" type situations, if the Courts Commission investigated a
supreme court member, then none of the Justices would sit on the
Courts Commission for that case. Rather, the appellate court justices
would choose a third justice as a substitute. With respect to appellate
court and circuit court judges, no appellate court justice from the same
district and no circuit court judge from the same circuit would sit on a
case with a judge from that district or circuit. Rather, an alternate from
another district or circuit would join the Commission for that case.
Ratification of the Lang-Cronin Amendment by Illinois voters this
November, would provide a significant and helpful reform arising
from the Heiple investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impeachment investigation of Illinois Supreme Court Justice D.
Heiple culminated an extraordinary episode in Illinois legal and
political history. That Justice Heiple brought that investigation on
himself by his imperious conduct both on and off the bench is beyond
dispute. But the stakes involved in those impeachment proceedings
were far greater than the career of a single judge.
When Alexander Hamilton wrote that judicial independence was
essential "to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from
the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men...
sometimes disseminate among the people, ' 26 he undoubtedly never
envisioned that judicial independence would be undermined by the "ill
264. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e); H.R.J. Res. 20, 90th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill.
1998); S.J. Res. 52, 90th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1998).
265. By contrast, the Brady Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 14, does provide for a
discretionary appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court by either the JIB or the judge facing
discipline. The CBA supported the discretionary review provision in its testimony
before both the House Judiciary Committee on March 25, 1998 and the Senate Executive
Committee on March 18, 1998.
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humors" of the judiciary, itself. Yet it was Justice Heiple's
intemperate defense of the Baby Richard decision-including his
gratuitous attacks on the General Assembly, the Governor, and the
press-that inflamed a controversy which ultimately threatened the
independence of all Illinois judges.
Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed. The House Committee should
be commended for diffusing the controversy, and especially for the
clear pronouncements by both the majority and the dissenters that
neither the Baby Richard decision nor any other opinion rendered by
Justice Heiple was relevant to the impeachment inquiry.
While the House Committee majority reached the right result in
recommending against impeachment, it could have performed a greater
public service by articulating a rationale for its decision rather than
simply making tautological statements that the various charges did not
rise to the level for which impeachment was appropriate. The
dissenters' cogent arguments in favor of impeachment warranted an
equally measured, reasoned response.
The majority's failure to provide such a response may have been a
reflection of discomfort with the lack of any express standards for
impeachable conduct in the Illinois constitution. Incorporation in the
constitution of the standards discussed in this Article would provide
valuable guidance to future legislators who are conducting or
contemplating impeachment proceedings. Those standards would also
ensure that judges are not unduly pressured to elevate politics and
public relations over precedent. As evidenced by the increasing calls
for retribution against judges who render unpopular decisions, those
threats pose a far greater danger to our justice system than an angry,
arrogant, and impolitic judge. That is the true lesson of the Heiple
episode.
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APPENDIX*
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
The Supreme Court of Illinois, and in particular Justice James D.
Heiple, has been the subject of intense and continuous media criticism
for many months. The criticism began with dissatisfaction with one or
more decisions of the Court and in more recent months, allegations of
personal misconduct by Justice Heiple.
On April 8, 1997, the House of Representatives passed House
Resolution 89 which provided for a legislative investigation of
allegations raised regarding the conduct of Supreme Court Justice
James D. Heiple to determine whether there existed cause for
impeachment.
A special Investigative Committee was thereafter named and a
counsel for the Committee was chosen. The Committee directed that
all of the reported allegations involving Justice Heiple be fully
investigated with the goal that all facts relevant to a possible
impeachment, be available for consideration by the Committee.
Rules governing the proceedings were adopted. There were four
days of public hearings, Justice Heiple was permitted counsel, he was
informed of all allegations being investigated, his counsel was allowed
to cross examine witnesses and the subpoena power of the Committee
was afforded him to call witnesses in his own behalf. Twenty-four
witnesses were heard and the record of the hearing exceeds 1100
pages. That the Committee achieved its commitment to a full and fair
fact finding hearing was acknowledged by Justice Heiple's counsel at
the conclusion of the hearing.
In preparation for the hearing, counsel for the Committee
interviewed persons with knowledge and assembled documents
relevant to allegations able to be substantiated regarding the conduct of
Justice Heiple, and every fact relevant to those issues was ascertained
and presented to the Committee in a public hearing.
** This report was originally published as Heiple Impeachment Report: Text of
House Committee Report Recommending Heiple Not Be Impeached, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
May 16, 1997) (reprinting Special Investigative Committee of the Ninetieth Gen.
Assembly of the State of Illinois Investigating Supreme Court Justice James D. Heiple,
Report of the Committee, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (I11. 1997)). This reprint appears with
the permission of Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, 415 N. State Street, Chicago, IL 60610,
and retains its original format.
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On April 29th, the hearing began with testimony from constitutional
experts from the Illinois Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Association
and the Chicago Council of Lawyers. These bar representatives
acquainted the Committee with the legal'history of and the standards
that govern impeachment. All agreed that Separation of Powers is a
central feature of the constitutional democracy created by the
Constitution of the United States and embodied in the Constitution of
the State of Illinois.
History teaches us that freedom is threatened when one branch of
government is able to control or ignore the independence of another
branch. Each branch of government, the executive, the legislative and
the judiciary must function cooperatively with but independently of the
other two.
This doctrine of separation of powers requires that each branch of
government respect and protect the independent function of the other
two branches within their own sphere. Flowing from that concept is
the necessary independence of the judiciary. The independence of the
judiciary is indispensable to the rule of law and therefore to the
protection of individual liberty. A fundamental aspect of judicial
independence is that the legislature cannot intervene in judicial affairs
on political grounds or because of disagreement with or dissatisfaction
with the opinions of a judge. Any such authority would destroy
judicial independence and make judicial tenure dependent on legislative
pleasure. It would deprive the citizens of this state of a major
safeguard for their constitutional rights.
Another aspect of the independence of the judiciary is that judges in
Illinois are elected by the voters; the suitability of their performance in
office is entrusted to the determination of the electorate.
The 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois, in furtherance of the
assurance of an independent judiciary, provided that disciplinary
matters within the judiciary be addressed by the judiciary. The Judicial
Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission were created to investigate
judicial misconduct, and in appropriate cases, remove a judge from
office. The Courts Commission has a variety of remedies available to
it from reprimand to removal. The legislative impeachment power,
however, is a fail safe for the situation where extraordinary
misconduct of a judge warrants his or her removal whether or not the
Courts Commission has asserted its jurisdiction.
It is an exception to the intent that the judiciary discipline itself, that
the Illinois Constitution provides the traditional power of the
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legislature to impeach a judge. This impeachment power has been a
historical feature of the American legal system. All four of the Illinois
constitutions have authorized impeachment proceedings of judges and
state officers. The Illinois Constitution does not provide particular
guidance as to grounds for impeachment, but the history of the
impeachment proceedings tells us that it was intended only for
instances of very serious judicial misconduct and has rarely been
invoked.
There have been but two occasions where the Illinois House of
Representatives has voted to institute impeachment proceedings against
judges. In 1832 impeachment proceedings began against Justice
Theophilus Smith. The seven articles of impeachment recited a variety
of egregious breaches of trust and criminal conduct. The seven articles
of impeachment alleged that he:
(1) allowed his son to "bargain off" the office of circuit clerk in
Madison County to a named person for a $25 monthly payment;
(2) sold that office:
(3) appointed circuit clerks without requiring a bond;
(4) instituted two baseless lawsuits against other men, presided
over the court where they were filed, and held the men in jail
under excessive bail;
(5) suspended and sought disbarment of a lawyer who had told
his client to tell the court that he would agree to a change of
venue if it was to a county where Smith did not preside;
(6) jailed for contempt a juror who refused to remove his hat
although he was Quaker and doing so was against his religion,
as the judge knew; and
(7) connived with the sheriff and treasurer of Madison County
in rendering a judgment in a sham suit between the two officials
that prejudiced the county, requiring it to appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Despite these charges, the Senate did not remove Justice Smith from
office.
In 1842, proceedings began in the House of Representatives to
impeach Justice Thomas Brown on the ground of insufficient mental
ability. Articles of impeachment were not voted and the Justice
remained in office.
A consideration of impeachments of federal judges gives us more
examples of conduct deemed impeachable. There have been 58 United
States House of Representatives impeachment investigations. Of
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these, eleven went to Senate hearing, resulting in seven convictions
and four acquittals.
The following were removed from office:
(1) John Pickering, U.S. District Judge for New Hampshire,
1803-04
Charge: Drunkenness and senility.
Decision: Removed from office
(2) West H. Humphreys, U.S. District Judge for Tennessee,
1862
Charge: Supported succession of Tennessee. (Treason)
Decision: Removed from office
(3) Robert W. Archbald, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, 1912
Charge: Misconduct including personal profits, free trips and
improper appointment of jury commissioner.
Decision: Removed from office
(4) Halsted L. Ritter, U.S. District Judge of S. Florida, 1936
Charge: Participating in champertous proceedings brought before
him for a cash consideration, practicing law while serving as a
federal judge, and preparing and filing false tax returns.
Decision: Removed from office
(5) Harry E. Claiborne, U.S. District Judge of Nevada, 1986
Charge: Tax evasion.
Decision: Removed from office
(6) Alcee L. Hastings, U.S. District Judge of S. Florida,
1988-89
Charge: Conspiracy to solicit a bribe.
Decision: Removed from office
(7) Walter L. Nixon, Jr., U.S. District Judge of S. Mississippi,
1988-89
Charge: False statements to a grand jury.
Decision: Removed from office
Since the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, there has been
considerable activity concerning judicial conduct before the Illinois
Courts Commission including five instances of removal of judges
from office, but, except as a recognition that there is an alternative to
impeachment in dealing with judicial misconduct, the details of those
proceedings are not relevant here.
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This history of impeachment proceedings sets the precedent for the
level of seriousness of the kinds of offenses regarded as the
appropriate subject of impeachment proceedings and deliberations.
The testimony of Donald Hubert, President of the Chicago Bar
Association, was accompanied by a report which is in evidence. The
report makes the point that for purposes of impeachment, the
conclusions of the Committee must be supported by ". . . clear and
convincing evidence . . .", a standard higher than that demanded in
ordinary civil law suits. The point is also made that the 1870
Constitution provided for the impeachment for ". . . any misdemeanor
in office." This phrase, included in the Federal Constitution, was
deleted from the Illinois' 1970 Constitution because it could be
interpreted to mean that impeachment could be sought for some minor
offense.
The report of the Bar Association discussed the standards for
impeachment and said:
"Not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct warrants
impeachment. Impeachment should be reserved for egregious
violations. Less serious ethical infractions should result in
discipline by the Courts Commission."
It is the conclusion of the Committee that legislative impeachment
should be limited to extraordinary cases of judicial misconduct
involving serious violations of the law or serious breaches of trust.
II.
The Committee recessed from April 29th through May 5th to allow
its investigators ample time to find the documents and witnesses
necessary to a full investigation. On May 5th the hearings reconvened
with three full days of testimony, concluding with the testimony of
Justice Heiple for nearly six hours. Thereafter a brief from counsel for
Justice Heiple was accepted.
The several areas of inquiry and the Committee's conclusions from
the evidence adduced are as follows.
A. Traffic Violations
Four traffic stops of Justice Heiple and the conduct of the Justice in
each of them were considered. Three of the stops were for exceeding
the speed limit and in each instance no citation was issued. In one
instance, the automobile the Justice was driving bore Supreme Court
license plates. In the other two instances, Justice Heiple, when asked
for his driver's license and proof of insurance, displayed his court
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credentials in a manner calculated to insure that the officer knew he
was a Supreme Court Justice.
The fourth stop in Pekin, Illinois on January 27, 1996 was marked
by a complex interaction between the Justice and several officers,
which resulted in the arrest of the Justice and the charging of him with
four violations:
(a) speeding;
(b) failure to yield to an emergency vehicle;
(c) resisting a peace officer; and
(d) two counts of disobedience to a police officer.
Justice Heiple pled guilty to the charges of speeding and
disobedience to a peace officer, was fined as to each and paid the fine
in the total amount of $346.00. The other charges against Justice
Heiple were dismissed.
The circumstances surrounding these four traffic stops were
investigated by the Judicial Inquiry Board and a resultant complaint
was filed with the Illinois Courts Commission containing allegations
of Justice Heiple's conduct. Justice Heiple filed a response indicating
his election not to refute the charges and the order of the Courts
Commission deemed them admitted.
Based upon these facts admitted by Justice Heiple, the Commission
determined that Justice Heiple violated supreme Court Rules 61 and
62(A) (155 I11. 2d Rules 61, 62(A)). The Commission further
determined that Justice Heiple's conduct was prejudicial to the
administration of justice and brought the judicial office into disrepute.
Based on these findings the Courts Commission entered an order
censuring Justice Heiple.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that Justice Heiple, during the
traffic stops, used his position on the Court to influence the officers
detaining him to treat him with leniency. His conduct showed a
disregard for his obligation as a citizen to respond to the directions
given him by the police and to the flashing lights and siren of a
pursuing patrol car. His conduct during the confrontation with the
Pekin police was arrogant and overbearing. However inappropriate,
this conduct does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
B. Justice Heiple's Discussion Of The Pekin Incident With The Court
At the Court's first meeting, after the Pekin incident, Justice Heiple
told the justices of the Court the story of his arrest and the
circumstances surrounding it. He gave his detailed version of the facts
and indicated he had been roughed up by the police. At a later time
812 [Vol. 29
Impeachment and Judicial Independence
when the event had escalated into a case before the Courts
Commission, Justice Heiple should have considered that this might
disqualify any Justice on the Court from sitting on his matter before
the Courts Commission, and should have brought about a serious
discussion of some alternate proceeding to resolve the accusations
against him.
The Courts Commission complaint against Justice Heiple was filed
on January 23, 1997. Thereafter, Justice Freeman raised with the
Court the need to meet to discuss the issues being raised about the
conduct of Justice Heiple, and in particular whether the Courts
Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice Harrison could any
longer be considered an appropriate forum for the resolution of the
charges against Justice Heiple. Justice Freeman reminded the Court of
an earlier appointment of a special commission created by the Supreme
Court to investigate charges of impropriety against two Supreme Court
Justices.
The vote of four Justices is required to convene such a meeting.
Justice Heiple would not and did not vote for such a meeting, nor did
three other justices, and the requested meeting did not occur. It would
appear to have been a better course had Justice Heiple voted for a
meeting to discuss alternatives to the Courts Commission's resolution
of the matter, but this internal administrative decision does not rise to
the level of impeachable conduct.
C. Election Of The Chief Justice
As the Supreme Court went into session the second Monday of
September 1996, on the 9th of September 1996, Justice Freeman
raised the question whether the Court should elect the Chief Judge in
September, rather than wait until November as was the custom. It was
Justice Freeman's intent to consider whether an earlier election might
serve to avoid an anticipated letter writing campaign against the
selection of Justice Heiple. Justice Freeman asked Justice Heiple
about the rumors of an investigation. Justice Heiple acknowledged
that he had heard similar rumors. Later during the fourth week of
September the election for Chief Justice was advanced. While the
Justices were discussing Justice Heiple's nomination and before the
vote, Justice Freeman again inquired of Justice Heiple, in the presence
of other members of the Court, about the rumors that Justice Heiple
was being investigated by the Judicial Inquiry Board.. Instead of
answering Justice Freeman's question directly, Justice Heiple just
shrugged off the question indicating he didn't think anything would
come of the investigation. In fact, Justice Heiple had been notified of
1998]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
the opening of a Judicial Inquiry Board file, on September 13, 1996,
had acknowledged this fact in writing on September 20, 1996 and was
scheduled to appear before the Board on October 11, 1996. The
record is clear that this specific information was withheld from the
Justices of the Supreme Court at the time they voted to make Justice
Heiple Chief of the Court. It is the conclusion of the Committee that a
concern for comity, cooperation and trust among the Justices should
have led Justice Heiple to inform the Court of these facts, but his
failure to do so does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
D. Election Of Justice Harrison To The Courts Commission
On the second Monday of January 1997 at a meeting of the Court,
Chief Justice Heiple announced that he had resigned as Chairman of
the Illinois Courts Commission. There was conflicting testimony
whether Justice Harrison asked for the position or whether Justice
Heiple asked him to take it. Justice Freeman thought he should have
been asked to take the position since he was the next in line to be Chief
Justice. Nevertheless, the full Court voted for Justice Harrison who
became Chairman of the Illinois Courts Commission by Order dated
January 13, 1997. While some of the Justices may have been aware
of the earlier rumors of an investigation, as of January 13th 1997
Justice Heiple had still not informed the Court of the pending Judicial
Inquiry Board matter.
In the event that Judicial Inquiry Board filed a complaint against
Justice Heiple, the newly elected Chairman of the Courts Commission
would preside over the hearing. Thus, at the time of the election of the
Chairman, the Chief Justice should have informed the Court of the
open Judicial Inquiry Board file involving him and should have
recused himself from voting on the Harrison appointment. While the
Committee is highly critical of this conduct, if finds that it does not rise
to the level of an impeachable offense.
E. Appointment of Justice Holdridge As Court Administrator
Before the convening of the January 1997 term, Justice Heiple
notified the Court of his plan to appoint sitting Justice William
Holdridge of the Third Judicial District as Court Administrator. A
vigorous dissent was voiced by three of the Justices on the grounds
that the Illinois Constitution Article 6, Section 13 prohibits a sitting
judge from holding another office under the state. Justice Heiple
requested a memorandum from the research section of the Court which
concluded that the appointment of Judge Holdridge did not violate the
Constitution.
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With four Justices indicating their approval of the appointment, one
or more of the remaining Justices asked that the order not be filed until
they could write dissents. Justice Heiple ignored this request and the
three dissents to the appointment were filed at a later date. The
Committee notes, again, Justice Heiple's lack of attention to
collegiality on the Court. The Committee, properly, declines to
question the Court's interpretation of the Constitution on this issue.
F. Reduction Of The Salary of Bonita Welch
Bonita Welch was the law clerk to Justice Tobias Barry for 12
years. Justice Barry was Justice Heiple's opponent for the Supreme
Court in a hotly contested election in 1990.
Ms. Welch subsequently applied for transfer into a vacancy in the
legal research staff. The Justices of the Third District granted her
request, determined, as was within their authority, that she would
receive a salary at the mid-range of the grade for that position and she
entered upon duty as a legal research clerk.
When her employment was brought to Justice Heiple's attention at
$39,464, the mid point level, he ordered her salary reduced to an entry
level salary of $32,571, despite her twelve years of experience. In
explanation, he said, ". . . a research clerk claiming twelve years of
experience really has abut one year of experience repeated twelve
times." In so doing he exceeded his authority under Illinois Supreme
Court Job Classification and Compensation Rules, specifically Rule 5
(D)(1).
Testimony differs on this matter. Two witnesses testified that
Justice Heiple ordered the reduction in salary. Justice Heiple said he
was merely giving his opinion. Bonita Welch testified that Justice
Heiple was motivated by hostility to her former judge employer,
Justice Barry. Justice Heiple testified that he had no personal animus
against Bonita Welch, and that he acted only on the general principle
that her experience did not justify more than entry level compensation.
G. Failure to Disclose Loans
The Committee investigated the allegation that Justice Heiple failed
to include in the Statement of Economic Interest he is required by law
to file with the State, two loan transactions entered into during the
years 1991 an 1995.
The first of these loans, from the AmCore Bank, was to Justice
Heiple's wife and was in the amount of $85,000.00. It was made on
July 24, 1991 and paid off in full on July 26, 1991.
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The second loan was from the Commerce Bank, was dated April
20, 1995 an was in the amount of $225,000.00. It was to Justice
Heiple and was paid off in full on May 5, 1995.
The form of filing a Statement of Economic Interest requires that
loans made within the reporting year must be revealed whether or not
they have been repaid at the time of filing. Justice Heiple admitted that
he did not report either of these loans and was unaware of the
requirement that repaid loans be reported until media inquiries called it
to his attention. There is no evidence that this was an intentional
attempt to conceal information required to be included in his Economic
Interest Statements. On the day of the commencement of the hearings
before this Committee, Justice Heiple filed amended Statements of
Economic Interest reporting the two loans, bringing him into
compliance.
H. Office Rental
An allegation was explored that Justice Heiple's rental of his judicial
office in Peoria in a building owned by a bank in which his wife was a
director and the owner of a number of shares, constituted an
impropriety. The Committee's investigation established that the rental
was at a fair market value and was consistent with similar space in the
building. Mrs. Heiple's shares in the bank were purchased to qualify
her to sit as a director and constituted a small fraction of one percent of
the outstanding shares. Among other things, 39 ILCS 505/11.1
makes it unlawful for an elected official to enter into a contract using
State funds with an entity in which that person's spouse has more than
a 7.5% ownership interest. Since Mrs. Heiple's ownership interest in
the bank was 0.01% of the outstanding stock, the Committee
concludes that Justice Heiple's office rental does not constitute a
criminal act nor, given its fair market value, an impropriety.
I. Jury Summons
While not a subject discussed at the hearing, the Committee
investigated an allegation in the media that Justice Heiple had
improperly avoided jury duty. Investigators for the Committee
ascertained that Justice Heiple was summoned for jury duty in the
Circuit Court of Tazewell County. He was required by law to serve
unless excused, and his status as a Supreme Court Justice did not
exempt him from jury duty.
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Justice Heiple asked to be excused because of illness in his family
and was excused. The jury clerk described the matter as routine. This
evidence does not support a conclusion of improper conduct.
CONCLUSION
The Committee recognizes that the Illinois Constitution provides a
means separate from impeachment for disciplining judges or removing
them from office. The Illinois House of Representatives through this
Committee, however, has the constitutional authority to intervene in
the affairs of the judicial branch by way of conducting investigations
and determining whether the facts found justify presenting to the
Illinois Senate Articles of Impeachment.
Bearing in mind that only two impeachment proceedings have taken
place since Illinois became a state, the Committee recognizes that the
standard for determining whether judicial conduct is impeachable has
historically been one that required criminal conduct or non-criminal
conduct of such gravity as to demonstrate the unfitness of the judge to
continue in office. Only then is the legislature entitled to exercise its
extraordinary Constitutional power to remove an elected judge.
This Committee is sensitive to the future consequences of its
decision today. To impeach on any basis less than the most serious
misconduct is to establish a precedent susceptible to future abuse of the
legislative authority and unwarranted attempts to breach the doctrine of
Separation of Powers.
The Committee is sensitive to the constitutional imperative that it
should not consider the judicial decisions of a judge, however it may
disagree with them, in the determination it makes.
The Committee has heard evidence of a number of instances of
personal conduct of Justice Heiple and has afforded Justice Heiple the
opportunity to testify concerning them. This he has done at
considerable length.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that Justice Heiple's conduct
during his confrontation with the Pekin police was inappropriate and
improper. While the Committee is highly critical of this conduct, it has
been dealt with by the Illinois Courts Commission and in any event
does not rise to the level of justifying impeachment.
In Justice Heiple's activities on the administrative side of the affairs
of the Court, he did not live up to his obligation to his fellow Justices
to deal with them candidly and to cooperate with them in the
discussion of serious problems for the Court occasioned by his
conduct. Nonetheless, this conduct does not justify impeachment.
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Further, the activities of Justice Heiple other than during the traffic
stops has not yet been considered by the Illinois Courts Commission
which has the Constitutional jurisdiction and prerogative to investigate
and enter appropriate orders.
The Illinois House of Representatives and this Committee may
consider the totality of Justice Heiple's conduct, even if his acts when
viewed separately do not support the conclusion that impeachment is
appropriate. There is no question that Justice Heiple's lapses in
memory while testifying, poor judgment and repeated instances of
arrogant behavior have diminished the public's respect for the
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the standard for impeaching a judge
because his or her conduct brings the court into disrepute must be
based on egregious conduct. It is clear that Justice Heiple's conduct
does not meet the criminal standard such as treason, bribery, sale of
office. A Justice may be impeached for noncriminal conduct. But that
conduct must be of a magnitude of gravity comparable to the criminal
standard. In the opinion of the Committee, Justice Heiple's
transgressions do not meet that standard. The Committee's
conclusions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Bearing this standard in mind the Committee finds the testimony it has
heard has failed to show that Justice Heiple engaged in impeachable
conduct. Breaches of comity, common sense an collegiality, while
unfortunate, are not sufficiently grave to justify impeachment.
In no way should the Committee's failure to find grounds for
impeachment lead to the conclusion that the Committee condones
Justice Heiple's behavior. On the contrary, the Committee is severely
critical of Justice Heiple's arrogance, his failure to deal with his
colleagues with candor and trust, and his imperious internal
administration of the Courts.
Since the Committee's decision has far reaching consequences
affecting the future of judicial independence in Illinois and across the
country, the standard this Committee adopts for impeachment takes on
lasting significance. To impeach for anything less than the most
serious offenses would send a chilling message to once and future
judges.
The Committee is mindful that a Supreme Court Justice is an elected
official. To remove an elected office holder is to vitiate the judgment
and the vote of the electorate. That action is justified only in the case
of extreme instances of misconduct.
It is the conclusion of the Committee that the conduct of Justice
Heiple evidenced by this hearing, while mean spirited and demeaning
to the Court, an unbecoming a Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court,
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does not justify the recommendation to the Illinois Senate of Articles of
Impeachment.
The Committee therefore recommends that no Articles of
Impeachment be referred to the Illinois Senate.
CERTIFICATION OF JUSTICE JAMES D. HEIPLE REPORT
We, the undersigned declare that we have read the contents of the
attached report on Justice James D. Heiple and agree with the contents
therein.
Dated this 15th day of May, 1997.
Barbara F. Currie, Chairperson
Jack Kubik, Chairperson
Judy Erwin, Member
Verna Clayton, Member
Arline Fantin, Member
Brent Hassert, Member
Lovana Jones, Member
Carolyn Krause, Member
Doug Scott, Member
Dan Rutherford, Member
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter, and
recommend that the General Assembly impeach Supreme Court Justice
James D. Heiple.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Article IV, Section 14 of the 1970 Constitution of the
State of Illinois:
"The House of Representatives has the sole power to conduct
legislative investigations to determine the existence of cause for
impeachment and, by the vote of a majority of the members
elected, to impeach Executive and Judicial officers ... "
Although the ability of the House to impeach is clear, the grounds
for doing so are not. In the federal constitution, for example, officials
may impeach for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors." (U.S.
Constitution, Article II, Section 4). However, in the drafting of the
1970 Illinois Constitution, any references to standards have been
removed, thus leaving the House to determine what conduct
constitutes an impeachable offense.
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In this proceeding, the Committee has received guidance from the
Chicago Bar Association ("CBA"), which filed a written report (Ex.
4). In this report, the CBA lists four general grounds upon which they
believe impeachment may be proper. The CBA was correct in pointing
out that only two (egregious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and abuse of power) appear to be relevant in the matter before the
Committee (Ex. 4 at 1-2.)
Also of help is the Constitutional authority of the Illinois Courts
Commission (I11. Const., Art. 6, sec. 15). The Illinois Courts
Commission is responsible for sanctioning judges against whom a
complaint is brought by the Judicial Inquiry Board ("JIB"). The
Courts Commission's authority, however, contrary to impeachment
proceedings, is limited in the instances in which it may discipline.
In this matter, the clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that
Justice Heiple has both committed serious violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and has abused his power as a judge. For the
reasons set forth below, and his impeachment by the House of
Representatives should be recommended by the Committee.
II. INCIDENTS GIVING RISE TO FINDING OF ABUSE OF
POWER AND BREACH OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
A. Traffic Incidents
Many of the details of four traffic incidents involving Justice Heiple
have been well documented. They were the subject of a Judicial
Inquiry Board investigation and a Complaint, Hearing and Order
before the Illinois Courts Commission (Exs. 7, 8, 14). Justice Heiple
was censured by the Courts Commission for his conduct with respect
to these incidents (Ex. 14, p. 8).
For purposes of brevity, the details will not be summarily listed, as
they are delineated in the Courts Commission Complaint, (Exhibit 7),
were not challenged by Justice Heiple's Answer to the Complaint
(Exhibit 8), and were adopted by the Courts Commission as their
findings of fact in their Order (Exhibit 14). We should do the same,
the testimony of Justice Heiple before the Committee notwithstanding.
The incidents themselves were:
1. A January 27, 1996 arrest by the Pekin Police (Ex.7, nos. 3-
12);
2. January 8, 1996 Tazewell County traffic stop (Ex.7, nos. 13-
15);
3. A November 24, 1995 Creve Coeur traffic stop (Ex.7, nos.
[Vol. 29820
Impeachment and Judicial Independence
16-18); and
4. A November 14, 1992 Mason City traffic stop (Ex.7, nos.
19-24).
In three of these incidents, Justice Heiple, when pulled over,
produced his Supreme Court identification card instead of his driver's
license (Ex.7, nos. 14, 17, 22). While the record clearly indicated
that, for a variety of reasons, the police officers involved chose not to
issue citations, it is clear that Justice Heiple attempted to use his status
to avoid citations.
Justice Heiple's explanation for his actions contradicts the testimony
of the police officers. Justice Heiple stated that, when he pulled out
his wallet, his Supreme Court identification card was visible, but that
he did not intentionally display the card (Tr. at 864). This testimony is
contradicted not only by the Courts Commission's findings (Ex. 14),
but also by the police officers who testified that Justice Heiple overtly
displayed his license (Tr. at 213, 228, 244).
In two of these incidents, Justice Heiple pull over as soon as
possible after the police officer pulled in behind him and activated his
emergency lights (Ex.7, nos. 4, 20-21). And in the Pekin incident,
Justice Heiple drove off, disobeying instructions from the police
officer, and went to his home, despite the officer flashing his
emergency lights behind him (Ex.7, nos. 6-7). Justice Heiple's
explanation for failing to pull over was that, in both the incident in
Pekin and the Mason City incident, where he did not pull over for five
miles (Ex.7, no. 21), Justice Heiple stated that he did not believe the
lights were meant for him (Tr. at 844, 873-4). This explanation
neither comports with law or common sense, as drivers are taught to,
and, in fact, legally required to, pull over for emergency vehicles
approaching from the rear, whether they think they are meant to be
pulled over or not. This is also part of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
11-204).
In the Pekin incident, Justice Heiple obstructed and disobeyed the
officers not only by driving away from the scene and by not pulling
over immediately, but also by attempting to enter his house when told
not, and by resisting arrest (Ex.7, nos. 6-11). His manner in dealing
with the officers was belligerent, and on one occasion he asked the
officers, "Do you know who I am?" (Ex.7, no. 11). He also told the
officers on the scene, "Oh shut up, do you know who you are talking
to?" (Ex.7, no. 10).
In at least some respects, it is understandable that Justice Heiple
would be aggravated by the situation. It was late, cold, snowy, windy
and there were many squad cars and officers present (Ex. 13, p.2, Tr.
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at 839-40, 848). But Justice Heiple, as with any other citizen, does
not have the authority to decide which instructions from police officers
to obey. Indeed, if it were otherwise, the entire system of laws might
fail. As a symbol of the rule of law in this State, his failure to accede
to the directions of police and his willingness to use his position in an
attempt to avoid punishment should not be tolerated. The Courts
Commission found that Justice Heiple's "conduct was prejudicial to
the administration of justice and brought the judicial office into
disrepute." (Ex. 14 at 8).
Before the Courts Commission, Justice Heiple filed an Answer
(Ex.8) in which he chose "not to refute the factual allegations
contained in the Complaint filed against him by the Judicial Inquiry
Board." During his testimony, Justice Heiple stated that this tacit
admission was a "tactical error" (Tr. at 954). Based on the testimony
from the police officers and Justice Heiple, it is reasonable to
conclude, as did the Courts Commission, that the incidents described
in the Courts Commission Complaint are an accurate representation of
the traffic incidents.
The Courts Commission further went on to say:
The present matter involves a pattern of incidents on multiple
occasions. In addition, the judge who engaged in the
misconduct in this case is a member of the highest court in
Illinois. Because of the Respondent's office and his position of
leadership in the judiciary, he had a special obligation to
comport himself properly and to set an example for others.
Under these circumstances, Respondent's misconduct was
particularly damaging to the integrity of the court system. (Ex.
14 at 8.)
B. Interference With Salary Decision Regarding Bonita Welch
In early 1994, a matter arose concerning a person named Bonita
Welch, who had previously been employed as a law clerk to Third
District Judge Tobias Barry. Judge Barry was defeated by Justice
Heiple in the 1990 campaign for Supreme Court (Tr. at 542, 944).
When Judge Berry retired in 1994, Ms. Welch sought employment
with the Third District as a Research Attorney.
The Third District Judges met, and offered Ms. Welch a position as
Research Attorney at an annual salary of $39,464, which is the mid-
point for salary range for the position of Research Attorney. That
decision was perfectly in line with the "Illinois Supreme Court Job
Classification and Compensation Rules" that were in effect at the time
(Ex. 276, Rule 5 (D)(1)). The judges who made this decision believed
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they were perfectly in their right to make this offer (Tr. at 621-5),
which was accepted. Ms. Welch began work on February 16, 1994
(Tr. at 542).
On that same day, Judge Barry sent a letter to Mr. William Smith,
who was Assistant Director of the Administrative Services of the
Illinois Courts (Ex. 21, p. 1). Judge Barry requested that Ms. Welch's
salary be increased from $39,464 to $40,295, which had been her
salary when working for him (Ex. 21, p.1). This request would be in
line with rule 5(D)(1) of the job classification rules, which states that
requests for hires above the midpoint must be approved by the
Supreme Court.
Judge Kent Slater, who participated in the decision to hire Ms.
Welch, testified that he received a call from Mr. Bob Davidson, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (Tr. at 626).
Mr. Davidson told Judge Slater that "there was problem with the
compensation level that was provided for Ms. Welch and that I should
contact Judge Heiple." (Tr. at 626)
Judge Slater then called Justice Heiple on February 21, and was told
that Justice Heiple would not approve of Ms. Welch's salary in excess
of the minimum salary (Tr. at 635). Judge Slater then sent a letter to
Justice Heiple arguing the case for hiring Ms. Welch at the original
midpoint salary (Ex. 21, pp.2-3). Justice Heiple responded two days
later with a letter reiterating his position that he would not approve a
Research Attorney being hired at anything other than the minimum
salary (Ex. 21, p. 7). Ms. Welch's salary was then reduced, even
though such an intervention had never previously occurred (Tr. at 635-
6), and even though the rules supported the midpoint salary originally
offered. Judge Slater testified that the other judges went along with
the decision, and stated "we just knew that we had been overruled."
(Tr. at 654).
Justice Heiple's testimony with respect to the matter is simply not
credible in light of the other evidence. He testified that his first
involvement with the case was the phone call from Judge Slater. (Tr.
at 1073). However, Mr. Davidson testified that, on February 21st and
before Judge Slater's call to Justice Heiple, Justice Heiple had told him
to reduce Ms. Welch's to the minimum level. (Tr. at 681-2). This is
corroborated by Mr. Davidson's February 21st Order reducing Ms.
Welch's salary to the minimum level (Exc. 21, p. 6).
Mr. Davidson and Judge Slater both testified that, on February 21st,
Justice Heiple had a problem with Ms. Welch's salary, which caused
Judge Slater to call Justice Heiple (Tr. at 627-8). After this telephone
call, Judge Slater sent his letter making his case for hiring Ms. Welch
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at the midpoint level. In that letter, Judge Slater specifically referred to
the salaries of the other research attorneys in the Third District,
including Ms. Lynn Harrington, who despite having been hired in
December, 1993 (two months before the letter) was making more than
the other two attorneys listed, and thus, could not have been hired at
the minimum amount (Ex. 21, at 2).
Justice Heiple's explanation for not catching this discrepancy is that
he did not pay much attention to the letter (Tr. at 1077), even though
his response letter (Ex. 221 at 7) makes reference to Judge Slater's
letter, and to specific points made by Judge Slater.
When subsequently made aware of Ms. Harrington's salary, Justice
Heiple testified that he made no effort to lower her salary, in spite of
his letter's pronouncement that all new hires should be paid the
minimum amount (Tr. at 1077-8, Ex. 21 at 7). He testified that he
subsequently suggested making Ms. Welch whole, but took no action
to see that this happened (Tr. at 1079-80). To date, Ms. Welch has
not been paid what she was originally offered, commensurate with the
desire of the Third District Judges and the Supreme Court Rules (Tr. at
549-50).
One more note needs to be made about credibility. Justice Heiple
testified that Judge Slater told him that to hire Ms. Welch above the
minimum would cause problems with the other employees (Tr. at
1086). This is not supported by any evidence, and directly contradicts
every piece of testimony and every exhibit, including Exhibit 32,
which shows that research attorneys were hired at many different
salaries during the relevant time period.
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Justice Heiple
intervened in this matter, where no other Supreme Court justices have
intervened in similar situations, in direct contravention of Supreme
Court Rules, the practice of the Third District, and the desires of the
judges of the Third District. While the motivation may not be clear, it
is clear that Ms. Welch was treated differently and unfairly compared
to other employees, and that this different treatment was the direct
result of actions by Justice Heiple.
Justice Heiple's actions with respect to Ms. Welch constitute an
abuse of his judicial power which must be addressed by the House of
Representatives in conjunction with the other matters discussed herein.
C. Withholding of Information and Failure to Recuse
The Committee investigated the circumstances surrounding the
appointment of Justice Moses Harrison to the position as head of the
Courts Commission, the constitutionally-created group designed to
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hear complaints against judges, and sanction them, if necessary.
While the evidence did not indicate any overt plan to install Justice
Harrison in an effort to help Justice Heiple's case before the Courts
Commission, it nevertheless showed that Justice Heiple withheld
important information from his colleagues. Then, when Justices
raised questions about the appointment, Justice Heiple participated in
blocking attempts to meet on the matter.
Justice Heiple not only withheld important information with respect
to the appointment of Justice Harrison, but also nominated and voted
for Justice Harrison to be on the Courts Commission. In a somewhat
related matter, Justice Heiple withheld information from fellow
Justices prior to their electing him Chief Justice in September of 1996.
These matters not only interfered with the efficient operation of the
Illinois Supreme Court, but also creates the appearance of severe
impropriety and breach of the public trust in the judicial integrity.
The Pekin traffic stop and arrest in January, 1996 triggered several
events. Justice Heiple testified that he told his fellow justices about the
events in January of 1996, although he later revised that statement to
say he told them in March (Tr. at 1087-88). All of the testimony
indicates that Justice Heiple told his fellow justices about the events in
Pekin during a meeting where all Justices were present.
Later that year, the Court considered who would succeed Chief
Justice Bilandic as Chief Justice, beginning in January, 1997. Justice
Freeman suggested voting on that decision in September rather than
November, as is customary, in a specific effort to short-circuit public
controversy surrounding Justice Heiple (Tr. at 452-4, 441-2).
At two separate meetings of the Justices in September, 1996, Justice
Heiple was asked about the Pekin matter and investigators from the
Judicial Inquiry Board ("JIB"). On both occasions, Justice Heiple
dismissed the matter, indicating that nothing would come of the case
(Tr. at 775). The timing is significant, because in between the two
meetings, Justice Heiple was formally notified by the Judicial Inquiry
Board that he was to testify before them in October concerning the
Pekin incident (Ex. 6).
It is inconceivable that Justice Heiple could have believed that this
requested appearance was so insignificant as to warrant withholding of
the information from his fellow justices, especially in the face of a
direct question about the Pekin case. Testimony from three other
Supreme Court Justices was clear that information about Justice
Heiple's requested appearance before the Board was something that
they wanted to know and, in some cases, was something that might
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have changed their mind about electing Justice Heiple as Chief Justice
(Tr. at 434-05, 732-3).
It makes perfect sense that, if the Justices were electing the Chief
Justice early in an effort to stem public controversy, information about
the Judicial Inquiry Board's investigation would have been important
to them.
After assuming his duties as Chief Justice in January, Justice Heiple
was required to resign from two committees: the Attorney's
Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC") and the Courts
Commission (Tr. at 379, 941). Justice Harrison testified that Justice
Heiple came to him and asked him if he would take over the position
as head of the Courts Commission. Justice Freeman, however,
testified that, when the matter was presented to the Justices, Justice
Heiple stated that Justice Harrison requested the Courts Commission
post (Tr. at 379). Justice Miller could not remember how the matter
was presented to the other Justices (Tr. at 791-2).
At no time in this process did Justice Heiple reveal that he had
testified before the Judicial Inquiry Board, or that the investigation was
still open. The evidence suggests that Justice Heiple was told that he
would be notified if the file were closed (Ex. 6) and no such
notification was ever given. Justice Heiple claims that he did not recall
being told this by the Judicial Inquiry Board (Tr. at 901).
All of this significant, because, when the Judicial Inquiry Board
finished its investigation and filed a complaint with the Courts
Commission against Justice Heiple, Justice Harrison by virtue of his
appointment to that Commission, was forced to judge a matter
affecting the person who nominated him and voted for him to fill that
very position. Despite the fact that other Justices would have liked to
have been appraised of the Judicial Inquiry Board investigation, and
that, in at least one case it may have changed the opinion of a Justice
with respect to the Courts Commission appointment (Tr. at 735),
Justice Heiple withheld this information.
Subsequently, when Justices Freeman and Miller learned of the
Courts Commission hearing, they independently sought to have a
meeting of all the Justices to discuss the matter (Ex. 22, Tr. at 788).
Justice Freeman's letter to his colleagues (Ex. 22) sets out that he
believes the Courts Commission matter raised questions about the
"public's perception of the Commission's composition and its trust in
the process" (Ex. 22 at 1).
No meeting was held because only three Justices agreed to a
meeting; however, the troubling part is that Justice Heiple took part in
the decision not to hold a meeting. Again, this is a decision as to
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whether the full Supreme Court should have met to discuss his
pending matter before the Courts Commission, his nomination of
Justice Harrison to be on the Commission, and the effect of Justice
Harrison being required to hear his case. Justice Heiple's participation
in all of these decisions cannot be sloughed off, as it directly pertains
to the integrity of the Court, and the Courts Commission.
Justice Heiple's participation in all of these matters delineated in this
section constitutes a serious breach of the public trust, for obvious
reasons. As Justice Miller testified in response to questions about the
importance of candor on the Court, specifically these incidents:
Q. And he did not in any way affirmatively answer the question
that he had, in fact, received notice and was, in fact, scheduled to
give testimony?
A. No, he did not.
Q. You think it would have been appropriate to give that
information?
A. Certainly. Yes, I think it was important. In candor to the
court, I think you should tell the court that.
Q. In your opinion, do each of the justices owe their brothers on
the court candor?
A. Absolutely.
Q. What is that?
A. Well, you can't function without candor among your
colleagues. You have to have trust and confidence in the people
you're working with, trust and confidence in what they say is
true, and that they'll tell you everything that's relevant to the
situation. I mean, we discuss opinions. We have to have
confidence that people aren't holding back and they're telling
us everything they know about the situation so we can base our
judgment on the information we hear.
Q. If a fellow justice is not candid or misleads one of his fellow
justices, does that undermine your job as a Supreme Court
Judge?
A. Well, yes, I would think so, and it would certainly undermine
my confidence, if a person made any misrepresentations, it
would undermine my confidence in that person. (Tr. at 733-4).
Not only his fellow justices, but the public has the right to expect
that important judicial decisions are made with full knowledge of all
pertinent information, and that individual justices are not withholding
information for their own personal gain. That happened in this matter
and it cannot be countenanced.
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III. MATTERS HEARD BUT NOT WARRANTING FURTHER
ACTION
In addition to the incidents outlined above, a number of matters
were brought to the attention of the Committee. Neither individually,
collectively, nor in conjunction with the previously articulated
incidents, do these matters warrant further consideration.
A. Bank Loans Omitted From Economic Interest Statements
Both testimony (Tr. at 88, 113-4) and the statues (Ill. Const., Art.
13, Sec. 2; S.Ct. Rule 68; 5 ILCS 420/4A-101) are clear that members
of the judiciary are to file statements of economic interest with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Secretary of State.
Justice Heiple filed statements which did not include two bank loans
that had been made by Justice Heiple and his wife that had been paid
back in a very short time frame, with market rate interest (Ex. 15, Tr.
at 889, Tr. at 114). The existence of the loans was verified by
testimony of Justice Heiple (Tr. at 890) and W. Wayne Sittler (Tr. at
523-4), an official of the Commerce Bank in Peoria, as well as the
loan documents themselves (Ex. 20).
While failure to report these loans is a technical violation of the
aforementioned statutes, Justice Heiple's testimony was credible that
he believed that he did not have to report these loans since they were
paid back within the time period covered by the reports (Tr. at 894).
When he was apprised of his error, he corrected the mistake. Since
reports are full of other items which were reported, it makes no sense
that the omission of the loans could have been anything other than an
oversight.
B. Failure to Comply with Jury Duty
The allegation that Justice Heiple avoided jury duty was investigated
prior to the hearing and the findings indicate he was excused by the
jury commission for an illness in his family in the normal course of
business.
C. Office Lease with Bank With Whom Justice Heiple's Wife Was A
Director
Justice Heiple leased his district office space in Pekin from a bank
for which his wife was a director (Ex. 19, Tr. at 894), potentially in
violation of 30 ILCS 505/11 1. However, the evidence showed that,
although Justice Heiple signed the leases (Ex. 19) and knew that his
wife was a director of the landlord bank, the shares owned by Mrs.
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Heiple amounted to far less than the threshold amount necessary to
trigger the statute.
D. Appointment of William Holdridge As Administrative Director of
the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts
The appointment of William Holdridge to perform the duties of
Administrative Director of the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts,
while perhaps badly handled was nonetheless done by a majority of
the Supreme Court. This Committee cannot and should not substitute
its own judgment for that of a majority of the Court.
The testimony is clear that Justice Heiple notified the other justices
of his intent to name Justice Holdridge to the position, and that
subsequently, a discussion was held by the justices with respect to this
nomination. (Tr. at 737-43). Some of the justices were under the
impression that there would be a subsequent discussion; however,
Justice Heiple ordered Clerk Hornyak to enter the Order "after hours"
on January 17, 1997 (Tr. at 108-12).
While much of the discussion could be had with respect to Justice
Heiple's actions in this matter, and while others, including three
Supreme Court Justices, may disagree with the handling of the matter
and the legal propriety of the Order, the fact remains that four Justices
were in agreement, and could rightfully enter the Order. Our judgment
cannot supersede theirs.
IV. DISCUSSION
The tenets of separation of powers between the judicial, executive
and legislative branches of government are very important. In fact, as
the Chicago Bar Association Report states:
"It is the role of the legislature in our system of government to
be the voice of the people. The majority rules in the legislature,
and it should. But it is the role of the judiciary to be the voice
of the law and of the Constitution and not necessarily of the
majority." (Ex. 4 at 9-10)
This dissent is not about decisions. Indeed, the circumstances
surrounding Justice Heiple's involvement in a highly-publicized,
unpopular decision is not and should never be allowed to be the basis
for impeachment. The testimony adduced concerning the so-called
"Baby Richard" case indicates that Justice Heiple wrote on behalf of a
unanimous court, and that his authorship of that opinion was by
chance. In fact, had he not had to recuse himself from a separate case
and trade opinions, a different justice would have written the "Baby
Richard" opinion. (Tr. at 909-11). Regardless of what anyone thinks
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of that decision, or of any other opinion of the Court, it is clear that
such rulings can play no part in this or similar proceedings.
As pointed out in the CBA Report, the "framers of the United States
Constitution went to great lengths to institute a system which would
preserve judicial independence." (Ex. 4, at 10). That principle is as
important today as it was when the U.S. Constitution was ratified in
1789 or when the latest Illinois Constitution was ratified in 1970.
But judicial independence also mandates that we have a judiciary
that is responsible, upholds both the letter and spirit of the law, and the
high regard for justice which justifies their independence. It is in this
regard that Justice Heiple has failed in his responsibilities.
The Illinois Supreme Court Rules set forth the Code of Judicial
Conduct, as described through the Canons of Judicial Conduct (S.Ct.
Rules 61-68). Cannon 1 (S.Ct. Rule 61) reads:
A Judge should uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary.
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to
justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally observe, high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective.
Cannon 2 (S.Ct. Rule 62) reads in applicable part:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and
should conduct himself or herself at all time in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.
Cannon 3 (S.Ct. Rule 63) reads in applicable part:
B. Administrative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should diligently discharge the judge's
administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence
in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. A
judge should exercise the power of appointment on the basis of
merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. A judge should not
approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of
services rendered.
A judge who violates these canons of ethics, according to Supreme
Court Rule 71, is subject to discipline by the Illinois Courts
Commission, which has the authority to remove judges from office,
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among other sanctions (Illinois State Constitution Article 6, Section
15). Thus, it is quite appropriate to assume that impeachment should
be possible under similar circumstances. If not, we are saying that
judges have greater authority than the Legislature to remove judges.
Since both have Constitutional backing, such a position does not seem
logical.
When Justice Heiple's actions as set out above are examined in light
of these Canons, it is abundantly clear that his conduct runs counter to
those Canons cited above. By his conduct, Justice Heiple put himself
and his interests above the law, above the Court, and above the
citizens of this State, who have the right to expect that all judges, let
alone Supreme Court Justices will uphold these canons.
Canon 1 contains the admonition that "(a) judge . . . should
personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved." Was this standard
met when Justice Heiple repeatedly used his Supreme Court
identification to attempt to avoid tickets? Was it upheld when Justice
Heiple, on three separate occasions failed to pull over when directed?
Or when he disobeyed direct instructions from police officers? Or
when he resisted arrest? Or when he old officers "Oh shut up ...
don't you know who I am"?
Not only is Canon 1 violated by this conduct, but so is Canon 2,
which states in part that "A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety." When Justice Heiple withheld
information from his fellow Justices concerning his appearance before
the Judicial Inquiry Board, he prevented the other justices from
performing their job with the best possible information. Canon 2's
admonition against the appearance of impropriety is not met when
Justice Heiple nominated and voted for the person who would
possibly be a judge in his case before the Courts Commission,
withheld information about the case, then helped to block a full Court
meeting about the matter once other justices discovered that the Courts
Commission was to proceed.
The appearance of impropriety is also strong when, at the time of
the vote to name Justice Heiple the Chief, information about the
pending JIB matter was withheld. This is wrong, and also runs afoul
of Canon 3, in that it prevented the Supreme Court from doing the best
job it could with respect to the selection of a Chief and in dealing with
the issue of the Courts Commission.
In the matter of Bonita Welch, Justice Heiple acted outside his
authority, outside the Supreme Court's personnel rules, and deprived a
1998]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
court employee of salary which had been legitimately agreed to by
proper authorities. Despite Justice Heiple's testimony concerning his
desire that Ms. Welch be compensated and made whole as originally
agreed, the fact is this has not happened, some three years after the
fact. Justice Heiple's explanations on this point are simply not
credible which leads to the conclusion that his actions were for the
reasons articulated by Ms. Welch. That would be improper in any
circumstance, but in the case of a Supreme Court Justice, it also
violates Canons 2 and 3 and is completely unacceptable.
Individually, perhaps none ,of these incidents would warrant
removal from the bench. But it is clear to me that the Legislature (and
for that matter the Courts Commission) should and do have the ability
to remove a judge for a pattern of behavior that evidences the abuse of
power and breach of the public trust that is evident in this case.
In fact, in the decision to remove from the bench Judge Keith by the
Courts Commission (which was headed at the time by Justice Heiple),
the Commission stated:
One or two of the matters brought to our attention might
have been overlooked or disregarded as a bad day for the judge
or an aberration or a temporary lapse . . . Considered in
isolation, specific incidents of a judge's misconduct might have
warranted only reprimand or censure. Considered as a whole
however, the Judge's misconduct indicates a person who should
not occupy the position of a judge. (Tr. at 1003-4).
On questioning from Judge McGarr, Justice Heiple stated the
following:
Q. I point that out only to suggest or ask whether that stands
for the proposition that in considering an issue of impeachment,
this committee is empowered and indeed would be wise to
consider not only individual incidences but courses of conduct.
Do you agree to that?
A. I presume so, Sir. (Tr. At 1004).
The Post-Hearing Memorandum filed on behalf of Justice Heiple
(Ex. 30) states that a decision to impeach in this case would be akin to
"blowing the judicial branch out of the water" (Ex. 30 at 2), and that
the judiciary would, as a result, be robbed of its independence (Ex. 30
at 2), and that the judiciary would, as a result, be robbed of its
independence (Ex. 30 at 2). And this brief goes on to further state that
the exercise of impeachment powers for a course of conduct would be
a "grave abuse of those constitutional powers." (Ex. 2 at 25). I
respectfully disagree.
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With respect to the first argument, that judges will be constantly
looking over their shoulder because of "minor" indiscretions, aside
from disagreeing with use of the word "minor," the conclusion is not
well taken. In this case, we have a Supreme Court Justice who has
displayed a pattern of not just violating traffic laws, but of using his
position to avoid the consequences, and of failing to adhere to those
instructions of law enforcement officers that every citizen must obey.
We have a Supreme Court Justice-who not only refused to recuse
himself from a decision impacting the selection of a person who would
shortly thereafter rule on his case, but whohelped to block an attempt
even to discuss the issue, and who most importantly, withheld
information and misrepresented his circumstances to his fellow justices
to further his personal ends.
And we have a Supreme Court Justice who intervened to reduce the
salary of an employee who had been aligned with a political rival in
contradiction to the very personnel rules approved by the Supreme
Court, and whose explanation of these circumstances is directly
contradicted by two witnesses and indirectly contradicted by a series of
documents.
It not only strikes me that this patter of behavior is not likely to
happen again, but that if it does, the justice who acts in this manner
should also be held accountable for his or her actions.
Justice Heiple's Post-Hearing Memorandum also makes the
argument that an impeachment in this case would "dilute the force of
the Constitution's impeachment clause." (Ex. 30 at 26). Again, I
disagree. Simply because impeachment in Illinois has been used once,
or because it was used for conduct different or arguably worse than
these matters does not mean that it is improper to proceed in this case.
If we do not proceed, we run the risk of weakening the bench, by
destroying the integrity of the judiciary as set forth through the
Canons. That is a far worse consequence.
V. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons listed above, I respectfully dissent from the
majority report in this matter, and would recommend that the House of
Representatives proceed with the impeachment of Justice James D.
Heiple
Respectfully submitted,
Douglas P. Scott
Committee Member
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DISSENT
Representative Carolyn H. Krause, dissents from the Majority
Report of the Special Investigative Committee of the 90th General
Assembly.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority Report of the Special
Investigative Committee of the 90th General Assembly. I have
reviewed the transcript of the proceedings, exhibits and the
memoranda.
The key issue in this hearing for me, was to define standards for
impeachment and thereafter to determine whether or not the facts in
this case met those standards.
The Illinois Constitution gives exclusive authority to the Illinois
House of Representatives to conduct investigations to determine
existence of grounds of cause for impeachment. The Constitution
does not give any grounds for impeachment, nor does it define
impeachment. The Chicago Bar Association (CBA) presented to the
committee a "Report of the Chicago Bar Association of the Illinois
House of Representatives Special Investigative Committee on the
Propose Impeachment of Chief Justice James D. Heiple." I relied on
their memorandum, both as to the burden of proof, as well as the
standard to be used to determine the grounds for impeachment.
The CBA Report defined four (4) different standards for
impeachment. If any one of the standards applied, impeachment
proceedings should go forward. The grounds of systemic
nonfeasance and willful malfeasance as defined therein do not apply.
The standard of egregious violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct does apply. As stated in the CBA Report, "This refers to
ethical violations that would also warrant a judge's removal from the
bench by the Illinois Courts Commission." (Page 1)
The fourth ground that could be considered for impeachment would
be "abuse of power" but is not discussed herein.
I firmly believe that the standard of whether or not there were
"egregious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct" is the standard
to be applied in this case. As stated in the CBA Report:
"(I)t would certainly seem that if this Committee and
subsequently the Illinois House of Representatives were to find a
judge had committed a serious violation of ethical canons, that
violation would constitute an impeachable offense." (Page 13)
[Vol. 29834
Impeachment and Judicial Independence
In addition, it is important to look at the cumulative or totality of the
facts to determine if the standard is met, and taken together the
offenses must be serious and clear.
Quoting from Judge McGarr's cross examination of Justice Heiple,
it is clear that the cumulative affect of one's action can be taken into
consideration in determining whether the standards for impeachment
were met.
"Q. The statement attributed to you and I quote is, "One or
two of the matters brought to our attention might have been
overlooked or disregarded as a bad day for a judge or an
aberration or a temporary lapse, Heiple said. Considered in
isolation however, specific incidents of a judge's misconduct
might have warranted only reprimand or censure. Considered
as a whole however, the judge's misconduct indicates a person
who should not occupy the position of a judge." (Tr. at 1003-
04).
The Code of Judicial Conduct found in the Supreme Court Rules,
states in part, in the preamble:
"... judges, individually and collectively, must respect and
honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in our legal system .. .The Code of
Judicial Conduct is intended to establish standards for ethical
conduct of judges ...The text of the canons and the rules is
authoritative. . .The text of the rules is intended to govern
conduct of judges and to be binding upon them. It is not
intended, however, that every transgression will result in
disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate,
and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be
determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of
the text of the rules and should depend on such factors as the
seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of
improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on
others or on the judicial system."
I believe that a judge is held to a high standard of conduct and that
the facts in this case must be applied to this high standard.
In Matter of Cieminski, 270 N.W. 2d 321 (1978), the Court stated:
"It necessarily follows that judges must be and are held to
higher standards than laymen. Judges hold a unique position of
administering justice. They symbolize the law and justice and,
consequently, their action and behavior will reflect favorably or
unfavorably on the integrity of the judiciary and the high
respect required in the administration of justice. The following
comment attribute to a former judge, who heard it from his
predecessor, is appropriate here. "It is not merely sufficient to
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do justice but the public and society must have a good cause
and reason to believe that justice, in fact, is being done."
Whatever the source of this statement, it has merit. We are also
convinced that the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct were
designed and adopted to accomplish this, as well as to require
that the judge not only act impartially but also that the litigants
and society believe that the judge did, in fact, act impartially.
Any action or behavior of a judge which will destroy the public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary will
tend to cause disrespect for the law itself." (270 N.W. 2d at
327)
In the Report issued to the House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania concerning the investigation into the
conduct of Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen (May 6, 1994) the
committee stated:
"1. Because the House has the sole power of impeachment,
it has broad discretion to consider a variety of serious
misconduct as grounds for impeachment. If the misconduct
may bring the courts into disrepute, undermine public
confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the court system or
bring into serious question a justice's fitness to remain in office,
it may be considered.
2. Impeachable misconduct is not limited to criminal
offenses, but it must be serious and substantial in nature, and
reasonably related to the judicial office of the subject.
3. The House of Representatives may consider a person's
misconduct in the aggregate in considering whether he or she is
liable to impeachment.
Three of the Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct of Illinois apply
herein:
Rule 61:
"A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence
of the Judiciary. A judge should ... personally observe, high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved."
Justice Heiple received a letter dated September 13, 1996, from the
Judiciary Inquiry Board (JIB) requesting him to appear before the JIB
and to testify about matters involving his conduct. On October 11,
1996 Justice Heiple appeared and was advised, in person (and had
prior knowledge through JIB's Rules of Procedure), that the matter
would be under advisement and that Justice Heiple would be informed
in writing if the Board voted to close the complaint filed without
further action. Justice Charles Freeman, during the latter part of
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September, 1996 specifically asked Justice Heiple whether he had any
knowledge concerning allegations of a hearing before the JIB. (Tr..
At 373) Justice Ben Miller corroborated this testimony (Tr.. At 731).
Justice Heiple shrugged and indicated he had not. (Tr.. at 732). The
Justices were about to vote to elect Justice Heiple as Chief Justice to be
effective in January, 1997. In addition, Justice Heiple did not disclose
information concerning a lawsuit filed by Bonita Welch alleging
discrimination against the Supreme Court and Justice Heiple.
Justice Heiple had a duty to affirmatively disclose the information he
had to the other justices. His failure to do so at the very time that
decisions ere being made concerning his assuming the position of chief
justice, constituted serious violations of the canons.
With respect to a series of traffic violations for speeding, the record
is clear from the JIB complaint. (Ex. 7). Not only did Justice Heiple
admit to speeding on four separate occasions but, (i) he twice avoided
police attempts to stop within a reasonable amount of time; (ii) he
attempted to avoid issuance of citations by displaying his Supreme
Court credentials; (iii) he used abusive language and resisted arrest on
January 27, 1996, and (iv) when stopped for traveling 73 m.p.h. in a
45 m.p.h. zone on November 24, 1995 and asked to justify the
excessive speed, he stated that "I thought I was home free." (Tr.. At
227).
Conduct as described herein breaches the public confidence in the
judiciary, affects the integrity of the court, and harms the trust that the
public must have in the courts.
Rule 62:
"A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and Appearances of
Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities. (A) A judge
should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
On January 13, 1997, Justice Heiple announced that Justice
Harrison would serve as chair of the Illinois Courts Commission and
the other justices voted their support. (Tr. at 734)
Justice Heiple again failed to advise the other justices of the JIB
inquiry. (Tr. at 152 and Tr. at 735) Accordingly, he participated in the
selection of the judge that would hear his case and deprived the Court
of any timely opportunity to consider an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism such as the Greenberg Commission.
As stated in the JIB motion requesting the recusal and substitution
of Justice Harrison:
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"For all of the same reasons that a judge is not permitted to
sit in judgment on his or her own case, so too is a judge barred
from selecting, or participating in the selection of the judge who
will judge his case. Preserving the integrity of the judicial
process demands that neutral fact-finders and decision makers
be selected free from the self-interested influence of one of the
parties. In particular, when a member of the judiciary is selected
to judge the case of another judge who knows that his own
conduct is likely to be reviewed by the very judge he is electing,
the entire process is infected by the specter of partiality and self-
interest. In such a case,'there is ample cause to remove the
selected judge and replace him with another judge selected
without the taint of influence from any interested party. That is
the case here. It appears that Respondent, (Justice Heiple)
without disclosing to anyone that he was under investigation and
that he himself might be required to appear as a party before the
Illinois Courts Commission, participated in (or even directed)
the selection of Justice Harrison. Those actions created an
impermissible appearance of impropriety that can only be
remedied by removing Justice Harrison as a member of the
Courts Commission panel that is reviewing the instant case."
In February, 1997, subsequent to the JIB filing of the JIB
complaint, Justice Freeman requested a conference of all Supreme
Court Justices to discuss the issues concerning the Courts
Commission, i.e., whether Justice Harrison should step aside as chair
of the Courts Commission. Three Justices voted for the meeting;
Justices Harrison and Heiple voted "no," one other justice voted "no"
and one did not vote. Justice Freeman stated that Justices Harrison
and Heiple "sit squarely in the middle of this controversy" I had
anticipated their recusal on this issue."
Justice Heiple, at the time when charges had formally been filed,
again participated in a vote related to the chairmanship of the Courts
Commission.
Rule 63:
"A Judge Should Perform the Duties of Judicial Office
Impartially and Diligently. B (1) A judge should diligently
discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate
the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other
judges and court officials."
The largest divergence on the facts between Justice Heiple and other
witnesses occurs with respect to the determination of Bonita Welch's
salary. Justice Heiple dismisses the incident by stating his
"misunderstanding" that Justice Slater wanted his opinion concerning
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the right thing to do. (Tr. at 949-50) Judge Slater believed that Justice
Heiple ordered the salary reduction (being $7,000.00 per year) and
that he (Judge Slater) was not in a position to argue with him or
question his decision. (Tr. at 628) Similarly, Mr. Davison stated that
Justice Heiple advised him that Bonita Welch could be "put on at the
minimum" salary for research attorney. (Tr. at 682-3)
Regardless of motive, Justice Heiple's testimony is not credible.
The balance of the testimony regarding Bonita Welch's salary suggests
that Justice Heiple interfered and abused his implied powers. I cannot
attribute any other explanation to a scenario in which all of the six
Appellate Court Judges in the Third District agree to employ Bonita
Welch, set her salary at a level consistent with the Court's
Administrative Rules and merely inquired as to the possibility of a
slightly higher amount.
Events surrounding the hiring of Judge Holdridge as Director of the
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts evoked considerable
discussion. Although the conduct is not evidence of a clear ethical
violation, nevertheless the handling of the matter is troubling.
Among other things, the Supreme Court is governed by the "rule of
four" (Tr. at 418) and Justice Heiple had the four votes.
Notwithstanding, "four votes are never enough in an administrative
matter when there are three people who feel strongly the other way or
two people or even one with a good reason it had never happened
before." (Tr. at 418-419) In addition, the Preamble to the Code of
Judicial conduct, cited above, states that:
"Intrinsic to all provisions of the code are precepts that
judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the
judicial office as a public trust" and that "The Judge is a highly
visible symbol of government."
Justice Heiple elected to ignore both Court tradition and the request
of three Justices to continue their dialogue on an important
constitutional question and rushed to hire an individual who, on the
surface, does not appear to have possessed credentials so impeccable
and necessary for the office as to exclude consideration of other
candidates. (Tr. at 420) The entry of his Order at the end of the day on
Friday, January 17, 1997 after being notified that a Justice wanted to
include a dissent showed a disregard for other Justices and is totally
unacceptable. As stated by Justice Miller: "Chief Justice Heiple's
actions of the last week suggest an attempt to stifle dissent and to
disenfranchise duly elected members of this court." (Ex. 11)
Accordingly, I believe Justice Heiple demonstrated extremely bad
judgment, at best, and thrust upon the Court unnecessary public
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scrutiny and controversy. That he has since seen the errors of his
ways does not undo the damage to the public trust.
The highest standard of conduct must be applied to a judge and his
actions must be measured against those high standards. A judge is
placed in a unique position in our society; his integrity and actions as a
public official must be above reproach. The Judicial Canons are the
standard to be used.
Quoting from Justice McMorrow's dissent in the appoint of judge
Holdridge as Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois
Courts, she stated: "I believe that judges must be held to the highest
possible standards of professional conduct. When we fail to meet
those standards we not only do ourselves a disservice, but more
importantly, we damage the honor of the courts we represent." (Ex.
11)
We must regain public trust in our judiciary; we must re-establish
the confidence of the citizens in the courts, and we must honor the
dignity and the integrity of the law and our Judges.
Justice Freeman, in writing to his colleagues urging dialogue states
(Ex. 22):
"In the words of the late Thurgood Marshall, I would
remind all of us that we must never forget that the only real
source of power that w as judges can tap is the respect of the
people."
The strength of our public institutions and the basis of our
democracy are through the people.
In examining the facts of this case, I believe that the cumulative
affect of Justice Heiple's action can lead to no other conclusion but his
conduct constitutes egregious violations of the Judicial Code of Ethics
and therefore articles of impeachment should proceed.
Carolyn H. Krause
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